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Let the soldier give way to the civilian.
(Cedant arma togae.)
Cicero: Orationes
Philippicae, c. 60 B.C.
In all cases the military should be under
strict subordination to and governed by
the civil power.
Virginia Declaration of
Rights June 12, 1776
Policy is the intelligent faculty, war
only the instrument, not the reverse. The
subordination of the military view to the
political is, therefore, the only thing
possible.
Clausewitzt On War, 1832
In its proper manifestation the jealousy
between civil and military spirits is a
healthy symptom,
Mahani Naval Administra-
tion and Warfare, 1903
I cannot too entirely repudiate any casual
word of mine, reflecting the tone which was
once so traditional in the Navy ,.. that
"political questions belong rather to the
statesman than to the military man." I
find these words in my old lectures, but
I very soon learned better,
Mahan: Naval Strategy,
1911
The Party commands the gun? the gun will
never command the Party,
Mao Tse-tung

There are some militarists who sayt HWe
are not interested in politics but only in
the profession of arms. 11 It is vital that
these simple-minded militarists be made to
realize the relationship that exists between
politics and military affairs. Military
action is a method used to attain a polit-
ical goal. While military affairs and polit-
ical affairs are not identical, it is impos-
sible to isolate one from the other.
Mao Tse-tungi On Guerrilla
Warfare, 1937
Both the Army and Navy are aware that they
are not the makers of policy but they have
a responsibility to define to the makers
of policy what they believe are the mili-
tary necessities of the United States....
The United States must have the means with
which to implement its responsibilities.,..





When I say that officers today must go far
beyond the official curriculum, I say it,
not because I do not believe in the tradi-
tional relationship between the civilian
and the military, but you must be more
than the servants of national policy. You
must be prepared to play a constructive
role in the development of national policy,
John F, Kennedy: To the
graduating class, U, S.




A historical case study of the development within the
American government of a policy decision concerning the dis-
position of the former Japanese mandated islands in the
Central Pacific after American forces had captured them
during World War II provides insights into many diverse
areas of interest. It traces the development of American
civil-military coordination during a period of rapid inno-
vation and change.
The problem of the disposition of the mandated islands
helped to develop an awareness of the need for coordination
between the State Department and the military. While current
civil-military relations are much more complex, formal, and
effective than during the Second World War, the basic ground-
work and principles were developed during the period this
problem was under active and controversial consideration.
For example, the first permanent inter- departmental machin-
ery (SWNCC) using an agenda and secretariat support was
created during this time frame. This was the direct ances-
tor of the National Security Council. Additionally, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff organization, for coordination within
the military system, was also created during this time.
The topic also illuminates the wartime methods of
making and carrying out of foreign policy decisions.
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President Franklin D. Roosevelt's personality looms large
throughout the issue. His personal style of leadership and
administration made possible the inter-agency debate and
maneuvering over the issue. His anti- imperialism helped
create the issue.
Because of the low state of social, economic, and polit-
ical development of the islanders, self-government or inde-
pendence was not a feasible solution at the end of the Second
World War, The feasible alternatives covered the spectrum
fromt (1) annexation, (2) a trusteeship granting a sole admin-
istrator exclusive military rights, C3) a trusteeship under
condominium administration, (4; the administration by an
agency of the universal /international organization or by a
regional council, and (5) direct administration by the uni-
versal international organization. Some decision had to be
reached j and the United States, as the conqueror of the
islands and as the primary power of the victorious partners,
had the responsibility to make it.
The issue was a clear case of conflicting concepts
about the correct way to achieve world peace and security.
The "one-worlders," whether it was President Roosevelt with
his internationally administered bases j or Cordell Hull,
Sumner Welles, and Harold Ickes with their rapid indepen-
dence for all dependent people under the aid of a powerful
world organization, felt the only way to achieve world peace
after the Second World War would be by great-power collab-
oration and the development of a strong international organi-
zation. They desired to set an example for the rest of the
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world by gaining no territorial advantage as a result of
the war and by submitting the former Japanese mandated
islands to the international organization as a trust
territory.
The military, on the other hand, had quite a different
concept of the means for achieving world peace With Ameri-
can national security involved, the military could not bring
themselves to rely on an untested international organization.
They had seen how Japan had fortified the Pacific Islands
contrary to the mandate agreement, they had seen the failure
of the League of Nations, and they could see the weakness
of relying completely on such a fragile thing as great-
power collaboration in the maintenance of international
peace and security. They would be willing to give an inter-
national organization a chance but not at the cost of any
impairment to American national security.
If the United States was to be expected to maintain
international peace and security in the Pacific Ocean area
after the war, the military believed it should have the
means with which to exercise its authority- -namely control
of the strategically located islands. If an effective inter-
national organization developed some day in the future | when
it had proved effective--then,some American security responsi-
bilities could be gradually shifted over to the shoulders of
the organization. Too many American men were being killed
capturing these islands while this inter-agency debate was
proceeding for the military to easily give up their convictions
on this particular issue. The military saw themselves as the
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pragmatists--the realists. To them, the "one worlders" were
the ideaiists--the dreamers,
»
On this issue, the military position was generally
supported by the Congress, American public opinion, and the
colonial powers, i.e., Britain, France, Australia, and The
Netherlands.
The clash of the two concepts occurred most clearly
over this issue, although it permeated other contemporaneous
issues. The final product of this conflict bore no resem-
blance to either side's original position. This is an un-
fortunate result for neither concept of the correct path to
world peace was followed. As a result of this issue, the
international organization was weakened in the field of
trusteeship. Distrust and suspicion developed. Other
nations and aspiring peoples saw the resultant strategic
concept for what it was--thinly disguised annexation; and
the trusteeship provisions of the United Nations Charter
were never used as an intermediate step toward independence
for emerging states. Other channels were utilized to gain
political aspirations, and independence" became the only
"respectful" solution. On the other side, the United States
did not annex the islands. If it had, the question of their
future political status would have been settled once and for
all? and, at least, American security interests in the area
would have been indefinitely guaranteed.
Research into this topic has produced insights into
areas of interest other than civil-military relations and
the formulation of American foreign policy during the Second

World War or various concepts of achieving world peace. From
a purely historical point of view, much has been learned about
the islands themselves, the evolution of American civil-
military relations since the Revolutionary War, and the develop-
ment of the United Nations Charter- -specifically its trustee-
ship provisions. This topic is also of interest and value
because of the individuals involved. The world situation in
which we now live was mainly determined during that period of
time and by those individuals. American leaders such as
Roosevelt, Truman, Hull, Stettinius, Byrnes, Forrestal, Stimson,
Leahy, King, Marshall, Welles, and Ickes were vitally involved
in this issue. "Working level" men such as Leo Pasvolsky,
Alger Hiss, James C. Dunn, Benjamin Gerig, John J. McCloy, .....
Abe Fortas, and Captain Robert L. Dennison were participants.
Other "actors" were Churchill, Eden, Macmillan, Stalin, Senator
Vandenberg, and Harold Stassen. Furthermore, the war-time con-
ferences of Cairo, Teheran, Moscow, Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta, San
Francisco, and Potsdam included discussions of this issue.
This issue includes questions of the proper role of the
military in a democracy on the formulation and determination
of foreign policy. The assumption is made that military
aspects and consequences of foreign policy options should be
considered along with the political, domestic, and other as-
pects in the formulation of any foreign policy. Foreign
policy and military policy should be coordinated in order to
effectively achieve national policy. The final decisions, of
course, rest with the duly elected and appointed civilian
officials? but the military's voice should, and must be,
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considered in the recommendatory stage if disaster is to
be avoided.
Because of the desire to restrict the length of this
paper to reasonable proportions, many significant aspects
and points of this topic had to be excluded. These will be
included as the paper is extended for the author's doctoral
dissertation.
Among the more important aspects excluded is the develop-
ment prior to 1940 of international concern and supervision
of dependent peoples. This is needed to place the issue in
context. Such a background will include such points as the
Nineteenth Century practices and conferences, the League of
Nations Mandate System, and the rapid rise of the doctrine of
self-determination.
Another aspect omitted is the post-war development of
the American civil-military coordination machinery and prac-
tice. This will trace the development from where this paper
concluded, to the present National Security Council system
and other current machinery for politico-military coordina-
tion. Presently, besides the President's own staff for
national security affairs, there is the large Joint Staff of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the National Security Council with
its staff j the Office of International Security Affairs under
an Assistant Secretary in the Department of Defense; the
Politico-Military Affairs staff under a Deputy Assistant
Secretary in the State Department; and a staff within each
military service to handle politico-military affairs. The
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Army has its International and Policy Planning Division, the
Navy has its Politico-Military Policy Division, and the Air
»
Force has its International Affairs Division. Additionally,
there are many permanent liaison committees and ad hoc work-
ing committees and task forces concerned with the coordination
of foreign policy with military policy.
Some points which require elaboration are the role of
Congress, various journalistic articles, the legal availability
of the islands as well as the actual possessor of their "sover-
eignty," and many smaller facts, incidents, and sidelights that
are needed to put flesh on the account.
Dr. Robert R. Robbins of Tufts University and the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy provided the suggestion for this
topic and has been of great assistance. Most of the original
research was done at the U. S. Naval Classified Archives Office,
Naval History Division, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. ; and
a special word of appreciation must be given to the unsung
staff of that office for their professional assistance.
Finally, it must be said that any views and opinions are
my own and can in no way be attributed to the United States
Government or to any of its agencies. Only material that has
been declassified has been utilized in order to avoid the neces-
sity of any official review of the research product. All mate-
rial of major importance on this topic, with the exception of
foreign government correspondence, has, in fact, been declassi-
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BACKGROUND OF THE ISLANDS
Covering an ocean area of three million square miles,
approximately the size and shape of the continental United
States, there are approximately 2,100 islands which are
presently administered by the United States under a United
Nations Strategic Trusteeship Agreement.
These islands form ninety- six islands units (single
islands, clusters, or atolls) of which only sixty-four are
regularly inhabited. They comprise three large groups j
the Marianas (less Guam) to the north, the Carolines to
1
the south, and the Marshalls to the east. The total land
area is only 687 square miles, about two-thirds the size
of Rhode Island.
The indigenous population is basically of Micronesian
stock, one of the three main cultural and racial divisions
of Pacific Oceania. However, there is "racial confusion"
2
in the Trust Territory. Variances in physical character-
istics, customs and languages abound. While collectively
called Micronesians, the peoples are locally called
Marshallese, Palauans, Trukese, Yapese, Chamorros and so
forth. Nine major languages and many variations of dialect
are spoken. The Spanish language changed basic Chamorro
1. See Appendix A for maps showing these islands in
relation to each other and to the Pacific basin.
2. Stephen H, Roberts, Population Problems of the Pacific
(London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd. , 1927), p. 15.

permanentlyi and there are German, Japanese and English
linguistic influences. Since the Second World War, English
has been the official language and the language of instruction.
The people of the Marianas, the Charaorros, resemble the
Filipinos and Asians, while the people of the Eastern Caro-
lines and Marshalls resemble, to some extent, the Polynesians.
The racial mixture is even more confused by Spanish, Filipino,
Malaysian, Formosan, German, Japanese and other bloods. Micro-
nesians t until perhaps quite recently, have never developed
an inter- island community but remained centered on their indi-
vidual island groups. Recently, there has been a degree of
"rural to urban" movement with resultant urban blight in
eome of the towns.
The Marianas are high volcanic islands, while the
Marshalls are all low coral islands or atolls. The Carolines
have many atolls and coral islands but, also, have the high
volcanic Island of Kusaie and four culturally distinct group-
ings of islands t Ponape, Truk, Yap and Palau. Only two
islands, Bebelthaup and Ponape, are larger than one-hundred
square miles. In November 1947, the peoples of the Carolines
numbered 33,148, the Marshallese 9,718 and the Charaarros (less
Guam) 5,431, for a total of only 48,297. Total population on
June 30, 1968, was 94,469.
Traditional native life was not the harmonious paradise
as often pictured. Rousseau's "natural manM did not exist
in the Pacific island communities. On the harsh side of
native life was the continuous uncertainty, fear and dread

with warfare the usual status. Cruel practices commonly
followed were massacres of women and children! widespread
cannibalism with great cannibal debauches after massacres,
a general disregard for human life with little or no care
for the sick, and social institutions of infante ide and
3
strangling of old people.
In 15Z2, Magellan discovered Guam, and the intrusion
of Europeans began. White explorers, traders, whalers and
ship-wrecked sailors had a shattering effect on the islanders'
social organization. Whiskey, firearms, whooping-cough, mumps,
measles, jaundice, miscegenation and forced labor were all
introduced to the islands. However, none of these undisci-
plined, itinerant whites had the disruptive effect of the
missionaries, for "there the strongest efforts were made to
transform native society by plan, not by inadvertance as in
the case of the commercial interlopers, and in the process
4
to assimilate it to the West."
<
The Spaniards concentrated on the Marianas during their
three-hundred year rule leaving the Caroline and Marshall
Islands virtually undisturbed. In the 1860's, the Germans
became interested in the copra potential of the Carolines
and Marshalls and proclaimed a protectorate over the Marshalls
in 1885, which created difficulties with Spain that were not
resolved until 1899. The Germans additionally raised their
3» Ibid.
. pp. 27-32.
4. C. Hartley Gratten, The Southwest Pacific To 1900:
A Modern History (Ann Arbor, Michigan i The University of
Michigan Press, 1963), p. 196.

flag on Yap in 1885; and the ensuing dispute over this issue
was settled by the Pope, as arbitrator, in favor of Spain.
»
By a treaty in 1899, the three island groups were ceded to
Germany for a payment of four-million dollars, with the
exception of Guam which had been ceded to the United States
a year earlier.
The Germans concentrated on producing copra in the
Marshalls and Carolines. In 1916, Japan obtained from the
Governments of Great Britain, France, and Italy a pledge
that at the peace conference those Governments would support
Japan's claim to the German islands north of the equator.
By the end of the war, Japan was in firm military possession
of the islands. The American Naval General Board, on Jan-
uary 24, 1918, recommended for strategic reasons that the
islands "be acquired by the United States; and this object
should be kept in view and prepared for by the Department of
State as a preliminary to future peace negotiations and settle-
5
ments." However, President Wilson, against any territorial
expansion for the United States, did not attempt to acquire
them. He did oppose Japan's demands for annexation and was
also against a Japanese mandate of the islands but felt he
could not prevent their being mandated. His main concern
5. U, S. , Naval Classified Archives Office, United
States Department of State, Background Information On The
Japanese Mandated Islands
. No. DA-1U7, November 18, 1946,
pp. 3-4, OP-35 files.

was to assure that Japan could not utilize them for naval
6
bases. The compromise was a Class "C" Mandate to Japan,
dated December 17, 1920, with a specific provision that "no
military or naval bases shall be established or fortifica-
7
tions erected in the territory. M The American Senate did
not ratify the Treaty of Versailles with the Mandate Charter.
It did, however, ratify a Japanese-American convention on
February 11, 1922, by which the United States gained cable
rights on Yap, which included verbatim the terms of the
8
League's Mandate Charter.
Japanese settlers were imported in great numbers, between
70,000 and 100,000. Sugar and fishing industries were deve-
loped in the Marianas with the copra industries, largely con-
fined to the Marshalls and Carolines, left in the hands of
the Micronesians. Railroads and roads were built, but educa-
tion and political development were neglected. The Japanese
policy was one of "exploitation, colonization, and militari-
9
zation."
6. Ibid. . p. 4 and R. H. Fifield "Disposal of the Caro-
lines, Marshalls and Marianas at the Paris Peace Conference,"
American Historical Review . Vol. 51, No. 3 (April 1946), pp.
472-478 and George H. Blakeslee "Japan's Mandated Islands,"
U. S. Department of State Bulletin . Vol. 11, No. 286 (Decem-
ber 17, 1944), pp. 764-768.
7. Mandate Charter, Article 4, Signed at Geneva on
December 17, 1920.
8. United States Treaties and Other International Acts
Series, No. 664.
9. Cdr. Daniel J. Morgiewicz, USN, "Micronesia Especial
Trust," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings . Vol. 94, No. 10
COctober, 1968), p. 7~5.
m
In 1932, rumors circulated that Japan was fortifying
some of the islands, especially Truk. Japan denied the
reports, although Japanese naval and nationalist leaders
had frequently stated in speeches and in newspaper and maga-
zine articles that they wanted the islands mainly for their
10
possible value in a war against the United States. On
March 27, 1935, Japan withdrew from the League but continued
to submit annual reports to Geneva on her mandate. Japan's
right to continue to operate as the mandatory power was never
officially questioned by the League; and Mr. Hirota, the Japa-
nese Foreign Minister, stated in the Diet on February 22, 1934,
that while Japan's status as a mandatory was not affected by
her withdrawal from the League, "The Japanese Government, how-
ever, have never entertained the view that these islands are
11
Japanese territory." Following Japan's withdrawal from the
League, the military policies of Japan began to dominate the
administration of the islands. In 1938, Japan ceased to
collaborate with the League and filed its last report in
late 1939 which failed to contain the usual paragraph stating
that no fortifications or bases had been constructed. Foreign
ships were not permitted to visit Micronesia after 1937; and
after 1939, no natives were allowed to go from the Marshalls
to Kusaie, where the only American residents were located. .
10, Blakeslee, "Japan's Mandated Islands," U. S. Depart-
ment of State Bulletin . Vol. 11, No, 286 (December 17, 1944),
p. 766 and United States Department of State, Background Infor-
mation On The Japanese Mandated I slands,, p. 4.
11. Blakeslee, "Japan's Mandated Islands," U. S. Depart-
ment of State Bulletin
.




Compared with an appropriation of $185,000 for harbor works
and aircraft facilities in 1936, the 1940-41 appropriation
»
was $367,000 for harbor works and $850,000 for air routes
12
and aircraft facilities.
World War II brought fighting and devastation to many
of the islands such as Tinian, Saipan, Kwajalein and Truk,
The effect on the peoples of the Marianas was tremendous;
but, except for the main bases, the Carolines and Marshall
groups were hardly touched by direct combat.
12. Huntington Gilchrist, "Japanese Islands* Annexation
or Trusteeship," Foreign Affairs. Vol. 22, No. 4 (July, 1944),
p. 640. Fortification was also prohibited by the Five-Power
Naval Treaty of 1922, Japanese fortification of any of these
islands prior to Pearl Harbor has recently been denied by a
former Japanese military officer. He also points out that
the prosecution at the Allied Military Tribunal, Tokyo, 1946-
1948, could not substantiate the charges of pre-war fortifica-
tion. Seei Lt. Gen. Mastake Okumiya, JASDF (Ret.), "For Sugar
Boats or Submarines," U. S. Naval Institute Proceed ings , Vol,





Much has been written about the "military mind" and
the concept of "civilian control" over the military. Because
of the desire to limit the scope of this particular paper,
a comprehensive historical review of these two aspects of
civil-military relations has not been included. These
aspects, with a more detailed review of the development of
the instrumentalities of civil-military coordination, will
be amply covered in this author's dissertation. The bibli-
ography to this paper indicates the sources utilized thus
far in research on these areas
,
The question of the proper relationship of military
power to civil authority is "one of the most ancient and
difficult problems of political society ... it is a major
problem in statecraft, upon the successful solution of
which will depend the welfare of the people and the sur-
1
vival of the state." When the military side of the rela-
tionship has been emphasized, the government has been called
"militaristic;" and when the civil side is dominant, it has
2
been called "weak," Quincy Wright also wrote that a balance
1. Louis Smith, American Democracy and Military Power
t
A Study of Civil Control of the Military Power in the United
States (Chicago* University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 1,
2. Quincy Smith, "The Military and Foreign Policy," in
Jerome Gregory Kerwin, ed., Civil Mili tary Relationships in









The military may be thought of as an
instrument of government or an influence
on government. It consists, on the one
hand, of an organization of men, mate-
rials, and ideas ready to enforce the law
or policy established by the government
and, on the other hand, of the complex
of attitudes and opinions of the members
of that organization ready to influence
the government's decisions on law or
policy. Either the military machine or
the military mind may be exaggerated and
also either of them may be depreciated,
3
Since colonial times, the character of civil-military
relations in the United States has been dominated by the
"civilian control" concept. Standing armies were despised,
distrusted, and feared by the Founding Fathers of the Republic,
This was part of England's legacy to America, The Declaration
of Independence accused George III of tyrannous acts in that
Mhe has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies
without the consent of our legislature,.,. He has affected
to render the Military independent of and superior to the
4
Civil Power." General Washington, as early as 1777, indi-
cated he was acutely aware of colonial distrust of the mili-
5
tary and patterned his actions accordingly.
3. Ibid.
4. Henry Steele Commanger, ed,, Documents of American
History (4th ed,, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1%5)
,
p. 101.
5. William R. Tans ill, The Concept of Civil Supremacy
Over the Mi l itary in the United States; Its History and Prac-
tice (Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service,
Public Affairs Bulletin No, 94, Washington, 1951), p. 3,

10
Many provisions of the Constitution were designed to
render the military subordinate to the civil authorities.
The debates over the adoption of the Constitution afford
vivid insights into the deep distrust and fear of any
federal military establishment.
The Constitutional provisions placed four principle
checks against a standing army ever becoming an instrument
of oppression. These were: (l) the policy of keeping mili-
tary forces at a minimum, (2) reliance upon the militia
primarily; the standing army was to be called upon only
when it was deemed necessary, (3) keeping the States* militia
independent and, thus, available to counteract any possible
uprising on the part of the standing army, and (4) insurance
that the professional forces remained under the control of
6
politically responsible persons, i.e., the Congress,
Presidents Jefferson and Jackson believed a standing
army was incompatible with the principles of democracy. In
fact, only after 1812 was there a regularly organized stand
-
7
ing army as the terra is understood today. This feeling con-
tinued to exist throughout the nineteenth century. The
"liberal ethic 1' , as described by Professor Huntington, was
dominant in American life and hostile to a "conservative
6, Elias Huzar, The Purse and the Sword: Control of
the Army by Congress Through Military Appropriations. 1933-
1950 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1950),
pp. 7-8,
7, Tans ill, The Concept of Civil Supremacy Over the




ethic" required to develop a professional officer corps.
Military officers were "political" in that they developed
friends within the Congress in their efforts to earn pro-
motion and to gain appropriations! but this "political"
activity did not involve the formulation of foreign policy
or participation in partisan political activity.
Naval officers sometimes participated in the making of
foreign policy because of the great distances and communi-
cation time- lags involved. Conspicuous examples are the
American relations with the Barbary Pirates and in early
relations with the Far East.
Overall, however, the American military did not parti-
cipate in either the formulation or the carrying out of
foreign policies during the nineteenth century. The rela-
tive peace and security for the United States from any
serious threat of aggression during that century permitted
this total lack of coordination. National attention was
focused on domestic matters, the "guilded age" of expansion
turned attention inward. The problem of civil-military
relations was simplified by "a policy of military weakness
9
and of calculated dispersion."
President Lincoln, by use of the Constitutional "Com-
mander-in-Chief" provision and the duty to "take care that
8. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and The Statet
The Theory and Politics of Civil -Military Relation s ( Cam
-
bridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959),
Chapter Six, pp. 143-162.
9, Louis Smith, American Democracy and Military
Power , p. 150.
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the laws be faithfully executed," permanently changed the
basic pattern of civil control of the military. By acting
»
"without Congress, against Congress, and in addition to
Congress" he suddenly exalted the office of " Commander- in-
10
Chief." This permanently reduced the "control-over-the-
military" role of the Congress relative to the President.
President Lincoln's bypassing of the service secretaries on
many occasions also derogated that aspect of civil control.
The various bureaus of the services developed into
tight little oligarchies of active duty officers competing
for the meager congressional appropriations. Congressional
interest was in terms of patronage and "pork-barrel" work
projects for constituents. As a result, little interest
was paid to the small (25,000 after the Civil War) army.
The Army was, in fact, supplied with arms from the state
arsenal at Springfield. The Corps of Engineers, however,
was utilized to build pet projects and was eventually
taken over by Congressional, rather than Executive, control.
The Navy was of some interest to the coastal states for
the shipyard activity involved. In fact, ships kept in
perpetual repair in the yards "provided an elastic demand
for politically docile labour. A ship at sea was a ship
lost from this point of view and one result was that, in
danger of war with Chile in 1881, the United States was
10. D. W. Brogan, "The United States i Civilian and
Military Power," in Michael Howard, ed,, Soldiers and
Governments t Nine Stud ies in Civil-Military Relations
—
^




also in danger of defeat."
During the nineteenth century, civilian control did not
come from any positive, dynamic type of civilian leadership
in the office of service secretary. These political appoint-
ments were not praised since they had little patronage com-
pared to other cabinet posts. Only two Secretaries of War
[John C. Calhoun, from 1817-1825, and Ewin M, Stanton, during
the Civil War] and only two Secretaries of the Navy [Gideon
Welles, during the Civil War and W. H. Hunt, during the
modernization of the Navy in the 1880' s] provided dynamic
12
leadership during the century.
Because of the civilian attitudes and the dispersal to
isolated posts and bases, the military tended to be insulated
from the mainstream of American life.
This was bound to have some impact
on their view of the world and, more par-
ticularly, on their ability to consider
nonmilitary factors in their planning,
training, and operations. Naturally there
was a tendency for the military to recipro-
cate civilian dislike, to resent poor pay,
poor treatment, and the meager resources
put at their disposal. This was compounded
by a certain contempt for a civilian society
oriented to material comfort and success to
the exclusion of concern for the nation's*
security. It is not surprising that this
attitude should have led many officers to
see themselves as the main guardians of the
nation and to distrust civilian abilities
^3
and views with respect to national defense.
H« Ibid.
. p. 176. See also» Huntington, The Soldier
and the State , pp. 226-230.
12, Louis Smith, American Democracy and Military Power.
p. 139.
13. Burton M, Sapin and Richard C. Snyder, The Role of the
Military in American Foreign Policy (Garden City, New York»
Doubleday, 1954;, p. 3,
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Morris Janowitz feels this social isolation may be
frequently overdrawn in that there were some ceremonial
and social contacts with the civilians, especially in the
south and west; but he agrees there were no real political
.14
or professional contacts. The officer corps, even with
the resentment toward the civilians, never questioned the
concept of civilian supremacy. This was because of the
military's dispersal, small numbers, and the constant indoc-
trination of the civilian supremacy concept. Professor
Janowitz describes the "mechanical" indoctrination achieved
at the military academies:
It is striking that the most power-
ful consequence of academy military edu-
cation in the past has been the inculcation
of a mechanical acceptance of civilian
supremacy. If the cadets themselves were
not taught to think about the political
dimensions of warfare, this was thought to
be appropriate for a society in which the
military was a profession under democrati-
cally elected civilian leaders. The con-
cept of submission to civilian authorities
centered about the understanding that poli-
tical authorities decided who was the enemy,
when war was to start, and the terms of
peace. But, until 19J9, the selection
system, the narrow emphasis on military
history, and the social isolation of the
academies produced a breed of political
conservatism or political indifference
among cadets. Those officers who developed
broader interests were influenced by higher
military education or by their own incli-
nations.
The academies have never concerned
themselves with the broader task of
14, Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier* A
Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press
of Glencoe, 1960), pp. 175-177.
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inculcating a belief in the importance
of accepting on-going civilian adminis-
trative supervision of the military
establishment. They have never sought
to establish principles for limiting the
political activities of the military pro-
fession as a pressure group on its own
behalf for more appropriations. Cadets
and midshipmen are implicitly taught not
to have open party preferences. But,
more explicitly, they have been taught
that Congress traditionally starved the
military establishment, and that, there-
fore, it Was the duty of the profession
to press continually for maximum alloca- 15
tions in the name of military preparedness.
Professionalism of the officer corps slowly grew during
this long period of isolation. General William T. Sherman,
Commanding General from 1869 until 1883, sparked the reform
movement within the Army. He was the father of the infantry
and cavalry school at Fort Leavenworth. He refused to enter
politics as Grant had, believing that a professional soldier
should have nothing to do with politics. Prior to Sherman,
three of the six Commanding Generals had become presidential
candidates. After his tenure, his concept of political
neutrality continued among the Commanding Generals and Chiefs
of Staff, with the exception of Leonard Wood, until after the
Second World War. Sherman also stressed the concept of civil-
ian supremacy and the total divorce of the military from
16
politics.
Within the Navy, professionalism was initiated by
15. Ibid. , pp. 138-139.




Admiral Stephen B. Luce who crusaded against politics and
"technicism" within the Navy. His influence had a lasting
«
effect throughout the naval officer corps. His efforts
eventually led to the establishment of the Naval War
College in 1884. Luce and Sherman were followed by many
other crusaders for professionalism, of which, Admirals
A. T. Mahan and William S. Sims as well as General Emory
Upton are the better known.
This rise of professionalism was a corollary to the
isolation of the military and the development of the mili-
tary institutions such as schools of higher education, pro-
fessional journals, and professional associations. The
"military mind" (with its "non-political" aspect) permeated
17
the bulk of the officer corps. Young reformers in the
Navy led by Henry C. Taylor, William S. Sims, and Bradley A.
Fiske advocated a General Staff for the Navy with authority
centralized in a single professional naval officer. This
was opposed by the entrenched bureaus. In 1900, a General
Board was created; but its functions i^ere not administrative
or executive. Instead, its functions were merely planning
and advisory. The Secretaries of the Navy from 1885 until
1912 supported this effort for more effective central adminis
tration but no effective reorganization was accomplished.
Meanwhile, in the Army the reformers were not as
17. Ibid. , p. 254.
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enthusiastic for centralized authority as those in the Navy.
However, Secretary of War Elihu Root, who initiated the Army
War College in 1901, felt the need for centralization after
the Spanish-American War had shown the disasterous results
of the entrenched bureau system. Secretary Root had more
effect in achieving a reorganization than did the Secretaries
of the Navy. The General Staff act of 1903 abolished the
separate office of Commanding General and initiated the
office of Chief of Staff. This office had supervision not
only of all troops but also of all the special staff and
supply departments which had previously reported directly
to the Secretary of War. Secretary Root believed this would
maintain civilian control over the various, previously serai-
autonomous, bureaus while increasing efficiency. As he
stated:
It will be perceived that we are here
providing for civilian control over the
military arm, but for civilian control to
be exercised through a single military
expert of high rank, who is provided with
an adequate corps of professional assis-
tants to aid him in the performance of his
duties, and who is bound to use all his
professional skill and knowledge in giving
effect to the purposes and general direc-
tions of his civilian superior, or make
way for ano crier expert who will do so.
In this way it is hoped that the prob-
lem of reconciling civilian control with
military efficiency with which we have been 18
struggling for so many years will be solved....
18. Walter Millis, ed
.
, American Military Thought
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), Extract from the Report
of the Secretary of War for 1903, pp. 259-260.
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The General Staff Act of 1903 set the basic tone for
the Department of the Array until after World War II. It
fostered an identity of interest between the Secretary of
War and the Chief of Staff. Professor Huntington evaluated
the effect as:
The old alignment of the Secretary
and the bureau chiefs versus the. Command-
ing General was replaced by a new align-
ment of the Secretary and Chief of Staff
versus the bureaus. While some Secre-
taries at times tried to take a few steps
toward a balanced system, their efforts
ran counter to the spirit of the existing
organization and came to naught. It was
easier to rely on the Chief of Staff as
the secretarial instrument. Harmony and
mutual confidence replaced nineteenth-
century acrimony between the military and
political leaders of the Department! Chiefs
of Staff lavishly praised their Secretaries;
the Secretaries were equally generous in
their response. 19
Secretary Josephus Daniels, who served throughout the
20
Wilson administration, opposed serious reorganization efforts.
He believed that civilian, i.e. Secretarial, control would be
lost if direct access of the bureau chiefs to the Secretary
was eliminated. This position had far reaching effects for
the Navy and contributed to Secretary Forrestal's position on
unification during and immediately after the Second World War.
Admiral Fiske went behind Daniels 1 back to sympathizers in
Congress and managed to have the office of Chief of Naval
19. Huntington, The Soldier and the State , p. 298.
20. Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing For Defense t The American
Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century (Princeton,




Operations created in 1915. The original bill called
for centralized control, but Daniels managed to have it
changed so that the Chief of Naval Operations* authority
was not extended to the civil activities of the bureaus.
Thus, the views of the Navy and Army about the proper
method of maintaining civilian control diverged after 1912,
Secretary Root also initiated the Joint Board, the first
permanent coordination machinery between the Army and the
Navy. By approval of the President, the Secretaries of
the Navy and V7ar agreed on July 17, 1903, to the formation
of the Joint Board, composed of four officers from each
service for the purpose of H conferring upon, discussing,
and reaching common conclusions regarding all matters
22
calling for the cooperation of the two services ."
Of interest, is the Navy's proposal for a Council of
National Defense. Admiral Mahan's doctrines were concerned
with comprehensive and long-range naval policies. An aspect
of these doctrines was the relationship of foreign to naval
policy. An interest developed within the Navy for some
means of emphasizing the relationship and encouraging the
civilian officials to actively assert their authority, if
only to get them to lay down the guidelines by which naval
23
strategy could be determined. By 1903, the General Board
21. Huntington, The Soldier and the State , p. 250.
22. Millis, ed., American Military Thought , Extract from
Army General Orders No. 107 quoted in the Report of the Secre-
tary of War for 1903, p. 261.




had recommended a long-range naval construction policy with
the goal of a fleet "equal or superior to that of any probable
24
enemy. " President Theodore Roosevelt also thought in these
terms; and in spite of a reluctant Congress and public, the
United States fleet was the second greatest naval power in
the world when he left office in 1909.
To stimulate interest in* (1) building a large fleet,
(2) the fleets' strategic and global uses, (3) the relation-
ship between the fleet and foreign policy, and (4) obtaining
national policy guidelines, the General Board endorsed a
25
proposal in 1911 for a Council of National Defense.
The Council of National Defense was to consist of the
Secretaries of State (as Chairman), War, and Navy; the chair-
men of the Senate and House Military and Naval Affairs Com-
mittees j the Chief of Staff; the Presidents of the Army and
Naval War Colleges; and the Aide for Operations. "Its func-
tion would be to coordinate military and naval policy and estab-
26
lish clear national policy for both." The Army supported the
plan, not for any doctrinal ideas, as did the Navy, but as a
way to gain a more sympathetic ear from the Administration
and Congress, especially in its fight to reorganize the Army
from frontier posts into divisions, and to protect it against
27
the inconstancy and parochialism of politics.
24, Millis, ed., American Military Thought , p. xxxiv.
25, Hammond, Organizing For Defense , p. 66,




The Navy needed policy guidance for long-term naval policy
and, therefore, desired that the civil authorities establish
long-term strategic national policies. The Navy believed
it had a role to play in diplomacy and any discussions of
national policy would encourage support for the naval
28
program. Both the Army and the Navy saw the Council as
a source of effective civilian political leadership.
There was much discussion about this proposal prior
to the First World War, and it was established in 1916,
29
It, however, proved to be a "moribund" organization. The
basic idea was advanced again by the Navy in 1919, but first
President Wilson's civil-military relations during the World
War should be examined.
President Wilson was unlike Lincoln in that he made
little use of the functions of the Commander-in-Chief; how-
ever, various congressional acts were passed granting him
additional authority in the administration of the war acti-
vities and while many of these were appealed after the war,
30
many remained.
In his relations with the military, President Wilson
28. This conviction of the Navy is evidenced by the
multitude of articles that appeared in the U. S. Naval Insti-
tute Proceedings between 1910 and 1940 on the relationship and
role of the Navy in diplomacy and national policy. See listing
of articles ini Hammond, Organizing For Defense, p. 69-70.
29. Walter Millis, Harvey C. Mansfield, and Harold Stein,
Arms and the State i Civil and Military Elements in National
Policy (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), p. 19.




"ratified the selection of General Pershing as the Command-
ing General of the American Expeditionary Forces, he insisted
American troops fight as organized units in Europe, he took
an active part in wartime diplomacy, and he resisted Congres-
sional efforts to reduce his authority in the administration
of the government's war activities. But he gave Pershing a
virtual carte blanche in his field command and left Baker
[Secretary of War] largely to his own devices in running the
31
War Department in Washington." President Wilson's manage-
ment by delegation was because, in large part, the grand
strategy of the war had long been fixed and American troops
were only fighting on one front. The War Department took
care of the procurement of supplies, the recruitment and
training of men, and the coordination between the activities
of the War Department and the other government agencies,
particularly the War Industries Board. Except for a few
general guidelines in negotiating with the Allies, the War




As soon as the war was over, the wartime forces were
demobilized. Public attitudes in the United States about
the use of force and the role of the military in government
underwent a regressive phase that was not to start the long,
31, Hammond, Organizing For Defense , pp. 38-39,




laborious road back until after 1933. The public, since
1915, had gone through Wilson's "neutrality without favor-
itism through preparedness" to all-out war but now seemed
to think that force had proved to be a failure and America
should refuse to be drawn into quarrels.
The public attitude toward the military during the
inter-war period underlies the report of the Dwight W.
Morrow board in 1925. This board was appointed by President
Coolidge as a result of General William Mitchell's court
martial to report on "the best means of developing and apply-
ing aircraft in national defense." The board recommended
keeping military and civil air services separate for the
following reasons:
The historic tradition of the United
States is to maintain military forces only
for defense and to keep those forces sub-
ordinate to the civilian government. This
policy has been amply justified by our
experience. It has been proposed that we
should establish a Department of Aeronautics,
which should control all or a portion of our
military air power'as well as our civilian
air activities. Such a departure would be
quite contrary to the principles under which
this country has attained its present moral
and material power. If the civilian air
development should have anything like the
wide ramifications that are predicted for
it, such a new policy might have profound
effect upon the historic attitude of our
Nation toward military and civilian activi-
ties. The peace-time activities of the
33. Harold Stein, ed., American Civil-Military Deci-
sions: A Book of Case Studies" (University, Alabama : Un iver
-
sity of Alabama Press, 1963), p. 5,
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United States have never been governed
by military considerations. To organize
its peace-time activities, or what it is
thought may ultimately be one large
branch of them, under military control
or on a military basis would be to make
the same mistake which, properly or im-
properly, the world believes Prussia to
have made in the last generation. The
union of civil and military air activi-
ties would breed distrust in every region
to which our commercial aviation sought
extension. 34
In 1919, the Navy again made a bid for the establish-
ment of a coordinating national policy body. Assistant Secre-
tary Franklin D. Roosevelt is attributed with this new pro-
35
posal. It was for a joint Army-Navy-State Department
General Staff. This staff would provide the Navy and the
Joint Board with policy guidance that was needed for plan-
ning national strategy. Captain Harry Yarnell, on the exist-
ing Army-Navy Joint Board, supported Roosevelt on this idea
as well as proposing that the Under Secretary of State sit
on the Joint Board, Two years later, the Joint Board pro-
posed a similar plan that would have given the State Depart-
ment a more prominent position in military planning than had
36
any of the earlier proposals. Unfortunately, these pro-
posals were not adopted.
34. Millis, ed., American Military Thought , p. 378.
35. Hammond, Organizing For Defense , p. 105.
36. E. R. May, "The Development of Political-Military
Consultation in the United States," Political Science
Quarterly . LXX (June, 1955), pp. 167-168.
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In Washington, there was a long tra-
dition of aloofness on the part of the
Department of State toward the service
departments. Its attitude often indicated
that it felt it enjoyed a special rela-
tionship with the White House and a pri-
macy among executive departments. State
showed no enthusiasm for the efforts of
the Navy Department over the years to
bring about closer relations, in the hope
of having a voice in policies while they
were still in the formative stage. Navy's
advances were regularly rebuffed; State
was prone to operate in a carefully culti-
vated atmosphere of splendid isolation. 37
From Wilson to Hoover, strategic planning was left
entirely to the military. The various color war plans were
prepared, revised, and filed. None of the Presidents during
this period took an interest in them. Even President Hoover,
watching the Japanese aggression, took no interest. He was
only concerned with the possible financial consequences for
38
the United States from the turmoil in Europe. For example,
when Secretary of State Stimson announced the policy of non-
recognition, Admiral Pratt, the Chief of Naval Operations,
was not consulted until afterward about any possible naval
implications of that policy. The policy of isolation followed
between 1931 and 1937 restricted Secretaries of State Stimson
and Hull to the means of moral exhortation and diplomacy.
"The diplomatic notes and official speeches took moral posi-
tions with no evident military implications. The reciprocal
37. Robert Greenhalgh Albion and Robert Howe Connery,
Forrestal and the Navy (New Yorki Columbia University Press,
1962), pp. 160-161.




trade agreements legislation was no concern of the military.
The long debates over the neutrality acts had indirect mili-
tary significance} but the military departments had, and
39
apparently sought, no formal voice in them".
This state of affairs continued through Roosevelt's
first term; although he took an interest in the Navy and in
the utilization of military officers for civilian tasks.
Most of the New Deal supporters of the President were anti-
militarists and only reluctantly supported his plans for the
40
Navy* The Army was kept in a starved and neglected condition.
The military were mainly concerned with professional and
technical matters during the inter-war period; but many officers,
such as Dwight D, Eisenhower, did come into contact with
politico-military affairs. Additionally, the Reserve Officers
Training Corps system was established which drew many officers
into contact with the academic world. The conservative poli-
tical views of the military elites during the inter-war period
41
were that of the "right wing" of the Republican party. Pro-
fessor Janowitz ably describes the political thinking of the
military elites during the first half of the twentieth century
their
and/attitudes toward the civilian authorities
i
Extremist political sentiment among
the military has not been extensive.
Throughout the turbulent response to the
depression, only an occasional profes-
sional officer joined the native "lunatic**
right,,,. Converts to the left were in
39, Millis, Mansfield, and Stein, Arms and the State, p. 28,
40, Brogan, "The United States i Civilian and Military
Power", p. 179,
41, Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 250,
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effect non-esistent. • .
.
From the point of view of democratic
requirements , the important issue is not
the extent of extremist thought, but
rather the lack of understanding and re-
spect for the creative role of the prac-
tical politician. A few conspicuous civil-
ian leaders are seen as heroes, but the
military shares the civilian image that
politicians are an unworthy lot. There
is, moreover, little sympathy for the
particular qualities required to produce
political compromise. There is little
appreciation of the fact that a political
democracy requires competing pressures.
The endless struggles over the military
budget only serve to re-inforce the con-
ception that party politics and pressure
group activities are nefarious. Military
conservatism tends to overlook the advan-
tages and safeguards of consensus arrived
at by debating conflicting interests and
pressures. In a mixture of realism and
naivete, the military is disposed to de-
emphasize "politics" in national security
matters. • •
.
Professional officers have always
resented the intervention of politicians
in military administration. But the
quality of civilian direction cannot be
judged by the opinions of professional
officers alone. Civilian supremacy has
operated effectively because political
leaders select for high military assign-
ments "unconventional" officers who are 42
the least hostile to civilian intervention,
General George C. Marshall, appointed Chief of Staff
on September 1, 1939, was such an "unconventional" military
officer, Marshall and President Roosevelt differed com-
pletely in administrative style. The General was reserved,
made careful judgments, and had a passion for clearly defined
43
channels of authority enclosed in a tidy organization.
42. Ibid. , pp. 250-251.
43. Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and




However, the two men learned to work together in full confi-
dence because of Marshall's attitude on civil-military
affairs. His biographer writes
t
•I never haggled with the Presi-
dent,* Marshall said later. 'I swal-
lowed the little things so that I could
go to bat on the big ones. I never
handled a matter apologetically and I was
never contentious. It took me a long
time to get to him. When he thought I
was not going for publicity and doing
things for publication --he liked it.'
Strongly committed to the princi-
ple of civilian leadership in the making
of national policy, Marshall determined,
if at all possible, to follow the Presi-
dent's lead in military matters. Despite
his discomfiture at the administration's
cautious policy on Army appropriations
[prior to the war], Marshall supported
it in public while vigorously arguing
his service's needs at White House con-
ferences. Only in those cases where the
President faced trouble in getting the
funds for which he had already asked did
the Chief of Staff feel justified in
approaching congressional leaders or
appealing to the public for support.
The General said in later years j 'While
it would be difficult at times and
[there] would be strong pressures for
me to speak to the public, I thought
that tt was far more important in the
long run that I be well established as
a member of a team and try to do my con-
vincing within that team than to take
action publicly contrary to the desires




The other high wartime military leaders in Washington
operated on similar principles. Possible exceptions to
following them might be found in the unification issue and
44. IbicU, pp. 23-24.
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the question of the disposition of the former Japanese man-
dated islands,
, After President Roosevelt's "Quarantine" speech on
October 12, 1937, the President began to take an interest
in the various strategic plans. At Christmas time, Captain
Royal E. Ingersoll, Head of the Navy War Plans Division, was
quietly sent to London with the President's approval to confer
with the British. This was the first step toward Anglo-
American strategic planning. As a result of the Ingersoll
mission, War Plan Orange (for a possible war with Japan) was
modified to take account of a potential Anglo-American alli-
ance. In both of these developments, "Roosevelt was involved,
overtly or covertly. The State Department stayed clear, even
45
though it had set the stage for Ingersoll' s trip ..."
Secretary Hull came under fire from some isolationists
in Congress when news of Ingersoll 's mission was leaked.
This encounter with Congress, on the heals of the defeat of
the Ludlow resolution, had a lasting effect on Secretary Hull.
"He stood them off j but the experience of hostile criticism
in Congress, connected to the suspicion of military commit-
ments abroad, reinforced his personal distastes. From that
time on he made it a working rule to avoid participation in,
and hence first-hand knowledge of — and hence influence on --
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The State Department, however, was interested in the
signs of Nazi and Fascist infiltration into Latin American
countries. Early in 1938, a series of meetings with the War
and Navy Departments were arranged on an informal basis. In
April, 1938, Secretary of State Hull recommended the estab-
lishment of a Standing Liaison Committee to be composed of
the second -ranking officers of State, War and Navy, to meet
regularly to work out coordinated policies and coordinate
47
activities abroad. President Roosevelt approved the idea
but modified it by substituting the Chief of Staff and the
Chief of Naval Operations for the civilian Assistant Secre-
taries of War and Navy, whose other duties had more to do
with domestic affairs than with foreign policy. The Com-
mittee was the first formal mechanism since the "moribund"
Council of National Defense to provide for high-level coordi-
nation on national policy. It was composed of Under Secre-
tary of State Sumner Welles as Chairman; the Army Chief of
Staff (General Marshall after 1939) j and the Chief of Naval
Operations (Admiral Harold R. Stark after 1939). The Com-
mittee gave most of its attention to Latin American affairs.
An evaluation of its significance is:
Although its specific recommenda-
tions of action were of minor conse-
quence, its deliberations, especially
after Marshall and Stark became its mili-
tary members in 1939, encouraged a major
47. Ibid. , p. 19.
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shift In military thinking, away from
the purely passive posture of repelling
an invader at our coast lines to the more
active anticipatory policy of securing
* bases and taking other measures in co-
operation with friendly Latin American
nations to deny to the Axis powers foot-
holds in the Western Hemisphere from
which they might further their ambitions.
So the notion of hemisphere defense was
born. ... It proved to be a temporary and
limited arrangement, but responded to a
real need and pointed ahead to broader,
ft
and more elaborate institutions later. °
In 1940, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy started
holding weekly meetings, but they were unofficial and had "no
connection with Mr, Roosevelt's final determination of
49
policy." A War Council composed of the three secretaries
as well as the Army Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval
Operations was also formed. This Council met at frequent
intervals in the White House j but "when President Roosevelt
learned to like the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 1942, he allowed
50
himself to dispense with any general meetings on war policy."
The War Council, like the Cabinet, had no staff, agenda,
or procedure. The old Council of National Defense only existed
on the statute books. President Roosevelt drew closer to his
military advisers with his Military Order in 1940 that trans-
ferred the Joint Army-Navy Board to direct Presidential control.
This was the fore-runner of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and an
48. Ibid. , pp. 19-20.
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Navy Knox.
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note to Japan on November 26, 1941. It was sent without
prior consultation with the Army or the Navy who wished to
stall for time until their Pacific preparations were more
complete. The next day Secretary Hull made his famous state-
ment to Stimsoni "I have washed my hands of it and it is now
54
in the hands of you and Knox--the Army and the Navy."
After Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt relied almost
exclusively on his close advisersi Byrnes, Rosenman, Hopkins,
and the military leaders, for war-time political and military
decisions. The Standing Liaison Committee, the Secretaries'
55
meetings, and the War Council "withered on. the vine." The
three Secretaries were excluded from matters of grand strat-
eSy °y President Roosevelt and did not even, with a few excep-
tions, attend the wartime allied conferences. The State
Department
played a minor role in the direction of the
war for political, personal, and organiza-
tional reasons. Ideologically, the State
Department was peculiarly ill-equipped to
deal with the problems of either the war
or the immediate postwar periods.... During
the war, the State Department continued to
believe that its function was diplomacy and
that diplomacy was distinct from force. As
a result, it devoted itself to relations
with neutrals and minor allies and to the
development of plans for the United Nations
organization. The bitter antagonism be-
tween Secretary Hull and Under Secretary
Welles also weakened the Department . 56
54. Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War ,
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American politico-military coordination was so confused
and, indeed, non-existant during the early months after Pearl
Harbor that Sir John Dill reported to General Sir Alan Brooke
in late December, 1941, and early January, 1942, that "this
country fthe United States} is the most highly organized for
peace you can imagine.... Never have I seen a country so
57
utterly unprepared for war and so soft." Sir John Dill
reported that the President had no secretariat and no regular
private secretary. His impression was that American inter-
agency administration was "completely unorganized," He con-
tinued his criticism on January 3, 1942, by reporting:
There are no regular meetings of their
Chiefs of Staff and if they do meet there
is no secretariat to record their proceed-
ings. They have no joint planners and ex-
exutive planning staff.... Then there is
the great difficulty of getting the stuff
over to the President. He just sees the
Chiefs of Staff at odd times, and again no
record. There is no such thing as a Cabi-
net meeting, and yet the Secretaries for
War, Navy, etc., are supposed to function.
At present this country has not- -repeat-not
--the slightest conception of what the war
means, and their armed forces are more un-
ready for war than it is possible to imagine
, ... The whole organization belongs to the
days of George Washington who was made
Commander-in-Chief of all the Forces and
just did it. To-day the President is
Commander-in-Chief of all the Forces, but
it is not so easy to just do it. 58
57. Arthur Bryant, The Turn of the Tide. 1939-1943:
A Study Based on the Diaries and Autobiographical Notes of
Field Marshall the Viscount Alanbrooke (London? Collins,
1957), p. 292.
58 • Ibid., pp. 292-293. See alsoi Pogue, George C.
Marshall, Ordeal and Hope , p. 262.
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At the Arcadia conference at Washington, December 22,
1941-January 14, 1942, General Marshall suddenly proposed
the establishment of a unified command for the Pacific.
Admiral King was for it, while Admiral Stark was uncommital.
Marshall, assisted by Eisenhower, got the approval of Secre-
tary Stimson and Assistant Secretary McCloy and then obtained
the President's approval. This plan was accepted. Then the
military representatives, under Marshall's leadership, estab-
lished a committee called the Combined Chiefs of Staff to
direct Anglo-American strategy. In international conferences,
the British Chiefs of Staff would act for themselves; other-
wise, they would make their wishes known through the Joint
Staff Mission in Washington headed by Field Marshall Sir John
59
Dill.
To provide an American side to the Combined Chiefs of
Staff, the old Joint Army-Navy Board was replaced by a new
organization, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The main difference
between the two was the "closed staff" system under the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, had
the services of its own staff. Some of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff subordinate committees will be explained below. Another
difference was the full representation of the Army Air Corps.
General Arnold had been just recently added to the Joint
Board and had been taken to the Argent ia conference in August,
1941. Additionally, he had been invited by General Marshall
to be present at the Arcadia conference as a full-fledged
59. Pogue, Georp.e C. Marshall. Ordeal and Hope , p. 262.
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member. The inclusion of General Arnold in the Joint Chiefs
of Staff finalized this trend. The manner in which General
Marshall achieved this inclusion is of interest
i
Thoroughly aware of the dangers of try-
ing to put through a basic change in organi-
zation, he [Marshall] resorted to a pleasant
subterfuge. Knowing that the President was
about to issue a statement about his military
advisers, he arranged with Marvin Mclntyre,
the President's secretary, to include the
name of General Arnold among the Chiefs of
Staff. Thereafter, without special legisla-
tion, "IIapM Arnold sat with Marshall and
King as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Technically the first meeting of this body
took place on February 9, 1942. No formal
document was ever issued establishing such
a group. In actuality it was born at the
Arcadia meeting."^
General Marshall had another reform in mind. In Febru-
ary, 1942, when he saw that Admiral Stark would be leaving
in early March and replaced as Chief of Naval Operations by
Admiral Ernest King, he recommended to the President the
appointment of a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He
knew that Admiral King would be concerned over the Army's
having two votes to the Navy's one. The General later told
his biographer i M I therefore thought it would be wise if we
had a chairman and one from the Navy, if one could be found




61. Ibid. , p. 298.
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The General nominated Admiral William D, Leahy, former
Chief of Naval Operations and the current Ambassador to the
French government at Vichy. President Roosevelt did not quite
agree with General Marshall on the concept of a Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Marshall expanded on his
motives for making the proposal and the President's modifica-
tion of the original concept in an interview with his biographer*
I thought that it was very important that
we, in effect have a neutral agency because
we would have had trouble with the Naval Air
and the Army Air and the Naval-Army disagree-
ments through the years -- which were exag-
gerated [at first] ... by the fact that the
Navy had a fleet; the Army had no army....
Therefore, I thought it was particularly
important to have Leahy in the chair..,.
I continued to press for Leahy being
returned and made chairman of the Chiefs of
Staff. The President always answered my
proposals regarding Admiral Leahy by saying,
•But you are Chief of Staff. 1 But I said,
•Mr. President, I am only Chief of Staff of
the Army and, in a sense, of the Army Air,
There is no Chief of Staff of the military
services.' •Well,' he said, 'I am the Chief
of Staff. I'm the Commander-in-Chief.' And
I explained to him in great frankness that
it was impossible to conceive on one man
with all of his duties as President being,
also, in effect, the Chief of Staff of all
the military services. That it was a super-
man job and I didn't think that even the
exaggeration of the powers of Superman
would quite go far enough; for this. And
I know he was not very well pleased with my
statement.
But the trouble was he didn't quite
understand what the role of the Chief of
Staff would be. |_The President appointed
Leahy on July 20, 1942, as 'Chief of Staff
to the Commander in Chief of the United
States Army and Navy'] ,.. But the President
said he was going to be his 'leg man. '62
62. Ibid. , p. 299.
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When Admiral Leahy arrived in Washington, he did not
have a clear conception of his duties. He saw Marshall, and
the General recommended he calmly attend the next meeting of
the Combined Chiefs of Staff and sit in the senior seat on
the American side. This Admiral Leahy did and functioned
63
as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from that meeting.
However, as time went on, Admiral Leahy became more of a Chief
of Staff of the President than a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
General Marshall was not happy about this trend; especially
as Admiral Leahy did not always keep the Chiefs of Staff
informed of the political happenings. The Yalta agreements
were one example cited by General Marshall, as well as the
fact that Admiral Leahy was "almost exclusively engaged in
64
attending the political meetings'* at Potsdam.
However, General Marshall felt that the overall situa-
tion was a positive step in the right direction. He gave
the following as his evaluation!
Even though Leahy's time was more
completely given to attending the President
in his political meetings, nevertheless it
was quite essential to have the arrangement
as it was, because it would never have done
to have tried to have gone right straight
through the struggle with Admiral King in
a secondary position and me as the senior
where I was also the senior of the Air.
It was quite essential that we have a neu-
tral agency, and Leahy, in effect, was that
so far as the Army and Navy requirements
and positions were concerned, 65





The wartime influence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff can
hardly be exaggerated. Professor Huntington states that,
next to the President, the Joint Chiefs were the "single
most important force in the overall conduct of the war, the
level and the scope of their activities far transcending
66
those of a purely professional body." As stated above,
these high military leaders were the "unconventional" type
of officer. Indeed, they had been chosen, in part, because
they possessed the "sense of statesmanship that enabled them
to consider the political as well as purely military aspects
67
of the global situation."
The Joint Chiefs of Staff quickly gained the President's
confidence and*
extended their activities and interests
far beyond the normal military confines
and into the areas of diplomacy, politics,
and economics. From the initial great
decision to defeat Germany first to the
last complex series of decisions on the
end of the war with Japan, the major
strategic and policy issues of the war
were resolved by the President, the Chiefs,
and Harry Hopkins . The absence of a formal
charter for the JCS facilitated the expan-
sion of its functions since it was impossi-
ble for any rival agency to argue that it
was exceeding its authority. Tied in close
to the President, the interests and power
of the Chiefs tended to expand and become
coextensive with his. 68
66. Huntington, The Soldier and The State , p. 318.
67. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An
Intimate History (New York: Harper, 1948,), p. 169.
68. Huntington, The Soldier and The State , p. 323. The
JCS did not have any charter or other formal definition of
functions until the National Security Act of 1947. See also:
RADM Julius Augustus Furer, USN (Ret.), Administration of the
Navy Department in World War II (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1959), pp. 663-664.
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Professor Huntington strongly criticizes the "politicali-
zation" of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Their concentration on
political objectives led them to forsake their primary role
as military advisers to the government. Thus, an effective
civil-military relationship broke down. Specifically, the
Joint Chiefs shifted from a pre-war position of recommending
the attainment of a balance of power system to the concept
of the solidarity of the three great powers. They also favored
deferring consideration of the postwar settlement until after
the end of hostilities. However, according to Professor
Huntington, they did not completely abandon the military view-
point in their thinking. He gives the examples of their pessi-
mism as to the time and effort that would be required to con-
quer Japan and their desire to 'acquire full ownership of the
Japanese mandated islands was a typically military approach
which brought them into sharp conflict with civilian agencies
of the government. In general, however, on the major issues
of policy, the views of the Joint Chiefs were those of the
69
civilian statesmen and of the American public."
The American military, in Professor Huntington's analysis,
did not "reach out after power- -Marshall was no Ludendorff.
Instead, power was unavoidably thrust upon them. They were
given no choice but to accept it, and, with it, the implicit
70
conditions upon which it was granted."
Professor Huntington's conclusion is thati
69. Huntington, The Soldier" and The State , p. 334.
70. Ibid. , p. 316.
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The prime deficiency in the conduct
of World War II was, therefore, the insuffi-
cient representation of the military view-
, point in the formulation of national strategy.
This key interest, which should have played
a major role, was downgraded and neglected..,.
Less harmony would have produced better policy.
If, instead of moving into the seats of power
and embracing civilian goals, the Joint Chiefs
had preserved their military roles and warned
the political leaders that no war is the last
war and that the problem of military security
would still be with us after V-day, the United
States would have come out of the war in a
far better strategic position than it did.
The derangement of American civil-military
relations was simply the institutional re-
flection of a deeper malady: the ignorance
and naive hopes which led the American people
to trade military security for victory. 71
On the lower levels of the military, the traditional mili-
tary viewpoints remained. Lower-ranking officers, both with-
in the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization and without, urged
the "desirability of formulating postwar goals before the
conflict ended, maintaining strong forces after victory, and
directing policy toward the achievement of a world-wide balance
72
of power,"
A committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Stra-
tegic Survey Committee (JSSC) , was established in November 1942
to advise the Joint Chiefs on matters relating to military and
strategic policy, postwar military policy, Array and Navy co-
ordination problems, and liaison with the State Department.
The members of this committee were delegates to the Dumbarton
Oaks Conference and served as advisors to the American dele-
gation at the San Francisco Conference for the drafting of the
United Nations Charter. The members throughout the war werei
71. Ibid. . p. 344,
72. Ibid. . p. 335,
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Lieut. General S. D. Embick, USA (Ret.), Vice Admiral Russell
Willson, USN (Ret.), and Major General M. S. Fairchild, USAAC.
* As the war progressed, the lower-ranking military staffs
also became involved in political matters. For the Army, the
Operations Division of the General Staff (OPD) became "enmeshed"
73
in matters other than military operations out of necessity.
This Division (OPD) was General Marshall's "Command Post"
throughout the war. It contained no less than four Rhodes
Scholars, It provided the Army's contact with the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the Combined Civil Affairs Committee. The Array
also had to deal with military government of occupied areas.
The Navy Department's Occupied Areas Section (OP-50E)
became the Military Government Section of the Central Divi-
sion (OP-13-2) under Captain Sabin on August 1, 1944, and in
October 1945 this was replaced by the Office of Island Govern-
ments (OP-22) still under Captain Sabin. Another organ of
the Navy Department was the Politico-Military Affairs Division
(OP-35) organized in early 1946 under Captain Robert L, Dennison.
These naval offices reported to the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions via Vice Admiral Russell Willson (who was also on the
JSSC) in his capacity as Vice Chief of Naval Operations or
via Rear Admiral R. S. Edwards, originally Chief of Staff to
Admiral King and, after October 1, 1944, Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations. Admiral Edwards' responsibilities after October 1,
1944, in Admiral King's words, were "to attend to matters of





the Navy Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State
Department or the several war boards, including postwar matters,
74
demobilization, organization, etc,"
With the occupation of North Africa, a need for civil
government arose; and a Combined Civil Affairs Committee under
the Combined Chiefs of Staff was created for handling related
political problems. This committee included James C. Dunn of
State, John T. McCloy of War, and Artemus L. Gates for Navy,
Other inter-departmental liaison machinery on the working
levels, such as the Working Security Committee (to formulate
instructions to Ambassador Winant on the European Advisory
Council), gradually evolved to provide collaboration on post-
75
war problems.
Yet, no high-level effective coordinating body existed.
The State Department soon fell into the habit of by-passing
the service Secretaries to deal directly with the Joint
Chiefs of Staff at the working level because of this lack of
high-level coordinating machinery. Additionally, the service
Secretaries were not on the routine distribution list for JCS
papers and had been essentially limited by the President to
administrative functions.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff answered only to the President.
In the War Department, General Marshall did keep Secretary
74. Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, USN and Walter M.
Whitehall, Fleet Adm iral King;, A Naval Record (New York:
Norton, 1952), pp. 573-574.
75, Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparat ion, pp. 99,
220-225, 349-350, T68~, Military officers were also often
consulted by the various State Department committees and sub-
committees on an ad hoc basis.
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Stimson informed, but "the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a cor-
porate body moved outside the orbit of the War Department.
And the Combined Civil Affairs Committee proved to be a
largely ineffective device for McCloy' s use, because as a
mere subcommittee it could work only when its parent committee,
Combined Chiefs of Staff, and that committee's highly indepen-
dent member groups, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the British
76
Chiefs of Staff Committee, concurred."
The Working Security Committee was not satisfactory as
an inter-departmental liaison device since it had no high rank
in the hierarchy. The members were ill informed on what had
been agreed to on higher levels. Obstacles were placed before
77
it by other agencies of similar rank.
Secretary Stimson wrote Cordell Hull a complaint letter
on the lack of inter-departmental liaison in November 1944,
and McCloy and Forrestal saw Under-Secretary of State Stettinius
about the situation. From this, developed the idea of reviving
the Secretaries* meetings and to provide a working level com-
mittee for continuous staff work. When Stettinius succeeded
Hull (officially on December 20, 1944), the State-War-Navy
Secretaries' Committee was revived, holding its first meet-
ing on December 19, 1944. It now had better organization
with an agenda and with Assistant Secretary McCloy appointed
recorder. The Three Secretaries' Committee met once a week
76. Stein, ed., American Civil-Military Decisions.
p. 462. Editor comment on article! Paul Y. Hammond, •'Direc-
tives For the Occupation of Germany, The Washington Contro-




at the State Department. The meetings were informal. Often,
decisions were not passed on throughout the three departments.
Eventually, assistants were included in the meetings who got
78
together afterwards to decide "who said what."
In November 1944, the 'Working level committee" was formed,
called the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC, or
SWINC as it was dubbed), which had a full-time secretariat
and smaller "working groups" of permanent and ad hoc subcom-
mittees. SWNCC provided for the first time effective and
competent coordination of the three departments in the politi-
79
cal-military field.
The initial members of the committee were James C. Dunn
(State), then Director of the Office of European Affairs;
Assistant Secretary John J. McCloy (Army); and Assistant Secre-
tary Artemus L. Gates (Navy), all of whom had worked together
on the Combined Civil Affairs Committee and its American inter-
departmental counterpart. Soon, the Working Security Com-
mittee and the American Civil Affairs Committee were absorbed
into the SWNCC system. SWNCC was authorized to make positive
commitments for the three departments; and its main purpose
was to* "reconcile and coordinate the action to be taken by
the State, War, and Navy Departments on matters of common
interest and, under the guidance of the Secretaries of State,
78, Admiral Robert L. Dennison, USN (Ret.), Interview,
September 4, 1969.
79. Huntington, The Soldier and The State, p. 320 and
Notter, Postwar Foreign Pol icy Preparation, pp. 347-348. The
committee continued until June 30, 1949, under the name of the
State,-Army, Navy, Air Force Coordinating Committee. It was the
direct ancestor of the National Security Council. See Harry S.
Trurnan, Memoirs (2 Vols., Garden City, New Yorkt Doubleday, 1955),
Vol. 2, p. 58.
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War, and Navy, establish policies on politico-military ques-
80
tions referred to it. H There was effective and direct liai-
son between SWNCC and the JCS with some military personnel
holding positions in both systems and many SWNCC papers going
81
formally to the JCS for comment and/or concurrence.
Area subcommittees were established within SWNCC for
Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and the Far East,
SWNCC was a vast improvement over the pre-war Standing Liaison
Committee, Its main drawback was that it was formed so late
in the war that H the practical shape of its subject matter
was largely determined by the military commanders in the
82
field, Eisenhower in Europe and MacArthur in the Far East,"
Throughout this account of American civil-military rela-
tions during the Second World War, the Congress has not been
mentioned. This is because Congress played a minor role in
wartime diplomacy and strategy. No opposition to President
Roosevelt developed within Congress to compare with the Com-
mittee on the Conduct of the War that confronted President
Wilson, There was a large measure of public debate over the
Vichy policy and the acceptance of Darlan in North Africa, but
Congress played "no significant part in this prolonged and
83
quite public debate." The Truman Committee was the only
80, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 13 (November 11,
1945), pp. 746-747.
81, The files of SWNCC papers at the U. S. Naval Classi-
fied Archives Office show an extremely close liaison and co-
ordination between the JCS and SWNCC,
82, Millis, Mansfield, and Stein, Arms and the State , p. 97.
83, Stein, ed., American Civil-Military Decisions , p. 16.
See also: Huntington, The Soldier and the State , pp. 324-235.
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real effort of Congress to "oversee" the war. Even there,
the Committee accepted the huge funding of the secret "Man-
hattan" project without knowing its purpose.
In summary, civil-military relations during the Second
World War saw vast institutional improvements. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff i the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee,
as well as the institutionalization of the Bureau of the
Budget, advanced the mechanics of inter-departmental coordina-
tion. However, the main emphasis was a highly personal one,
Sherwood's and Stimson's accounts, as well as all others, show
how high-level coordination was really only achieved at the
Presidential level. President Roosevelt was the only one who
could resolve questions when any component of the coordination
process insisted upon its position rather than compromise.
Even within the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "any officer, in a
minority of one, could employ a rigorous insistence on una-
84
niraity as a means of defending the interests of his own service,"
Effective coordination on the difficult issues was not guar-
anteed. In cases of disagreement, resort had to be made to
the President for a definite and final decision. This state
of affairs was in keeping with his style of administration,
but the burden placed upon the system was almost unbearable.
The burden placed upon the President took his life,





Having outlined the background of the islands and of
civil-military relations, it is now possible to describe
the decision-making process that led to the offering of the
Japanese mandated islands to the United Nations as a stra-
tegic trusteeship. The years, 1942-1944, can be described
as a period of departmental juggling for position on the
issue. The various positions were developed and put forward
,
factional lines were tentatively formed on the issue, poten-
tial allies were sought, and the opposing positions were
attacked
o
President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull
were in agreement on two areas concerning dependent areas
.
First, they were determined that the United States would seek
no territorial advantage or aggrandizement from the war be-
cause, in part, of their desire to set an example for the
1
rest of the world, particularly the Soviet Union. Second,
they believed that after the war, nationalism and anti-
colonialism would be major forces and that all dependent
peoples who were ready for the responsibility of independence
and who wanted it should be aided in achieving their aim.
In this regard, they felt that the old mandate system was
unsatisfactory for developing the people since "the nation
1. Cordell Hull, The Memo irs of Corde ll Hull (2 vols.,




which is given the mandate soon comes to believe that it
2
carries sovereignty with it."
Even before the United States entered the war, the
principle of non- aggrandizement was proclaimed. President
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill issued, in
August 1941, the Atlantic Charter which began, "first,
their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or
3
other." On January 1 and 2, 1942, the United Nations Dec-
laration, which subscribed to the principles of the Atlantic
Charter, was signed by representatives of twenty-six nations,
including the United States.
The British were rushed into both of these declarations
without sufficient time to study them. The President pre-
sented Prime Minister Churchill with the requests without
prior, lower- level, consultations; and the declarations were
4
marked by "haste and informality." In fact, there is no
signed copy of the Atlantic Charter in the British Archives,
and Roosevelt told Churchill at Yalta that the Prime Minister 1 s
5
signature on Roosevelt's copy was in Roosevelt's handwriting.
2. Elliott Roosevelt, ed. , F. D, R. His Personal Letters
1928-1945 (2 vols., New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950),
Vol. 2, pp. 1371-1372, letter to Jan Christiaan Smuts, Vic-
toria, South Africa, dated November 24, 1942, See also: Hull,
Memoirs
. Vol. 2, pp. 1478, 1484 and 1496.
3. Ruhl J. Bartlett, ed., The Record of American Diplomacy:
Documents and Readings in the History of American Foreign Rela-
tions (4th ed., New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), p. 624.
4. Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the
Second V/orld War (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office,
1962"), p. 430.
5. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War. Vol. 6:




As for the United Nations Declaration, the War Cabinet cabled
Churchill on December 31, 1941, asking Mwhy the urgency was
•so great as to oblige us to accept a declaration with these
6
defects.*" Mr. Churchill's reply, that the President desired
immediate approval and that the Russian Ambassador couldn't
agree to any changes without receiving new instructions from
Moscow [he evidently had had more warning than Churchill],
did not reach London until January 2, 1942, the day of the
7
signing. It soon became evident that a sharp difference of
interpretation existed between Churchill and Roosevelt over
the principles enunciated in the declarations. Roosevelt con-
sidered the principles to have universal application, while
Churchill told Parliament that the Atlantic Charter in no way
8
affected British policy in India and Burma. In fact, the
proddings of Roosevelt over India during Churchill's visit to
Washington after Pearl Harbor raised Churchill's anger so much
that he "reacted so strongly and at such length that he [Roose-
9
velt] never raised it again verbally." The question of India,
and colonialism in general, was to continue j however, as a
sore point in official discussions between the British and the
Americans.
6. Woodward | British Foreign Policy , p. 432,
7. Ibid. , p. 433.
8. Foster Rhea Dulles and Gerald E. Ridinger, "The
Anti-Colonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt," Political
Science Quarterly. LXX (March, 1955), p. 6,
9. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. 4t The Hin,f>e
of Fate , p. 209.
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Harold Macmillan, Under-Secretary of the British Colonial
Office from February to December, 1942, remarked later:
To Roosevelt, Britain owes much.
Churchill, from the beginning of the War,
set himself out to win the President's con-
fidence.... Nevertheless, President Roose-
velt's response was by no means as warm or
as open as Churchill believed. Certainly
there were prejudices deep in the Presi-
dent's soul which made him suspicious of
British policy. With all his apparent sin-
cerity and charm, there lay behind the out-
ward show of friendship a feeling of hos-
tility - perhaps even of jealousy - of the
great Imperial story of the Old Country.
The British Empire was a bugbear to him.
Without any precise knowledge, he would lay
down the law about Indian and Colonial affairs;
and the liquidation of the British Empire was,
whether consciously or unconsciously, one of
his aims.... I have frequently observed that
this inherited antipathy to 'colonialism' is
most marked among the oldest families in the
United States, especially in New England.
To affect suspicion of Britain is perhaps a
kind of unconscious, almost nostalgic, tri-
bute to history. Some of my Boston friends,
for instance, never seem to be able to for-
get that unlucky business about the chests
of tea. However this may be, the President
was no friend of the British Empire. Nor
did he understand the clearly defined and
steadily pursued procedures by which we had
long planned to bestow, by gradual means,
first political education and then political
independence upon those races for whom we
held responsibility. In almost every joint
declaration of policy, the Cabinet had to
watch, and if possible eliminate, some dan-
gerous phrases. 10
Soon after Pearl Harbor, the State Department established
an Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy under Secre-
tary Hull as chairman and Sumner Welles as vice-chairman.
10. Harold Macmillan, The Blast of War. 1939-194 5 (Londoni
Macmillan, 1967;, pp. 158-159.
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This committee included many "outsiders" such as Norman H.
Davis, president of the Council of Foreign Relations;
Hamilton Fish Armstrong, editor of Foreign Affairs ; Isaiah
Bowman, president of Johns Hopkins University; Benjamin V.
Cohen, general counsel, National Power Policy Committee; and
Anne O'Hara McCormick, editorial staff of The New York Times .
This committee worked out the framework for studies of
the various postwar problems by July 1942 and, thereafter,
ceased to work as a whole. Its Subcommittee on Political
Problems under Sumner Welles appointed in June 1942 its own
Special Subcommittee on International Organization, which was
also headed by Welles, to work in conjunction with the State
Department's Division of Special Research under Leo Pasvolsky,
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for International
Organization and Security Affairs, in developing plans for
international trusteeship for dependent areas and for a general
international organization.
Dr. Pasvolsky was Chief of the "Research Staff," the
officer personnel of the Division of Special Research and its
succeeding (after January 1943) Divisions of Political Studies
and Economic Studies. Harley A. Notter headed the Division of
Political Studies and, under him, Durward V. Sandifer and
Benjamin Gerig worked on planning for an international organi-
zation. In January 1944, the Division of Political Studies was
replaced by the Office of Special Political Affairs, and the
Division of Economic Studies was abolished. James C. Dunn
headed the Office of Special Political Affairs; and Dr. Pasvolsky,
still in overall charge, became Executive Director of a new
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Committee on Post-War Programs.
By November 1942, a radical plan had been formulated
within the State Department to Include all dependent terri-
tories under a powerful International Trusteeship Agency




This proposal reflected Sumner Welles* own ideas. It
also reflected the ideas of Professor Arthur N. Holcombe, Chair-
13
man of the Government Department at Harvard University. Secre-
tary Hull restricted the concept to only those dependent terri-
tories taken from the Axis and the mandates of the League of
14
Nations because of "obvious reasons of political feasibility."
The President approved the tentative plans as modified by Hull.
Although believing in the political development of dependent
peoples, President Roosevelt saw the trusteeship concept itself
more in terms of providing for international peace and security
15
than in terms of promoting self-government or independence.
Internationally administered "trusteeships" would avoid the
11. Harley A. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation.
1939-1945
. pp. 109-110 and George Thullen, Problems of the
Trusteeship System * A Study of Political Behavior in the United
Nations (Genevei Droz, 1964), p. 23.
12. Sumner Welles, The T ime for Decision (New Yorkt
Harper and Brothers, 1944), pp. 383-384.
13. Arthur N, Holcombe, Dependent Areas in the Post-War
World (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1941), pp. 97-94.
14. Hull, Memoirs . Vol. 2, p. 1638.
15. Thullen, Problems of the Trusteeship System , pp. 25-
26 and Hull, Memoirs , Vol. 2, pp. 1304-1305, 1996.
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necessity for annexation of any strategic points, deny these
points to potential aggressors, avoid rival territorial claims,
16
and enable the international organization to police the world.
President Roosevelt had proposed to the Soviet Foreign
Minister Molotov in June, 1942, a form of trusteeship for the
island holdings and other colonial possessions of the "weak
17
nations." In this, he specifically referred to Indo-China,
Siam, the Malay States and the Dutch East Indies.
The first recorded mention of the post-war disposition of
the Pacific Island Mandate is a letter from the Joint Chiefs of
Staff dated September 15, 1942, and signed by Admiral William D.
Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President and head of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs had written the letter to
Norman H. Davis, Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Security
Problems of the State Department Advisory Committee on Postwar
Foreign Policy. In it, they stressed the necessity of depriv-
18
ing Japan of the Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana Islands.
President Roosevelt referred to international trusteeship
and, in particular, the Pacific islands during his March, 1943,
conference with British Foreign Secretary Eden. He went beyond
the State Department's trusteeship plan by suggesting that Indo-
16. Hull, Memoirs . Vol. 2, pp. 1595-1600} also, John C.
Campbell and others, The United States in World Affairs 1945-
194/ (New York* Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 42.
17. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins » An Inti-
mate History, p. 572.
18. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States t Diplomatic Papers 1944~T7 vols., Washington: U. S
Government Printing Office, 1965J, Vol. 5, p. 1201 footnote.
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China and Korea be placed under trusteeship. He then indi-
cated that the Japanese mandated islands should be inter-
19
nationalized. Hull writes that Eden "indicated he was
20
favorably impressed with this proposal." However, Harry
Hopkins, who was present at the meeting, wrote that in keep-
ing with British dislike for internationalization of colonial
areas, Eden said it would be better to turn the islands over
21
to the United States, "preferably in outright ownership."
Eden cabled home his notes on his most formal conference
with the President which was held on March 27, 1943, He reported t
in the Far East the policy is to be 'Japan
for the Japanese.* Manchuria and Formosa
would be returned to China and southern
Sakhalin to Russia. The Japanese mandated
islands in the Pacific would pass under the
trusteeship of the United Nations.... The
French Marquesas and Tuamotu Islands would
pass to the United Nations, for use respec-
tively as stages on the northern and south-
ern air routes across the Pacific from
Caribbean area to Australia and New Zealand.
Korea and French Indo-China would pass under
international trusteeship; for the former
the trustees might be the United States, the
Soviet Union, and China,.,. [The President]
suggested in passing that places like Dakar
and Bizerta were of the greatest importance
for the defense respectively of the United
States and Mediterranean. His idea was that
the United States should act as policeman
for the United Nations at Dakar and Great
Britain at Bizerta.
I remarked that the President was being
very hard on the French, from whom the
strongest opposition was to be expected. He
admitted this, but said that France would no
19. Hull, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 1596 and Sherwood, Roose-
velt and Hopkins i An intimate History , pp. 715-716.
20. Hull, Memoirs . Vol. 2, p. 1596.




doubt require assistance for which consider-
ation might be the placing of certain parts
of her territory at the disposal of the United
Nations. Welles reminded the President that
• the United States Government had gone on the
record for the restoration of French posses-
sions. The President said he thought that
this referred only to North Africa but Welles
observed there was no such modification.
The President said that he thought in the
ironing out of things after the war this
kind of position could be rectified, 22
President Roosevelt gave his approval a few weeks after
Eden's visit to a draft proposal for a policy statement on
dependent peoples which was to be presented for discussion
at the Quebec Conference with the British in August. One
of the major points of the draft was that peoples liberated
from Japanese rule and unprepared for autonomy should be
placed under some form of international trusteeship repre-
23
senting the United Nations. This draft proposal, which
included the goal of independent national status for all
colonies, was ill received by the British. Foreign Secre-
24
tary Eden took special exception to the word " independence. M
25
Churchill "made no comment on it," a rare occurrence for him.
The President instructed Hull to bring the proposal up
22. Anthony Eden, The Reckoning (Bostoni Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1965), p. 438.
23. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation , pp. 471-
472 and Hull, Memoirs, Vol. 2, pp. 1234-1235.
24. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 254
and Hull, Memoirs . Vol. 2, p. 1238.
25. Woodward, Brit ish Foreign Policy, p. 440.
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at the Foreign Minister's conference at Moscow in October.
At a briefing on October 5, 1943, the President once again
set forth his position, emphasizing the idea of an interna-
tional trusteeship system for non- self-governing peoples
such as Indo-China and Korea as well as for certain other
places in order to provide the United Nations as interna-
tionalized string of bases encircling the globe. In this
latter category, he mentioned the Pacific mandated islands,
Hong Kong, the Bonin Islands, the Kuriles, Ascension Island,
26
Dakar, and a point in Liberia. Secretary Hull even had
to admit that Roosevelt wanted to apply the trusteeship idea
27
"widely to all sorts of situations."
Military opposition to Roosevelt's ideas on trusteeship
quickly arose. Admiral Leahy, who was probably closer to
Roosevelt than anyone else except Harry Hopkins, firmly dis-
agreed with the President on this issue. In his memoirs he
states:
One of Roosevelt's pet ideas, which
he had discussed with me on many occasions,
was a plan for a series of strategic bases
all over the world to be controlled by the
United Nations. I could never agree with
him on this proposal and always felt that
any bases considered essential for the
security of our own country should be under
the sovereignty of the United States.
His argument, particularly in regard
to strategic areas in the Japanese mandated
groups which we had captured at a high cost
in American lives, was that the United States
did not wish to acquire any territorial gains
26. Hull, Memoirs . Vol. 2, pp. 1305 and 1596.
27. Ibid., p. 1305.
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as a result of the war. That was a fixed
principle with him. Roosevelt believed
that we would get the same protection if
,
the mandated territory was under the
United Nations. I thought he was wrong
then, and have not changed my mind as
these notes are being compiled. 28
The Navy Department had also been thinking of the post-
war status of these islands; and on March 27, 1943, the high-
level General Board headed by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, who
later became a Senator and carried his conclusions to the
Senate, reported to the Secretary of the Navy;
It Is scarcely conceivable that the
terms imposed upon Japan as a result of the
present war will permit her to remain estab-
lished in any capacity in the Pacific islands
mandated to her after the last war. Her fla-
grant and deliberate violations of the pro-
visions of Article 4 of the mandate [no forti-
fications^] would seem definitely to require
that an administration other than Japanese be
established. For reasons of our own security,
and because we are likely to be committed to
the protection of the Philippines after they
have become independent, the United States is
vitally interested in the form which a re-
adjustment in control of these islands may
take..,. Guam belongs to us and again will be
administered by us when it has been wrested
from enemy hands. The island is one of the
Marianas and, as has been demonstrated in the
past, is potentially menaced by the other
islands of that group unless the same power
controls them all. It follows naturally that
the United States should control the entire
Marianas group.... Because of their geograph-
ical position with relation to the Marianas,
the Philippines and Hawaii, the same military
principle applies in the case of all the is-
lands mandated to Japan; the control of the
whole properly belongs to the United States
. ... None of the islands in question possesses
28. Fleet Admiral William Leahy, USN, I Was There i The
Personal Story of the Chi ef of Staff to Presidents Roo sevelt
and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time
(New Yorki McGraw-Hill, 1950), p. 314.'
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natural features of value from other than
the military standpoint. Both from the eco-
nomic and the political standpoints they are
a liability to the nation charged with their
control and administration. The transfer to
the United States of any or all of those is-
lands with all that is implied therein can-
not constitute territorial aggrandizement.
Japan has frankly referred to them as "un-
sinkable aircraft carriers" and their sever-
ance from her control will be part of her
disarmament.... In connection with future
sovereignty over the Japanese islands dis-
cussed above, the General Board recommends
that planning for postwar conditions provide
for the United States possesion of » (a) All
of the former German islands mandated to
Japan by the League of Nations, i.e. the
Marshalls, Carolines and Marianas (except
Guam) . 29
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Navy Department strongly
felt that permanent and exclusive control over the islands by
the United States was a military necessity for national secur-
ity and international peace in the postwar world. The proposed
international organization was untested with no guarantee
that it would be able to maintain international peace and
security; whereas, traditional sovereignty would be clearcut,
with rights and duties universally accepted. Since the is-
lands would not be an economic asset, there could be no ques-
tion of "territorial aggrandizement" i and the welfare of the
natives, few in number, would be adequately guaranteed by
American sovereignty. Furthermore, if the islands were to
become a trust territory run by the international organization,
who would "watch the watchers?" Quis custodlet ipsos custodes ?
29, U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, General
Board, Post-war sovereignty over certain Islands in the North
Pacific . Report No. 450, Serial No. 240, March 27, 1943,
Declassified June 22, 1969, General Board files.
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If the organization were to later break down, the status of
the islands would be in doubt producing an unstable situation.
,
These islands were intended by the President and the
State Department to be included in the trusteeship system;
and, therefore, for that reason alone , the military began
demanding changes in the trusteeship plan itself while still
fighting for annexation of the islands.
An example of the military's concern is the "Central
Pacific Islands" incident. In January 1944, Admiral Nimitz
in Honolulu referred in a civil-government directive to "the
British Resident Commissioners of Central Pacific Islands to
be occupied," meaning the Gilberts and other Central Pacific
Islands that Britain owned prior to the war. Admiral King
sent a quick message with a follow-up letter telling Nimitz
that the wording could be construed to include the Japanese
mandated islands; and that, therefore, the directive should
be changed to avoid the possibility of giving any nation,
other than the United States, any basis for obtaining sover-
30
eignty or other territorial rights in the mandated islands.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, also, recommended to the Secretary
of State at the same time that "no action should be taken
which directly or indirectly would prejudice the ultimate
31
disposition of these islands," Some writers have mentioned
that this letter to the Secretary of State was a result of
30. U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, CinCUS and
CNO letter to CinCPAC and CinCPOA, serial 00178, January 18,
1944, Declassified June 20, 1969, CNO files.
31, U. S, Department of State, Fore ign Relations. 1944.
Vol. 5, p. 1266, Referred to in Memorandum by the Director




British activity in the islands, but the recently declassi-
fied communications to Nimitz show that it was clearly a
»
result of the Admiral's directive and intended as a pre-
cautionary measure. The military were obviously protecting
their preferred solution.
At the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference of October
1943, Hull circulated the United States' proposed plan for
trusteeship, still in general terms; but the topic was not
32
placed on the agenda. Secretary Hull wrote that "we had
definite ideas with respect to the future of the British
33
colonial empire on which we differed with the British."
He claimed the United States had the right to discuss the
British Empire since failure to make provisions for the
ultimate self-government of the possessions could produce
possible future conflicts involving the United States and
that the "right of self-determination" declarations applied,
not only to the occupied countries of Europe, but to peoples
34
everywhere. Eden remarked that he was not prepared to
discuss the American proposed text, and Molotov only said he
35
would study it.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff obtained a victory of sorts
when the President, on November 23, 1943, approved the policy
32. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation , pp. 197*
198.
33. Hull, Memoirs . Vol. 2, pp. 1477-1478.
34. Ibid ., p. 1478.
35. Woodward, British Foreign Policy , p. 440.
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that "the Bonins and all Japanese Mandated Islands lie in
the 'Blue Area* described as 'Required for the direct defense
36
of, the United States , .. ,M Yet, the President only a week
later, holding a memorandum from the State Department's
Geographer's Office on the question of trusteeship for certain
Pacific islands, favorably mentioned the concept of interna-
tional trusteeship as Hull had outlined it at Moscow during
the afternoon conference on November 29 at the Allied Con-
37
ference at Teheran.
Admiral Leahy was still trying to convince the Presi-
dent not to apply the trusteeship concept to the mandated
islands. In his notes of the Teheran conference, he wrote
»
The problem of trusteeships came up
during the United Nations discussion.
Roosevelt was convinced that his proposed
world organization could exercise the neces-
sary sovereignty over such areas as the man-
dated Japanese islands which Tokyo had ex-
ploited so fully while ostensibly these
islands still were under the control of the
League of Nations. In our conversations,
I had argued vigorously that the United
States, for its own future security, should
keep and exercise sovereignty over any of
the Japanese mandated islands that we
captured, 38
The Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, stated that
the United States, United Kingdom, and China "covet no gain
for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion.
36. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States, Diplomatic Papers 1945"T~5 vols., Washington*
U, S. Government Printing Office, 1967), Vol. 1, p. 94.
Memorandum by the Chairman of the State-War-Navy Coordinating
Committee to the Secretary of State, February 26, 1945.
37. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation , pp. 197-198.
38. Leahy, I Was There , p. 210.
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It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the
islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied
39
since the beginning of the first World War in 1914...."
Thus, the policy was officially announced that the mandated
islands would be taken from Japan, but the old formula of
"no territorial aggrandizement" was repeated.
Early in 1944, the State Department's committees pro-
duced a revised plan for trusteeship which would include
dependent areas voluntarily placed under the system as well
as the mandates and former enemy territory. The new plan
called for the system to operate under the international
organization's General Assembly rather than through regional
councils. Actual supervisory authority would be exercised
by a subsidiary Trusteeship Commission. Of major importance,
it contained a provision giving the international organiza-
tion's Executive Council authority over any trust territories
where fortifications were to be established under the appli-
40
cation of international security measures. This was the
beginning of the subsequent strategic areas concept in the
United Nations Charter. Thullen believes that this provi-
sion reflected "the tendency towards increased realism regard*
ing the necessity of mechanisms to ensure international
security and, in particular, Roosevelt's determination to
39. U. S., Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 232,
(December 4, 1943), Cairo Declaration, p. 393,
40. Ruth Russell and Jeanette Muther, A History of the
United Nations Charter* The Role o f the United States 1940-1945




place all strategic bases under United Nations control since
it was an abandonment of the former principle of non-
41
militarization of mandated areas."
Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox spoke out for annex-
ation publically on March "9, 1944, when he stated to the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, "'those mandated islands
have become Japanese territory and as we capture them they
are ours. 1 He explained that they were not of much use
except for military purposes, and that nobody in the Govern-
ment opposed his view that such of them as were necessary as
42
bases should be allotted to us." Where Secretary Knox got
the impression that "nobody in the Government opposed his
view that such of them as were necessary as bases should be
allotted to us" is hard to imagine. President Roosevelt and
Secretary Hull were still thinking in terms of an interna-
tional organization administering strategic bases throughout
the world. Unfortunately, Knox always relied on his "news-
paperman's memory" and never dictated notes of conferences,
and his private papers contain little substantive matter.
His statement probably is just indicative of his being left
out of strategic and postwar planning discussions. Admiral
King's papers seem to indicate there was little personal
contact or friendship between Knox and himself, and President
Roosevelt relied solely on his military advisers during the
war for strategic planning.
41. Thullen, Problems of the Trusteeship System , p. 32.
42. Huntington Gilchrist, "Japanese Islands i Annexation




On March 11, 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote to
the Secretary of State detailing their firm position on the
mandated islands t
As evidenced in the present war, the
Japanese Mandated Islands bear a vital re-
lation to the defense of the United States.
Their assured possession and control by the
United States are essential to our security.
Together they constitute a single military
entity, no element of which can be left to
even the partial control of another nation
without hazard to our control of that entity
•••• The Japanese Mandated Islands should be
placed under the sole sovereignty of the
United States. Their conquest is being
effected by the forces of the United States
and there appears to be no valid reason why
their future status should be the subject
of discussion with any other nation. 43
In April 1944, Dr. I. Bowman of the State Department was
in London with Under-Secretary Stettinius. Dr. Bowman told
the British Foreign Office that the State Department still
wanted a joint Anglo-American declaration concerning trustee-
ship. According to the British Foreign Office, the State
Department's
idea was now to emphasise the promotion of
material well-being and self-government
rather than political independence, but
they envisaged international machinery of
a supervisory and not merely a consultative
character. He [Dr. Bowman]) said that Ameri-
can opinion would expect something to be
said on the subject in connexion with the
World Organisation. Mr. Stand ley told him
that the British Government would not go
beyond the parliamentary statement of
July 13, 1943 [statement of British policy
43. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1944 ,
Vol. 5, p. 1201. Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of
State, March 11, 1944.
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in the House of Commons by Mr. Oliver
Standley that explained the British policy
of gradual self-government for dependent
peoples]. The Foreign Office thought that
1 the Americans wished for a statement in
order to justify their own plans to annex
certain Japanese islands in the Pacific,
and because the President wanted in his
election compaign to avoid any risk of
being called a champion of imperialism. 44
Of interest in respect to that last surmise, a Gallup
Poll published on May 23, 1944, gave a boost to the advo-
cators of American control of the islands. It indicated
that 69 percent of the American public desired to "keep"
Micronesia as well as the islands owned or controlled by
45
Britain and Australia that the United States had captured.
The State Department still intended for the islands to
be placed under the trusteeship systemj and the latest form
of the plan, dated June 22, 1944, was submitted to the State
Department's high-level Postwar Programs Committee which,
under Hull as chairman and Under Secretary of State Stettin-
ius as vice-chairman, reviewed proposals before they were
submitted to the President.
The next day, June 23, 1944, a representative of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Major General George V. Strong, Senior
Army Member of the Joint Post War Committee, concerned with
reports of Australian and New Zealand designs on the islands,
saw Joseph C. Grew, Director of the State Department Office
44. Woodward, British Foreign Policy , p. 440.
45. Gilchrist, "Japanese Islands: Annexation or Trustee-
ship," Foreign Affairs , p. 642.
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of Far Eastern Affairs. He repeated the Joint Chiefs' posi-
tion on the disposition of the islands. This conversation
46
was reported to the Secretary of State,
The military officers gained a strong supporter in this
matter when James V. Forrestal became Secretary of the Navy,
He saw the State Department's June 22, 1944, trusteeship plan
and was shocked. He talked to Stettinius about it on July 7,
1944, asking "if this was a serious document and if he under-
stood that the President was committed to it (I [Forrestal]
added that it seems to me a sine qua non of any postwar arrange-
ments that there should be no debate as to who ran the Mandated
47
Islands. ..) ," While this shows the beginning of what proved
to be great support for the military's point of view, it also
demonstrates the appalling lack of coordination between the
military and the Office of the Secretary of the Navy and, also,
the lack of coordination between the State and Navy Departments,
The State Department began to feel the influence of
political, as well as, military pressure. Former President
Hoover supported retention of Pacific bases in a speech to
the Republican national convention in June 1944, and various
48
Senators were also speaking out for annexation.
The trusteeship plan was radically revised downgrading
the powers of the Trusteeship Council to merely examining
46. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1944 .
Vol. 5, p. 1266. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of
Far Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of State, June 23, 1944.
47. Walter Millis, ed,, The Fp rrestal' Diaries (New York»
The Viking Press, 1951), p. 8.




reports from the administering authorities, conducting peri-
odic inspections, and considering petitions. Under the older
plans, the stress was on direct administration; and the
Trusteeship Council would have had the power of being able
to recommend and revise trusteeship charter terms, to desig-
nate or replace administering authorities, and to terminate
trust status. Another gain for the military was that the
active role that the trust territories were to play in pro-
viding for the maintenance of international peace and secur-
49
ity was emphasized.
The President himself was finally influenced by the
consistent opposition of the Joint Chiefs to international
administration of the islands. In reply to a letter from
the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommending annexation, he pointed
out on July 10, 1944, that the United States was seeking no
additional territory but that "I am working on the idea that
the United Nations will ask the United States to act as Trustee
for the Japanese Mandated Islands. With this will go the
civil authority • • • and also the military authority to pro-
tect them; i.e. fortifications, etc. It does not necessarily
50
involve a decision on permanent sovereignty." The Presi-
dent on July 15th also approved the trusteeship proposals in
their new, July 6th, form.
49. Russell and Muther, A History of the United Nations
Charter , pp. 344-345 and Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Prepa-
ration . Appendix 39, p. 606,
50. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation , p. 387,
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The above steps were a giant movement toward a compro-
mise position in the formulation of an agreed-upon policy;
but the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of War and
Navy (now Stimson and Forrestal) still felt uneasy over the
situation. The President had left Washington on the 15th
(the same day he approved the trusteeship plan) for a con-
ference in Honolulu with MacArthur and Nimitz. While he was
gone, the American Delegation for Dumbarton Oaks met on
July 18 preparatory to the conference. The Delegation was
composed of Under-Secretary Stettinius, Grew (then Director
of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs), Bowman, Cohen, Dunn,
Hackworth, Hiss, Hornbeck,. Pasvolsky, Notter, Admiral Willson,
Admiral Train, General Embick and General Strong, among others.
At this meeting, the members representing the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Admirals Willson and Train with Generals Embick
and Strong, achieved a "coup" when they "by specific and
insistent request" obtained the decision to omit the section
on trusteeship from the "Tentative Proposals" and from the
scope of matters to be raised by the United States at the
51
conference. Secretary Hull described this as a "great
dissappointment" for it
had been a project conceived and elab-
orated in the State Department by my
associates and me and enthusiastically
concurred in by the President.... The
" Joint Chiefs felt that a discussion of
the trusteeship system would inevitably
embrace concrete questions of who should




be trustee over what territories, and
that dissension might therefore arise
among the Allies.
Furthermore, they were anxious to
keep the whole matter open pending a
determination within our own Government
of a definite policy with regard to the
subsequent disposal of some of the Japan-
ese islands in the Pacific, including
those held by Japan under mandate. It
was their view that complete control of
these islands by the United States for
military purposes was necessary to our
national security, and they felt that
this could perhaps best be achieved
through outright annexation rather than
through a trusteeship system.
My associates and I, on the other
hand, were convinced that the security
objective of the United States control
of the islands for military purposes,
could be fully secured through a system
of trusteeship.,.. While we agreed to the
omission of this subject from the Dumbar-
ton Oaks discussions, we did not intend
to let the project die and hoped to bring
it up again at the general meeting of the
United Nations. 52
These views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were later
officially conveyed to the Secretary of State in a note dated
53
August 3, 1944, from General Marshall. The Joint Chiefs
of Staff expressed the opinion that:
From the military point of view, it
is highly desirable that discussions con-
cerning the related subjects of territorial
trusteeships and territorial settlements,
particularly as they may adversely affect
our relations with Russia, be delayed
until after the defeat of Japan. ^
52. Hull, Memoirs. Vol. 2, pp. 1706-1707.
53. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation , p. 295 and
U. S. State Department, Foreign Relations 1944 . Vol. 1, p. 700.
54. U. S. Naval Classified Archives Office, SWNCC 27 files;
SWNCC 27 dated January 19, 1945, and February 15, 1945; and
SWNCC 27-1, dated February 26, 1945; Declassified, March 1970.
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At the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations, held between August
and October, 1944, trusteeship was not discussed except for
»
an informal expression of interest by each of the foreign
governments in a future consideration of the issue after a
55
private exchange of papers. For two weeks after the Dumbar-
ton Oaks Conversations, the State Department worked on a draft
letter addressed to General Marshall for consideration by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. It proposed that the "Tentative Pro-
posals" that had been withheld from the conversations at
Dumbarton Oaks should now be sent to the other three major
powers for inter-governmental exchanges of views prior to the
general United Nations conference. An ad hoc committee was
established to consider the problem as a whole and the draft
letter in particular. It was comprised at the "policy level"
by Pasvolsky and Dunn and at the "working level" by Henry S.
Villard of the Near Eastern Office, Robert B. Stewart of the
European Office, Harley Notter of the Office of Special Poli-
tical Affairs, Benjamin Gerig, Donald C. Blaisdell, James F.
Green, and Ralph Bunche from the Divisions of the latter Office,
and C. Easton Rothwell, the Executive Secretary of the Post-
56
War Programs Committee. Rather than delivering the draft
letter, it was decided to invite Admiral Willson and General
Strong of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to informal discussions on
the issue. Such a discussion was held on November 8th with
55. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation , p. 375.
56. Ibid. , p. 387.
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Acting Secretary of State Stettinius, Hackworth, Dunn, Pasvolsky,
and Wilson participating. No meeting ground could be reached,
57
and consideration of the problem was inconclusive.
On November 15, 1944, Stettinius, Hackworth, and Pasvolsky
saw the President who told them that the principle of inter-
national trusteeship should be firmly established with ade-
58
quate machinery for this purpose. He also directed the State
Department, "in consultation with the military and naval author-
ities, to redouble their efforts in examining the trusteeship
59
proposals further."
Prior to leaving the year 1944, it is useful to take a
look at what the Congressional and public opinions were con-
cerning this issue during this period, August 1944 through
January 1945.
Church groups, labor groups affiliated with the Congress
of Industrial Organizations, the Commission to Study the Organi-
zation of Peace, and the Universities Committee on Post-War
International Problems (which summarized the views of faculty
groups in forty-five colleges and universities), all advocated
the advancement of dependent peoples, with a variety of adminis-
trative machinery recommended. Beyond the general attitudes,
the above groups gave very little attention to the mandated
60
islands.
57. Ibid., pp. 374-376.
53. Ibid., p. 377.
»
59. Thullen, Problems of the Trusteeship System , p. 34.
60, John W. Masland, "Group Interests in Post-War American
Pacific Policy," Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific
Relations . American Council Paper No. 6, January, 1945, p. 10.
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The Universities Committee proposed three main solutions
for the islands. One solution was to put them under the direct
»
supervision of the international organization. Another solu-
tion was to put them under a regional commission represent-
ing the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and China. The
commission might, in turn, report to an agency of the inter-
national organization. The third solution was that they
should be mandated by the international organization to some
one country, in the case of many islands to the United States.
The report stated the first solution was favored by two-thirds
of the faculty groups expressing an opinion, and that the other
third were evenly divided between the other two solutions.
However, several groups mentioned they would favor the third
61
choice as an alternative if the first one was unavailable.
On the other side of the issue, the American Legion
recommended in September 1944 that "support be given such
measures as may be needed to assure our nation of the con-
tinued control and supervision of such Army and Navy bases as
may be deemed necessary for national security and protection
62
of our nation," The National Opinion Research Center at the
University of Denver reported to the Pacific Affairs Conference
that during 1944 (no month mentioned), the following questions
were asked of the American public
t
61. Ibid. , pp. 58-59.
62. Ibid. . p. 25, Resolution adopted by the Twenty-
Sixth Annual Convention of the American Legion, Chicago, Illi-
nois, September 18-20, 1944,
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"Do you expect the United States to fight
in another war within fifty years?"
Yes 54%, No 25%, Depend on Peace 4%, Un-
decided 17%.
Those who answered "Yes" and the "Undecided"
were asked: "Are there any particular coun-
tries you think we are likely to fight against?"
33% spontaneously mentioned Russia
17% " - Germany
10% " - Japan
6% " " England 6 ~(Some other nations received a few votes)
These results would seem to indicate a sense of realism, rather
than idealism, among the American public that might be construed
as likely support for retention of strategic islands.
Senator McKellar (D. Tenn.) introduced a resolution
asking for permanent American tenure of all Japanese islands
between the equator and 30°N plus Bermuda, the West Indian
64
colonies, and the Galapagos Islands. Senator Reynolds
(D., N.C.) concurred with Senator McKellar and offered to
65
extend the proposition to include "southern" California.
Senator Albert B. (Happy) Chandler (D., Ky.) announced the
United States must "have possession of every island in every
ocean which, if in the possession of an enemy, would be a
66
direct menace to the people of the United States." Of
course, this was a period close to the 1944 elections, and
the political statements might not always reflect sober judg-
ment} but the general tenor is important.
63. Harry H. Field, "American Public Opinion and Foreign
Policy," Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations,
American Council Paper No. 8, January, 1945, p. 16.
64. U. S. f Congress ional Record . 78th Cong., 2nd sess.,
August 15, 1944, p. 7007.
65. Ibid.. August 15, 1944, pp. 7017-7018 and August 18,
1944, p. 7170.
66. Ibid.. August 15, 1944, p. 7017.
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The Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Rela-
tions, held at Hot Springs, Virginia, in January 1945, dis-
«
cussed dependent peoples. It was attended by Phillip C.
Jessup, Admiral T. C. Hart, Ralph J. Bunche, Huntington
Gilchrist, and Felix M. Deesing, among other Americans. A
total of twelve countries were represented. The round-table
discussions strongly emphasized the need for the political
development of dependent peoples. Those representing subject
peoples felt that "security" might become an excuse after the
war for the deferring of independence. The representatives
from the colonial powers argued that their .countries had: no
desire to extend their possessions and that they were in favor
of future self-government but had to keep in mind their respon-
sibilities which, if hastily abandoned, would increase the
67
"instability and insecurity of the world as a whole." When
the mandated islands were discussed, an American member, not
identified, told the round table that the United States,
because of postwar security commitments to the Philippines,
might need bases in the islands. The United States would then
need to exercise full sovereignty over the islands. He pointed
out that the "islands were deficient in economic resources and
that their maintenance will involve enormous expense.... There
was no doubt, however, that if the general doctrine of account-
ability prevailed, the United States would fully accept its
68
requirements," A British member said that a transfer of the
67. Security in the Pacific? A Preliminary Report of the
Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations (New
Yorki Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945), pp. 89-90.
68. Ibid. , p. 117.
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Islands to the United States could hardly be considered a
matter of imperialism but Hof common sense and world security,
as well as in the interests of the local people; but such a
matter was tied up with the future of the mandate system.
There could be no objection if the transfer were with the
consent of the people and made by international agreement
69
and if the principle of accountability were adopted." There
is no record of other responses. "Accountability" referred to
the proposed requirement that the administering powers, while
having full sovereignty, would make reports on the administra-
tion of their dependent territories and would permit visits
by members of an international authority.
Stettinius and Grew were confirmed as Secretary and Under-
Secretary of State on December 20, 1944, and quickly put into
effect a reorganization plan that had been developed within
the State Department. Dr. Pasvolsky continued as Special Assis
tant to the Secretary of State for International Organization
and Security Affairs, in charge of "the work of preparing for
a United Nations Conference to establish an International
70
Security Organization." The Office of Special Political
Affairs, under Edwin C. Wilson since May 8, 1944, and under
Alger Hiss after January 27, 1945, assumed more responsi-
bilities. It had a Division of International Organization
Affairs under Durward V. Sandifer with Benjamin Gerig as
69. Ibid.




associate chief who also headed the new Division of Dependent
Area Affairs. Under the Division of Dependent Area Affairs,
ca'rae Ralph J. Bunche as associate chief and James F. Green
who was in charge of the Trusteeship Administrative Branch.
The new Division of International Security Affairs, under
Joseph E. Johnson, was responsible for matters regarding the
security phases of the proposed United Nations organization
including "the relevant security aspects of United States
71
foreign policy generally." The high-level Policy and Post-
war Programs Committees were transformed rather than abolished,
being effectively replaced by a new Secretary's Staff Committee.
This committee had a secretariat under Mr. Yost which succeeded
the former secretariats of the Policy and Post-War Programs Com-
mittees. The members of the Secretary's Staff Committee were:
the Secretary as Chairman; the Under Secretary, Joseph C. Grew;
the Assistant Secretaries; the Legal Adviser, Mr. Hackworth;
and the Special Assistant to the Secretary for International
Organization and Security Affairs, Leo Pasvolsky. The Assis-
tant Secretaries included William L. Clayton, Economic Affairs;
Nelson A. Rockefeller, Latin American Relations; Brig. General
Julius C. Holmes, Administration; Dean Acheson, Congress-State
Relations; and James C, Dunn, European, Far Eastern, Near
Eastern and African Affairs.
Additionally, it was during December 1944 that the State-
War-Navy-Coordinating Committee and the Committee of the Three
71. Ibid. , p. 351.
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Secretaries were established. Within the military, the uni-
fication controversy had begun in 1943 and by December 1944,
72
had already arrived full blown before Congress. Addition-
ally, the Interior Department, under the head of Harold Ickes,
was casting covetous eyes on the navy administered islands in
the Pacific, i.e. American Samoa and Guam, Some navy personnel
were evidently reciprocating these sentiments, for Ickes wrote
the following letter to Forrestal on November 1, 1944
i
For Personal Attention
Dear Jim* I have again received word from
a reliable source that the Navy is working
on a bill to transfer jurisdiction over the
islands and territories [Interior adminis-
tered Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the
Virgin Islands] from this Department to the
Navy. I may have told you that I mentioned
this matter to the President, and he ex-
pressed his opposition to any such transfer.
I am virtually certain that work is being
done in the Navy, and I believe that it is
being done without your consent, I have
reason to believe that a Captain Ramsey, of
the Judge Advocate General's Office, is par-
ticipating in this activity,
I hope that you will take immediate
steps to put a stop to this enterprise. 73
This was the beginning of a long and bitter conflict bet-
ween the Navy and the Interior Department that was to last
through the 1950* s. Both Departments desired to administer
the Pacific island possessions, and Harold Ickes 1 personality
and contempt for the Navy only exacerbated the struggle.
Thus, 1944 ended with the military heavily involved in
72, Demetrios, Caraley, The Politics of Mil itary Uni-
fication* A Study of Conflict and.the Policy Process (New York
i
Columbia University Press, 1966T, Congressional hearings were
conducted on unification each year from 1944 through 1947.
73. U. S,, National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Office of Territories, RG 48, Box 3667.
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the development of the trusteeship system as a result of
their interest in the Pacific islands. If the President and
the State Department had not the intention of including the
Pacific mandated islands within the trusteeship system, the
military would not have become interested in the trusteeship
system.
The military had, in fact, obtained a virtual veto on
the trusteeship plans by the President's requiring the State
Department to examine its plan M in consultation" with the
military. This fitted in with the President's administrative
style of frequently not making firm decisions thereby allow-
ing subordinates to fight out the issues in order to force
the disagreements either to a compromise solution or eventu-
ally up to his level for final resolution. His health at this
time and his general style of administration have been suc-
cinctly described by James MacGregor Burns
t
The great tasks of peace lay ahead -
but now [after the 1944 election], as the
year of victory neared, Roosevelt was des-
perately tired. The ceaseless toll and
tension of the war years were leaving their
mark. Like the great actor he was, he could
shake himself out of his weariness and take
his old role before the people. Fighting
off campaign rumors about his condition, he
had handled the exacting "Fala" speech -
which so easily could have flopped - with
exquisite skill? he had driven gaily for
hours through New York streets in a cold,
driving rain. But at other times he seemed
quite different. His face went slack; he
slumped in his chair; his hands trembled
more than ever.
Yet so swiftly did he shift from dull-
ness to buoyancy that even while his friends
were whispering to one another about their
concern there would be fresh reports that





Those who know Roosevelt best could
agree fully on only one point - that he was
a man infinitely complex and almost incom-
prehensible, 'I cannot come to grips with
himl ' Ickes cried more than once, and the
words were echoed by a host of congressmen,
politicos, diplomats, and bureaucrats who
dealt with the canny politician in the White
House. His character was not only complex,
Robert Sherwood observed, it was contradic-
tory to a bewildering degree.
The contradictions continually bemused
or galled Roosevelt's lieutenants....
In many little ways inconsistency ruled;
in the way he thanked some subordinates for
their efforts and said nothing to others,
intervened in some administrative matters
and ignored others, had four men doing a
single job in some instances (as Flynn once
complained) and one man doing four jobs in
others, was unaccountably frivolous about
some matters and grave about others.
And there was the most baffling quality
of all - his sheer, superb courage in facing
some challenges, and his caution and indirec-
tion in facing others. He acted instantly,
electrically, on certain decisions, and un-
accountably postponed others for months.
It was not strange that he should follow
Machiavelli's advice that a leader must be
as brave as the lion and as shrewd as the
fox, for this had long been the first lesson
for politicians. But his metamorphoses from
lion to fox and back to lion again mystified
even his intimates. ?^
Stettinius, Hackworth, and Pasvolsky must have been very
mystified after their November 15, 1944, conference with the
President. They must have expected full support for their
trusteeship plan with a firm Presidential decision made in
their favor. Instead, they were directed "in consultation
with the military and naval authorities, to redouble their
efforts in examining the trusteeship proposals further."
74. James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt t The Lion and the
Fox (New Yorki Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1956), p. 468
[health] and p, 472 [style].
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The military, thanks to the President's failure to
firmly back the State Department, now had a virtual veto on
the trusteeship plans. The State Department was anxious to
have an approved plan ready for the San Francisco conference;
whereas, the military, if they were not satisfied, could pro-
tect their position by merely withholding their approval or
by utilizing delaying tactics. The State Department fully
realized this state of affairs. On December 30, 1944, Stettinius
wrote letters to Forrestal and to Stirason emphasizing that a
provision for trusteeship was bound to appear in the United
Nations Charter since "not only had the issue been raised by
the other participants at Dumbarton Oaks, but considerable
criticism had been voiced in the United States against omission
75
of Section IX [trusteeship] from the 'Tentitive Proposals.'"
This statement was evidently a bluff for Britain would pro-
bably have been more than willing to see no chapter on trustee-
ships in the Charter while China and the Soviet Union had not
shown any strong interest in the matter. Public opinion in
the United States has already been described. After this open-
ing comment, Stettinius conceded a major point to the military
in order to get consultations started. The State Department
proposed that "preparations be made to discuss the general prin-
ciples and appropriate machinery for international trusteeship,
leaving for future discussions all questions of specific terrl-
76
tories ." [emphasis added]





FINAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
TRUSTEESHIP PLAN, 1945
»
Agreement was reached in January 1945 on the establish-
ment of an ad hoc Inter-departmental Committee on Dependent
Area Aspects of International Organization. The State Depart-
ment appointed its members on January 5th? but the first meet-
ing was not held until February 2, 1945. The State Department
was represented by Dr. Pasvolsky (Chairman), Assistant Secre-
taries Dunn, Nelson Rockefeller, and Clayton, and Isaiah
Bowman. Admiral Willson represented the Navy Department, while
Generals Embick and Fairchild represented the War Department
and Air Corps respectively. The military representatives
were all from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Harold Ickes sent
his Under-Secretary Abe Fortas on the basis of Interior's
administration of certain island possession of the United States,
This is the first official representation of the Interior Depart-
ment on a committee considering trusteeship provisions. The
Interior Department was also to be represented at the San
Francisco Conference by Abe Fortas and Benjamin Thoron on
1
the direct request of Secretary Ickes. Other members of the
committee were Charles W. Taussig, the United States Commis-
sioner on the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission; Wilson,
1, U. S., National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Office of Territories, RG 48, Box 2879, Letters,





Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs and the
committee's Acting Chairman when necessary; Charles P. Taft,
Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Economic
Affairs and alternate for Mr. Clayton; Benjamin Thoron, Direc-
tor of the Interior Department's Division of Territories and
Island Possessions; Mr. Haley, Director of the Office of Com-
mercial Policy; and Gerig and Green from the staff of the
Division of Dependent Area Affairs. Admiral Harold C. Train
stood in for Admiral Willson on one occasion and Alger Hiss
for Mr. Wilson on one occasion.
While this committee was being established, informal dis-
cussions between the State Department and Col. Oliver F. G.
Stanley, British Minister of State for the Colonies "on the
possibilities of regional commissions for colonial territories,
of a declaration of standards for administration of all depen-
dent territories, and of trusteeship. There was recognition,
most fully expressed in the discussion on January 18, of the
heightening urgency for effecting an exchange of papers on
trusteeship before the projected general United Nations confer-
2
ence convened." However, the State Department was fully aware
that the main problem was not the British but the American mili-
tary. Harley Notter continues!
The immediate problem in the remaining
preparation on this question, however, was
not international. Rather it was to arrive
at an agreed policy proposal within this





Government that would satisfactorily
take into account all the vital national
interests of the United States involved
in this complex question, including espe-
cially provision for the security of the
United States in the Pacific. Congres-
sional interest in the disposition to be
made of the Pacific islands not under the
control of an Ailied power was strongly
expressed in this period, and a subcom-
mittee of the Committee on Naval Affairs
of the House of Representatives was ap- 3
pointed on January 23 to study this matter.
About January 20-21, 1945, Forrestal entered in his diary
a memorandum that Stimson had prepared for the Secretary of
State which was eventually delivered on January 23 just prior
to Stettinius' departure for the Yalta Conference. Forrestal
records that Stimson felt the disposition of the islands should
be settled by the big powers in advance instead of through
the proposed trusteeship system. "You will get into needless
mazes if you try to set up a form of trusteeship which will
Include them before the necessity of their acquisition by the
4
United States is established and recognized t " Stimson wrote.
Stimson further pointed out that the Pacific islands could not
properly be regarded as colonies since they did not have large
populations or' considerable economic resources.
They do not really belong in such a
classification. Acquisition of them by the
United States does not represent an attempt
at colonization or exploitation. Instead
it is merely the acquisition by the United
States of the necessary bases for the defense
of the security of the Pacific for the future
3. Ibid.
4. Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries , pp. 28-29,
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world* To Serve such a purpose they must
belong to the United States with absolute
power to rule and fortify them. They are
not colonies; they are outposts, and their
• acquisition i3 appropriate under the gen-
eral doctrine of self-defense by the power
which guarantees the safety of that area
of the world.
5
Dr. Pasvolsky stressed the "necessity of responding to
the approaches of other governments concerning our views on
a trusteeship system" when the Inter-departmental Committee
6
met for the first time on the second of February. A break-
through of sorts occurred during the second meeting, held on
the 8th. Certain essential differentiations between stra-
tegic and non-strategic areas for trusteeship purposes were
developed at this meeting. Strategic areas would come within
the purview of the Security Council, where the unanimity rule
would apply. This was the basic concept that eventually
proved acceptable to all parties. Of course, the military had
gone into the discussions with the firm agreement that any dis-
cussions or agreements would not prejudice the ultimate deci-
sion as to the disposition of any specific territory.
On February 26, 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff officially
informed the Secretary of State they had no objections, from the
military point of View, to inter-departmental discussions on
trusteeship providin g; such discussions
»
5. Henry L, Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service
in Peace and War , p. 600,
6. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation , p. 389.
7. Ibid. , pp. 389-390,
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a. Give full consideration to the
future defense needs of the United States.
b. Exclude direct or indirect dis-
,
cussion of the disposition of any terri-
tory under the sovereignty of the United
States, or any Japanese territory occupied
by the United States forces.
c. Consider no agreement that may
eventually give to any foreign nation claim
to any control of the "Japanese Mandated
Islands" north of the Equator If
there are to be no direct acquisitions of
security outposts by the United States or
the other principle powers, such proposals
should include a type of trusteeship, in
respect to all or any part of these areas,
which will assure the security interests of
the several agreeing nations.... You are
assured that, when it has reached a point
where there is a draft - or perhaps alter-
native drafts - suitable for submission as
a basis for discussion within this Govern-
ment, the War and Navy Departments and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff will promptly supply
their suggestions and recommendations cover-
ing the security interests of the country,
3
The trusteeship plan eventually adopted by the committee
specifically stated that it made no assumption about the in-
clusion of any specific territory. It included a special cate-
gory of trusteeships: that of "strategic areas" which would
come under the United Nations Security Council where the United
9
States* veto would safeguard American interests.
8. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations. 1945 ,
Vol. 1, pp. 93-95, Memorandum by the Chairman of the State-War-
Navy Coordinating Committee (James Clement Dunn) to the Secretary
of State, February 26, 1945, The various drafts and position
papers that the military utilized in preparing this reply are
found in: U, S. Naval Classified Archives Office; SWNCC 27 files;
SWNCC 27, dated January 19, 1945, and February 15, 1945; and
SWNCC 27-1, dated February 26, 1945; Declassified, March 1970.
9, U. S. Department of State, Fore ign Relations 1945 ,
Vol. 1, p. 134. Memorandum by the Inter-departrnental Committee
on Dependent Areas, March 17, 1945. The Committee ceased to
meet after March 15, 1945.
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No evidence is available to indicate exactly when or by
whom the "strategic area" suggestion was made. Between meet-
ings of the Inter-departmental Committee, the State Department
representatives on the Committee as well as Ralph Bunche,
Hartley, Johnson, Notter, and Sandifer met to consider the
problems and devise or appraise solutions. The original idea
may have come from one of these men or possibly from one of
the other Departments represented on the Committee. Ambassador
John D. Hickerson states it probably originated in Pasvolsky's
and Benjamin Gerig's "United Nations Office" of the State Depart-
ment; and that it was a real compromise of "one-worlder" Gerig's
principles to accept the strategic trusteeship concept. Gerig
probably felt it was the only way to break the deadlock after
seeing how strong the Navy felt about annexation. For Ambassador
Hickerson, who was on the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
and in the State Department's European Affairs Office, the
strategic concept was acceptable since annexation of the islands
appeared to be out of the question. He had previously argued
within the State Department for the exclusion of the mandated
islands from trusteeship by annexation rather than water down
the trusteeship system in order to include the islands; while,
10
at the same time, protecting American security interests.
The State Department felt that American security would be
fully safeguarded by such a "strategic trusteeship." From this
time on, the State Department argued for making the islands a






"strategic trusteeship" with the United States as sole ad-
ministrator. The military were still not ready to discard
their preference for outright annexation. As a fall-back
position, however, the military now had a category of trustee-
ship that was the next closest thing to annexation. They con-
tinued to stress the point that their cooperation in develop-
ing the trusteeship system did not prejudice in any way the
ultimate decision on the pastwar disposition of the mandated
islands.
While the plan was still being worked out in the Inter-
departmental Committee on Dependent Areas, President Roosevelt
took the original, broad trusteeship ideas to Yalta; and when
Stettinius started to read them to Churchill, the Prime
Minister exploded. He stated that "after we have done our
best to fight in this war and have done no crime to anyone I
will have no suggestion that the British Empire is to be put
in the dock and examined by everybody to see whether it is up
11
to their standard."
Eden writes that "though the Prime Minister's vehemence
was a warning signal to the Americans it appeared to give most
pleasure to Stalin. He got up from his chair, walked up and
down, beamed, and at intervals broke into applause. This
embarrassed Roosevelt and did not really profit anybody, except
perhaps Stalin, who was able to please himself and point the
12
division of his allies at the same time."
11. James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankl y (New York: Harper
& Brothers, 1947), Foreword, no page number.
12, Anthony Eden, The Reckoning , p. 595.
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Churchill calmed down when Stettinius explained that the
United States did not contemplate any discussions of specific
»
islands or territories to be placed under the trusteeship
system; and that "later on, we have in mind that the Japanese
mandated islands be taken away from the Japanese. We have
13
nothing in mind with reference to the British Empire,"
Churchill, still distrustful, obtained the following notei
It would be a matter of subsequent
agreement as to which territories within
the above categories would actually be
placed under trusteeship. No discussions
of specific territories are contemplated
now or at the United Nations Conference.
Only machinery and principles of trustee-
ship should be formulated at the Confer-
ence for inclusion in the Charter. 14
These statements reassured American military leaders as
much as they did the British. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had
found a helpful ally.
One disturbing thought is suggested by Sir Llewellyn
Woodward's comment that one of the reasons why Churchill did
not oppose President Roosevelt on matters which Churchill con-
sidered secondary was that "he expected to have to resist
American proposals hostile to the recovery of British territory."
Churchill was evidently so opposed to placing any part of the
British Empire under international trusteeship that it affected
his position on non- related issues. Churchill explained his
13. Byrnes, Speaking; Frankly . Foreword, no page number.
See alsoi Edward R. Stettinius, FDR and the Russians: The Yalta
Conference (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1949), pp. 232-
237 and Leahy, I Was There , p. 313 for slightly different
accounts of the incident.
14. Stettinius, FDR and the Russians , p. 212.
15. Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in




Yalta position to the Lord President of the Council on March 10,
1945, as follows
i
* The expression "mandate system" was
only used at Yalta to limit the territories
which would come within the scope of dis-
cussions affecting 'territorial trusteeship. 1
This is necessary in view of the disappear-
ance of the old League of Nations, on whose
authority the mandates were held. It in no
way governs any arrangement that may be made
for the future. We are certainly not com-
mitted to the maintenance of the mandate
system; but there is no question of subject-
ing any non-mandated British territories to
any form of territorial trusteeship unless
we choose to do so of our own accord. I
should myself oppose such a departure, which
might well be pressed upon nations like
Britain, France, Holland, and Belgium, who
have great colonial possessions, by the
United States, Russia, and China, who have
none. 16
In February 1945, Forrest al toured the Pacific theater
and became even more concerned over the question of postwar
control of the islands. This is indicated by a memorandum
that a Captain C. J. Moore wrote to Admiral Edwards that seems
17
to have been written soon after Forrestal's trip. Vincent
Davis interprets this memorandum as also suggesting that there
was very little consultation between the Navy Department and
18
the other Departments (State and War) on the issue. As has
been shown, however, there were inter-departmental consul-
tations on the matter i but, in effect, Secretary Forres tal
16. Winston Churchill, The Second World War; Vol. 6.
Triumph and Tragedy
, pp. 739-740,
17. U. S. Naval Classified Archives Office, Captain Moore
to Admiral Edwards, undated, Serial 1150D, OP-50D files.
18. Vincent Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the U. S.
Navy, 1943-1946 (Chapel Hillt University of North Carolina
Press, 1966), p. 298.
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had been left out of the picture. As Vincent Davis points
out, Forrestal's diaries indicate he did not go to Admiral
King until March 10, 1945, to learn Mwhat the officers were
19
planning or desired in connection with this matter. " This
was the time the Three Secretaries (State, War, and Navy)
Meetings and the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee were
just starting to get off the ground. From this point on,
Forrestal plays a leading role in the struggle to insure the
protection of American security interests in any trusteeship
system.
At a cabinet meeting on March 9, 1945, Roosevelt talked
of his ideas on the trusteeship of the mandated islands.
Forrestal summarized the discussion in his diaryi
He [Roosevelt] said that his idea
which he advanced to Stalin and Churchill,
was based on the concept of what he called
multiple sovereignty - that is, sovereignty
would be vested in all of the United Nations,
for example, of the Pacific islands, but
that we would be requested by them to exer-
cise complete trusteeship for the purpose of
world security. He further said that the
Australians had advanced the theses that
they would take by direct acquisition every-
thing south of the equator, leaving to us
those islands north of that line [the man-
date]. This he said was unacceptable. I
said there were a number of places that we
ought to have for our naval security -
Kwajalein, the Marianas, Truk, etc. He also
included Manus in this category and said
that he would even be inclined to have mili-
tary rights on Noumea while leaving to the
French the economic accruals from New Cale-
donia. The Secretary of War [Stimson] ex-




idea was adopted the basis of our exer-
cise of powers under it would be very
clearly stated so that there could be
no misunderstandings in the future. 20
This account, if accurate, indicates Roosevelt's thoughts
on the sovereignty of the- islands had clarified since his
letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the past July, It was
the day after this cabinet meeting that Forrestal discussed
the matter with Admiral King. At the State-War-Navy Secre-
tarial Meeting on March 13th, Stimson repeated his concern
about the trusteeship concept and "told the Secretary of State
[Stettinius] he thought he would in due course have to get rid
of the gentleman [Leo Pas volsky] in his Department who was the
sponsor of this idea. The Secretary of State agreed, said he
21
had discussed this matter last night with Mr. Hull." This
was the first indication that Stettinius was not of the same
mind as Hull and Pasvolsky on this issue.
On March 15th, Mr. Charles W. Taussig, of the State Depart-
ment's Section on the Anglo-Caribbean Commission and later a
member of the American Delegation to San Francisco, met with
the President and briefed him on the trusteeship discussions
within the Inter-departmental Committee:
I outlined the agreement that had been
reached on the general category of strategic
areas, and told the President that the mili-
tary had indicated that they would interpret
strategic areas as an entire area - for
instance, all of the Japanese islands, north
of the Equator, that might come under the
20. Millie, ed., The Forrestal Diaries , p. 33.
21. Ibid. , p. 36.
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administration of the United States. I
told him that under their interpretation,
the entire group of islands irrespective
,
of whether they were fortified or not
would be exempt from substantially all
of the international agreements pertain-
ing to civilian populations; that the
military had been unwilling to agree to
divide strategic areas into two categories
- closed areas and open areas.
The President said that he would
favor these two categories and that the
open areas should be subject to interna-
tional agreements. He said that if the
military wanted, at a later date due to
change in strategy, to make all or part
of the open area a closed area, it should
be provided that this could be done with
the approval of the Security Council.
The President then asked me, "What
is the Navy's attitude in regard to terri-
tories? Are they trying to grab every-
thing?" I replied that they did not seem
to have much confidence in civilian con-
trols. The President then asked me how
I accounted for their attitude.
I said that I thought that the mili-
tary had no confidence in the proposed
United Nations Organization. The Presi-
dent replied that he thought that was so.
I told the President of the letter that
Admiral Willson showed me addressed to
the Secretary of the Navy, referring to
the need of sending representatives to
San Francisco in order to protect them-
selves against "the international welfare
boys." The President then said that nei-
ther the Army nor the Navy had any business
administering the civilian government of
territories: that they had no competence
to do this. 22
Forrestal met with Stimson and Assistant Secretary of War
McCloy on March 30, 1945; and they discussed their fears over
the trend of thinking on trusteeships. Stimson thought that
22. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945.
Vol. 1, pp. 121-122. Memorandum of Conversation with Presi-
dent by the Adviser on Caribbean Affairs (Taussig).
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the United States "might be tempted into making quixotic
gestures the net result of which might be that we would sur-
render the hardly won islands which we had taken in the Pacific
to the principle of trusteeship, whereas the British, Dutch,
23
and French would not." Stimson was also of the opinion
that the State Department proposals camouflaged the realities
©f the situation and were pointlessly roundabout.
The State Department proposals were
meticulously building up a world organiza-
tion which was to be the trustee and were
proposing that we should turn over these
bases to this trustee and then take back
the management of them and try to make the
powers of management big enough to give us
the power which we now hold from our efforts
in the war.... With that attitude [that the
defense of strategic islands was essential
to the United States and a definite advan-
tage to all Pacific powers] properly demon-
strated 1 feel sure that we could have met
with no objection to retaining enough bases
to secure our position in the Pacific. My
point was that we had always stood for free-
dom and peace in the Pacific and we had
waged this war to throw out an aggressor
ana to restore peace and freedom and every-
body knew it | that these bases had been
Stolen by the aggressor, who had used them
to attack us and destroy our power; that we
had fought this war with much cost of life
and treasure to capture these bases and to
free from the threat of aggression all of
the peace-loving nations of the Pacific,
We had actually thus saved from threat Aus-
tralia and the Philippines and we were engaged
in the process of doing it to the East Indies
and to China; that if we had called atten-
tion to all of this and then said that we
proposed to hold the bases which we now had
gained In this painful struggle as a means
and for the purpose of protecting freedom
and peace in the Pacific, no one would have
Objected* In other words, we should have
announced our possession with a declaration
23% Miliis, ed,, The Forrestal Diaries , p. 37.
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of trust in which all peace-loving nations
were the beneficiaries. 24
Stimson, therefore, proposed to Forrestal that a joint letter
be sent to the State Department expressing the view that "(a)
These islands were of primary importance not merely to the
security of the United States but of the world, and essential
to the success of any world security organization, (b) That
we propose not only to keep them but to exercise our ownership
as a trust on behalf of world security, not for any national
25
advantage M
A better idea was for a joint State-War-Navy letter to
the President; and at the meeting of the three secretaries on
April 2nd, Stimson presented a letter drafted by his Special
Assistant, Mr, Harvey H. Bundy. Surprisingly, Stettinius was
in agreement. It was decided to M try to get postponement of
the whole subject of trusteeships at the San Francisco Con-
ference, and that they should also draft a public statement,
to be made either by the President or the Secretary of State,
to the effect that the United States intended to keep the
islands but 'only for the continued insurance of peace and
26
liberty for all nations and peoples* adjacent to the Pacific."
The State Department immediately drafted a proposed memorandum
to the President to which segments of Bundy's draft were grafted.2'
24, Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and
War, pp. 601-602. [Diary, March 30, 1945 entry]
25. Millis, ed., The Forres tal Diaries, p. 38.
26. Ibid.
27, U. S. Naval Classified Archives Office, Proposed State
Department memorandum to the President, dated April 2, 1945,
Declassified, 1969, Secretary of the Navy (SC) A14-7/EF files.
See appendix B for a copy of this document.

96
On April 7th, Stettinius reported to his Staff Committee
that serious differences of opinion existed among State, War,
arid Navy Department officials regarding trusteeships, and he
was going to send a "short memorandum to the President present-
ing both sides and pointing out the importance of my discussing
28
it with the President and reaching a decision promptly."
Stettinius wrote in his diary that he was very dissatisfied
with the proposed trusteeship system developed by the ad hoc
inter-departmental committee which he claimed had been developed
while he was out of town and without full consultation with
hira (he had been at Yalta). Yet, he also wrote that the memo-
randum approved by Stimson and Forrestal did not fit with his
29
views either. Unfortunately, his own views were never
written down.
At the next Secretarial meeting on the 9th, Stettinius
informed Stimson and Forrestal that he "did not propose to
associate himself with the document • • . that he proposed to
let the document go as a statement by War and Navy, informing
the President that he reserved judgment." When Forrestal asked
him why he did not want to go along with the recommendation to
postpone trusteeship discussions at San Francisco, Stettinius
said "that while his private views accorded with ours, he was
30
under orders to the contrary," This comment by Stettinius
23. U. S. Department of State, FpreiRn Relations 1945.
Vol. 1, pp. 140-141. Extracts from the diary of Edward R.
Stettinius, Jr., March 18, 1945-April 7, 1945.
29. Ibid. . Vol. 1, pp. 209-210. Extracts from the diary
of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., April 8-14, 1945.
30. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, p. 38.
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is remarkable. The only person in the nation who can give
orders to the Secretary of State is the President, If it had
been the President, then Stettinius would probably have informed
the other two Secretaries of this so that they could plan accord-
ingly. The best guess would be Karry Hopkins or former , Secre-
tary Hull,
Secretary of the Interior Ickes had sent a letter drafted
by Under Secretary Abe Fortas to the President on April 5th
urgently recommending against any postponement of the discus-
sions at San Francisco on trusteeship. The letter, shown to
Stettinius by the President, may have had some influence on
Stettinius* actions. It stated*
I am considerably disturbed • .
.
as to the attitude of the Army and Navy i ...
with respect to the international trustee-
ship problem. Under Secretary Fortas, who
participated in the State-War-Navy-Interior
committee discussions of this problem, has
advised me from time to time of the atti-
tude taken by the representatives of the
various agencies, I understand that the
representatives of the Armed Forces have
indicated a strong feeling that the United
States should insist upon complete sover-
eignty of the Japanese mandated islands,
I am now informed that the War and Navy
Departments are urging that the matter of
international trusteeship should not be
discussed at the San Francisco Conference,
or at least should not be discussed until
there is a firm agreement as to United
States jurisdiction over the Japanese man-
dated islands,
I agree that the United States should
be the administering power for the Japanese
mandated islands. The arrangement worked
out, by the interdepartmental committee seems
to me to assure to the Government all of the
rights which it could desire for security
purposes. The only question in ray mind is
whether the arrangement has not gone too
far in providing a scheme by which these
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areas may be exempted from international
accountability. But I feel most strongly
that if the United States should insist
» upon complete sovereignty, an interna-
tional grab-bag would result.... I also
feel that it would be a mistake to fail
to reach an agreement on the subjects of
mandated territories and dependent areas
at the San Francisco Conference. The
elimination of this topic from the agenda
of the Conference would arouse suspicions
and would be a continuing source of hos-
tility and distrust. 31
At the President's press conference of April 5th (his
last press conference) , he indicated he wanted the islands
placed under a trusteeship by saying when asked whether the
controlling government in the islands would be the United
States, "I would say the United Nations. Or it might be
called the world, which has been much abused and now will
32
have the chance to prevent any more abuse," Another account
records he said, "the United States and the other United Nations
must accept trusteeships over Japanese mandate islands, build
33
new naval and air bases.,." This statement to the press made
while Roosevelt was in Warm Springs may also have influenced
Stettinius.
James MacGregor Burns poignantly describes the President's
health at this time by recalling, "at the end of March Roosevelt
31. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945,
Vol. 1, pp. 198-199. Secretary of Interior to the President,
April 5, 1945. An apparent earlier draft of this letter,
stronger in tone but without substantive difference, is on
file at U, S. National Archives, U. S. Department of the
Interior, Office of Territories, RG 48, Box 2879.
32. Samuel I. Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses o f
Franklin D. Roosevelt (9 vols., New Yorki Random House, 1938-
1950), Vol. XIII, p. 610.
33. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945, Vol. 1,
pp. 282-283. Secretary of State to the President, April 13, 1945,
See also: The New York Times . April 13, 1945.
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left for Warm Springs. The usual crowd was waiting when the
train pulled into the little Georgia town. There was the usual
bustle of activity at the end of the rear car. But something
was different. Roosevelt's big frame, slumped in the wheel
chair, seemed to joggle slightly as he was rolled along the
platform. His face, once so strong and well fleshed, seemed
wasted? the jaw, once so firm, quivered perceptibly. A murmur
34
swept through the crowd."
On April 9th, Stettinius sent to the President the trustee-
ship plan as developed by the inter-departmental committee
along with a long letter detailing the differing views of the
State Department and the War and Navy Departments . He did not
take any position in the letter but merely asked for a meeting
35
of all concerned with the President.
That same day, the Secretaries of War and Navy discussed
the situation over the telephone; and their staffs drafted a
joint letter to the President explaining their position and
including a proposed declaration of policy for public release
stating that the Pacific islands would be retained by the United
States for strategic reasons. This letter was not smoothed
out until the 13th. In the meantime, the President had recei-
ved Stettinius' letter and cabled from Warm Springs on the 10th,
"Your message on International Trusteeship is approved in prin-
ciple, I will see your representative and that of the Army
34, James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt; the Lion and the
Fox
, p. 471.
35. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945 .




and Navy on the 19th. That will be time enough. And if you
36
have already left I will, of course, see you on the 25th."
On the afternoon of the 12th, the President died; and Stettinius




early conference on the question with all concerned.
The issue was next taken up at a high-level conference
held at the State Department on the 16th. Those present were:
Stettinius, Stimson, Forrestal, Joseph C. Grew, James C. Dunn,
Leo Pasvolsky, Harvey H. Bundy (Special Assistant to the Secre-
tary of War) , and Major Mathias F. Correa (Special Assistant
to the Secretary of the Navy). At the outset of the meeting,
it was agreed that the issue of international trusteeships
would not be eliminated from discussion at San Francisco. Next,
Secretary Stettinius urged that the declaration of policy annexed
to the draft letter of the Secretaries of the Navy and War dated
April 13, 1945, not be promulgated at this time "because of the
effect it would have on the other nations participating in the
38
conference." It was agreed it would not be announced at that
time but "at some future date such a declaration would be
39
promulgated."
36. Ibid. Footnote to p. 211,
37. Ibid. , Vol. 1, pp. 282-283, Secretary of State to
the President, April. 13, 1945.
38. U. S. Naval Classified Archives Office, Major Correa
to Secretary Forrestal, dated April 16, 1945, declassified
June 20, 1969, Secretary of the Navy files, (3C) A14-7/EF. See





The statement of policy, that was drafted by Mr. Bundy,
was premised on the United States entering into discussions
»
on a trusteeship system at San Francisco. It declared that
the United States does not seek annexation
of territory or economic wealth but stra-
tegic rights in a certain number of these
islands and atolls [in the Pacific^ are
vital to any effective military guaranty
of peace in the Pacific,.., In order to
discharge its responsibility as a champion
of peace and freedom in the Pacific, it
will be necessary for the United States to
have these strategic rights and such rights
will involve complete control in the case
of certain atolls in the Pacific.,,,
The United States Government considers
that it would be entirely practicable under
a trusteeship system to provide, by agree-
ments, for the maintenance of such United
States military and strategic rights and
control as will be necessary to assure
peace and security in the Pacific Ocean
or elsewhere in the world, 40
The wording is of importance since the Joint Chiefs of
Staff were still remaining firm on their position that any
discussions or agreement on a trusteeship system did not prej-
udice the ultimate decision for the disposition of the Japanese
mandated islands. This draft statement indicates that Forrestal
and Stimson were now willing to have the islands as a strategic
trusteeship on the condition that the United States had absolute
control. The actual draft letter of April 13, 1945, has not
yet been located to confirm this, but subsequent statements by
Forrestal and Stimson, especially at the April 17 conference,
would seem to support this conclusion.
40, U. S. Naval Archives Office, Draft Declaration of
United States Policy, HHB #2, April 16, 1945, Declassified,
1969, Secretary of the Navy files, (SC) A14-7/EF. See Appendix
D for a copy of this document.

102
To continue with the conference on the 16th, Forrestal
then asked Stettinius whether or not it would embarrass him
if, the Secretaries of War and Navy were to send to the Presi-
dent their draft letter that detailed their positions.
Stettinius replied it would be embarrassing at that time and
"asked that the sending of such a statement be deferred 'for
a few days.' The implication of his statement, although it
was not entirely clear, was that he did not wish such a state-
ment to go forward to the President until the San Francisco
Conference was finished or at least until it was well under
way. The Secretaries of War and Navy indicated that they
41
acquiesced in his request." It was also agreed that the
United States draft on trusteeship (the one approved "in
principle" by President Roosevelt) would include language that
made it clear the United States did not commit itself to plac-
ing any particular territory under the system. The formula
worked out at this meeting was that the draft was changed to
read i "It shall be a matter for subsequent agreement as to
which specific territories within the foregoing categories
should be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what
42
terms."
Finally, Forrestal asked that the United States draft be
further changed to provide that the initial negotiation of
41. U. 3. Naval Classified Archives Office, Major Correa
to Secretary Forrestal, dated April 16, 1945, Declassified




trusteeship agreements for strategic areas would be in the
Security Council rather than in the General Assembly.
»
Dr. Pasvolsky dissented, believing all negotiations should
be made with the General Assembly but was overruled. It is
apparent that Forrestal and Stimson were still keeping their
options open by including a statement that the United States
was not committed to placing any particular territory under
the system. At the same time, they were also stiffening the
strategic trusteeship provisions in case the islands were
ever placed under that category.
On the 17th, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy
met with the full United States Delegation to San Francisco
43
and discussed their decisions of the day before. At this
meeting on the 17th, Forrestal expressed his fundamental
philosophy on civil-military relations and on this issue in
particular:
1. Both the Army and Navy are aware
that they are not makers of policy but they
have a responsibility to define to the makers
of policy what they be lieve are the military
necessities of the United States, both for
its own defense and for the imp 1 indentation
of its responsibility for maintenance of
world peace.... 2. I take it as a premise
about all discussions of world peace that
the United States is to have the major re-
sponsibility for the Pacific Ocean security,
and if this premise is accepted there flows
from it the acceptance of the fact that the
United States must have the means with which
to implement its responsibilities.... 5. I
closed by re-emphasizing the fact that re-
tention of power by the United States was
43. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Affairs 1945 , Vol. 1,
pp. 311-322. Eleventh meeting (Executive Session) of U. S. Dele-
gation, April 17, 1945.
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not inconsistent with the work on and the
hopes for a world peace organization - that
those that hate war must have the power to
prevent it . [Emphasis added] 44
Senator Vandenberg, a member of the delegation, noted of
this conference that Stimson made a "particularly moving
speech - told of the mistake we made after the last war in
letting Japan get these mandated islands.... He said he didn't
care so much about the 'title* to these islands if we have
45
absolute , undisputed control over our base needs." This is
a different attitude than Secretary Stimson revealed in his
diary on March 30th, Unfortunately, there is no mention of
this conference or any change in attitude in his memoirs.
While noting that Forrestal backed up Stimson "100%", Senator
Vandenburg wrote that he himself agreed with the State Depart-
ment which insisted "that this [control over the islands^ must
be accomplished without setting a precedent for all the other
Big Powers to take what they claim they need for their defense
46
(precisely as Russia is already doing)." It is difficult to
tell whether this comment about Forrestal referred to his
backing Stimson on the necessity for complete control over the
islands or to backing Stimson' s view that the "title" to the
islands did not matter as long as the United States had control.
There is no clear mention of this fine distinction in Forrestal'
s
diary, Forrestal is clearly for absolute control, but he does
44. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries , p. 45,
45. Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed,, The Private Papers of




not mention whether he is still for annexation at this time
or whether he now supports a strong strategic trusteeship for
the islands.
That night, and at the Delegation meeting the next day,
the final wording of the trusteeship plan and a United States
trusteeship policy was hammered out. Stettinius was able to
submit a mutually agreeable policy recommendation to the Presi-
47
dent. The President approved it the same day. The policy,
not intended for publication but intended mainly as a guideline
for the American Delegation at San Francisco, stated:
It is not proposed at San Francisco
to determine the placing of any particular
territory under a trusteeship system. All
that will be discussed there will be the
possible machinery of such a system.
The United States Government considers
that it would be entirely practicable to
devise a trusteeship system which would
apply only to such territories in the follow-
ing categories as may, by trusteeship arrange-
ments, be placed thereunder, namely* (a) terri-
tories now held under mandate: (b) territories
which may be detached from enemy states as a
result of this war; and (c) territories volun-
tarily placed under the system by states re-
sponsible for their administration. It shall
be a matter for subsequent agreement as to
which of the specific territories within the
foregoing categories shall be brought under
the trusteeship system and upon what terms.
This system would provide, by agreements,
for (1) the maintenance of United States mili-
tary and strategic rights, (2) such control
as will be necessary to assure general peace
and security in the Pacific Ocean area as well
as elsewhere in the world, and (3) the advance-
ment of the social, economic, and political
welfare of the inhabitants of the dependent
territories. 43
47. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Affairs 1945 ,
Vol. 1, pp. 350-351. Secretaries of State, War, and Navy to




This policy is a far step from that which was behind the
initial plans drafted by the State Department in 1942 and 1943.
The military leaders, however, were still absolutely for
annexation and feared that control of the islands might be in-
advertently lost at San Francisco by some "quixotic" gesture.
They decided (undoubtedly on an individual basis) to take the
issue to the public in order to gain additional support.
Admiral King publically called for retention and asked "how
long can the United States afford to continue a cycle of fight-
ing and building and winning and giving away, only to fight
49
and build and win and give away again?" Admiral Nimitz on
Guam told reporters that the Marianas and Iwo Jima were "vital
to our defense in the future.,.. Those islands are as impor-
50
tant to the United States as the Hawaiian Islands." Support
quickly came. Former Admiral Hart, now a Senator from Connect
-
51
icut, made similar statements. The Senate Naval Affairs Com-
mittee sent a subcommittee, headed by Senator Harry F. Byrd
(D. Va.), to oversee the American Delegation at San Francisco
"to see that the United States got control of the mandated
52
islands,"
49. Army and Navy Journal , Vol. 82 (April 7, 1945),
p. 987. Also i The New York Time s, April 5, 1945, and U. S.
Congressional Record Appendix
. 79th Cong., 1st sess,, pp.
A1660 and A1706.
50. The New York Times . April 13, 1945.
51. Address given April 22, 1945, over NBC network.
Quoted in: Earl S. Pomeroy, Pacific Outpost : American Strategy
in Guam and Micronesia (Stanford, California: Stanford Univer-
sity Press, 1951), p. 170.
52. The New York Times . May 4, 1945, and May 8, 1945.
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The Joint Chiefs of Staff had representatives on the
delegation as advisers who briefed Governor Stassen, the
American representative on the Big Five discussions and on
Committee II/4 which was writing the trusteeship section of
the Charter. They ensured that there was no deviation from
53
the policy approved by the President on April 18, 1945.
Secretary Forrestal received almost daily reports on
the subject of trusteeships from his Special Assistant, Keith
54
Kane, who was an adviser to the American Delegation. No
amendments were submitted to the trusteeship plan that would
have seriously harmed American security interests. One amend-
ment, to include "independence" as a political goal for depen-
dent areas rather just "self-determination" created a stir
55
between the Navy and the Interior Department, The delegation
refused to get involved in an inter-departmental fight, and
the situation was finally resolved by avoiding the word "inde-
pendence" in Article 73(b) and to qualify the term in Article
76(b). Actually, in regards to the declaration on dependent
areas (Article 73), the Navy did not consider the term in that
53. U. S, Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945
.
Vol. 1, pp. 448-452, 1205-1206, 1209, 1279-1280, 1303, 1417-
1421. Minutes of U, S, Delegation meetings,
54. U. S, Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandums
from Major Correa to Secretary Forrestal transmitting reports
from Keith Kane, dated April 30-May 25, 1945, All declassified
June 20, 1969, Includes State Department drafts of April 17
and 26, 1945, Secretary of the Navy files, A14-7/EF.
55. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945 .





§6ntext to be of military concern. The military was more
worried about the trusteeship system than about policies deal-
ing with dependent areas. Overall, the final forms of the
Ghapters of the United Nations Charter that cover trusteeships,
Shatters Xlt and XIII , did not vary to any major extent from
the American trusteeship plan of March 17, 1945, and the Presi-
dential Policy on Trusteeship of April 18, 1945.
0f interest Is that the representatives of Australia, New
Zealand, and The Netherlands felt free to state publically
that the United States should retain control of the islands,
§6me advocating annexation and others stating that they did
not care whether It was done by annexation or by trusteeship.
Little "press reaction against retention was shown. Annette
Baker Fox wrote a memorandum in March 1945 for the Yale Insti-
tute of international Studies advocating, after considering
Various alternative solutions and rejecting annexation because
§£ the Atlantic Charter commitment, that the United States be
the soie administrator of the islands under a revised mandate
%^stern Which wouio* '"permit the fortification of these islands
for the use of at least One Of the guardians of peace in the
Pacific." Only one relatively unknown commentator, Frederick J.
56 •. U> S: Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum
from -Major Gorrea to Secretary Forrestal transmitting reports
from Keith Kane, -May 2-1
:
, 1945. Declassified June 20, 1969,
Secretary e-'i" the Navy -files* A14-7/EF.
%7«b fee New York times * April 20, 1945, quoting Dr. Herbert
V*. Evat't', -Australian Minister for External Affairs; The New York
quoi
58. Annette Baker Fox, '"The Disposition of Enemy Dependent
Areas," Yale Institute of International Studies . Memorandum




Libby, warned against "territorial aggression." It appears
that almost all Americans were in favor of retaining control
over the islands with a division in opinion over the legal
form of control, whether by strategic trusteeship or by annex-
ation, with the annexationists the most vocal side at this
point. For example, a Charles M. Davis, in a paper presented
to a foreign relations conference on the United States in the
post-war world held July 23 - August 3, 1945, analyzed the
Pacific frontiers that the United States would have after the
war. He stated:
certainly the first problem which will arise
from the conclusion of the war in the Pacific
will be the disposition of the islands lately
under Japanese mandate. To Americans as well
as to many other peoples the solution is funda-
mentally simple; the United States will take
them over. There are few reasons why we should
not do this, and there are strong ones why we
should..,. Our experience in Pacific colonial
administration has included three types of
governmenti the trusteeship in which we have
held the Philippines; the economic-strategic
administration of Hawaii, by which we have
added to the economy of the islands and they
to ours; and the naval government, which has
controlled Guam, Wake, Yap, and some of the
Line Islands between Hawaii and the Samoans,
This third type is the one which is likely to
be exercised over the mandated islands, 60
Secretary Stettinius felt the need to state publically that
the United Nations Charter sufficiently safeguarded American
59. United States News . Vol. 18 (May 11, 1945), p. 30.
60, Charles M, Davis, "Problems in the Southwest Pacific,"
in William S. Willcox and Robert B. Hall, ed. , The United States
in the Postwar World t Add resses Given at the 1945 Summer Confer-
ence o f the "Universit y of Michigan (Ann Arbor « The University




security interests in the Pacific. He also felt the need
for a formal military endorsement of the Charter for insur-
ance purposes and for use in the Senate Hearings on the
62
Charter. The Joint Chiefs of Staff gave their endorsement
on June 23, 1945, stating- they were "of the opinion that the
military and strategic implications of this draft charter as
a whole are in accord with the military interests of the
63
United States." This statement was not a change of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff position that American control of the
mandated islands by sovereignty was considered by them as
the only sure way of guaranteeing American strategic rights.
The military was to continue until late October 1946 their
unsuccessful fight against the application of the strategic
trusteeship system to those islands.
The "annexationists" feeling of success at the San
Francisco results was shaken by President Truman's statement
enroute to Potsdam on July 20, 1945, that "we are not fighting
for conquest. There is not one piece of territory or one
61. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 7, No. 310
(June 3, 1945), Secretary of State speech of May 28, 1945.
Also: Secretary of State statement, U. S. Congress, Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings . The Charter of the
United Nations . 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, p. 221,
62. U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations 1945 ,
Vol. 1, p. 1355, Minutes of 76th meeting of the U. S.
Delegation, June 19, 1945.
63. Ibid. . Vol. 1, pp. 1430-1431. Secretary of War
and Secretary of the Navy to Secretary of State, June 26,
1945, Also: U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Hearings , The Charter of the United Nations ,




thing of monetary value that we want out of this war."
Their spirits were slightly lifted when the Potsdam Declara-
tion reaffirmed the Cairo Declaration's terms that Japanese
sovereignty would be limited to the four main islands and
65
"such minor islands as we determine,"
President Truman must have thoroughly confused the issue
when he stated in a broadcast, August 9, 1945, in his report
on the Potsdam Conference:
...though the United States wants no terri-
tory or profit or selfish advantage out of
this war, we are going to maintain the mili-
tary bases necessary for the complete pro-
tection of our interests and world peace.
Bases which our military experts . deem to be
essential for our protection and which are
not now in our possession, we will acquire.
We will acquire them by arrangements con-
sistent with the United Nations Charter,""
It would seem clear that Forrestal and Stimson did after all
take their letter and statement of policy to the President and
this was the result. No evidence has yet been located concern-
ing the background of this particular statement.
The August 9, 1945, statement, of course, raised many
questions. Were the mandated islands considered already in
our possession? Or were they to be "acquired", by arrangements
"consistent with the United Nations Charter?" What did the
President mean by that phrase? That the United States would
64, Cdr. Dorothy E. Richard, USNR, United States Naval
Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
(3 vols., Washington: U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 1957), Vol. 2,p.6£
65, U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 13, No. 318
(July 29, 1945), Potsdam Declaration, p. 137.
66, U. S, Department of State Bulletin, Vol, 13, No, 320
(August 12, 1945), President's broadcast August 9, 1945, p. 208,
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refrain from the use of force in acquiring bases? This
could be a logical interpretation to avoid worrying the cur-
»
rent possessors of bases that the United States wanted. It
was well known that the United States was pressuring Australia
for cession of a base on Manus island as well as desiring other
bases around the world. Or did he mean consistent with the
trusteeship provisions of the Charter, as many liberals took
it to imply?
When the war ended on September 2, 1945, with Japan
accepting the terms of the Potsdam Declaration by the instru-
ment of surrender, the disposition of the mandated islands




AND DEBATE LEADING TO THE FINAL DECISION
Secretary Forrestal obtained President Truman's consent
to naval administration of the Marianas on August 14, 1945
j
and on September 11th, the President approved naval adminis-
tration over the rest of the mandated islands as "interim
arrangements pending study and recommendation by the State,
1
War, and Navy Departments." The Interior Department must
have heard of this action because the next day Acting Secre-
tary of the Interior, Abe Fortas, sent a letter to the Presi-
dent while his superior, Harold L, Ickes, was in London.
Fortas informed the President that he had asked the Division
of Territories and Island Possessions to make a study of the
problems of the mandated islands. He concluded by asking, "I
hope that you will advise the Secretaries of State, War, and
the Navy and Secretary Ickes that you wish the Interior Depart
-
2
ment to participate in the discussion of this problem,"
Fortas did not have to fear Ickes' disapproval, for Ickes*
3
opinion of naval administration was well known.
1. Cdr. Dorothy E. Richard, USNR, United States Naval
Administration of the Trus t Territory of the Pacific Island s
(3 vols. , Washington* U. S. Government Printing Office, 1957),
Vol. 2, pp. 70-71.
2. Harry S. Truman Library, Abe Fortcis to President,
September 28, 1945, Official file, 85-L.
3. See i Harold L. Ickes, "The Navy at Its Worst," Collier's
Vol. 118 (August 31, 1946), pp. 22-23, 67 and below pp. 124-125




The President, however, sat on the letter j and Secretary
Ickes wrote a letter on October 18th to remind the President
of» Fortas 1 letter and to "offer the suggestion that a joint
expert group representing the four Departments visit the Paci-
fic islands for the purpose of preparing for you a detailed
plan for iterim administration, pending decisions and agree-
ments concerning future disposition and administration of the
4
islands.*' President Truman sent a memorandum to the four
Secretaries on October 20, 1945, appointing them as a committee
to study the problem.
Following the appointment of the Cabinet Committee, repre-
sentatives of the four Secretaries met on October 25, 1945, and
decided to establish a subcommittee to prepare a draft of a
recommendation for the Cabinet Committee's consideration. The
State Department representative, Mr. Fred Searles.Jr., delayed
convening the subcommittee's first meeting. A bitter exchange
of letters occurred between Secretary Ickes and Secretary Byrnes
,
and the subcommittee finally met on January 30, 1946. Mr. Edwin
G. Arnold, the Interior Department's Director of the Division
of Territories and Island Possessions, submitted a proposal for
civil administration of the islands i only to have the State,
War, and Navy representatives adopt a resolution that Interior
"polish up the plan" , for the subcommittee to submit it to the
superior committee with the recommendation
that no action be taken until final decision
is reached as to trusteeship and as to the
disposition of military bases within the
4. Harry S. Truman Library, Ickes to President, October
18, 1945, Official file, 85-L.
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Islands under consideration, including not
only the islands derived from conquest of
Japan, but also those under negotiation
with Britain, France, Nether land East
,
Indies, Australia, and New Zealand.
5
This was rightly considered by Interior as a delaying tactic.
The "polished" proposal was forwarded on February 20, 1946, and
considered by the Secretaries of State, Navy, and War on Febru-
ary 28, 1946, These Secretaries unanimously recommended to
the President on March 6, 1946, that "no action should be
taken on the proposal by the Committee until such time as the
status and title of the Pacific islands concerned should be
6
determined," The Department of the Interior was not even
informed of this action until June 8, 1946. Secretary Byrnes
delayed any action because he felt that the status of the
islands should be settled at the peace conference, and then
the question of which agency should permanently administer
the islands should be discussed.
The Secretaries of War and Navy blocked action since they
were quarreling over which one should have the civil adminis-
8
tration of the islands. Agreement was reached among themselves
5, U. S. National Archives, Department of the Interior,
Office of Territories, A Review of Correspondence and Discus-
sions on Pacific Islands Administration, August 1945 to March
1945, declassified 1969, RG 48, Office files of Oscar Chapman.
6« Ibid
.
. Background Information Memorandum, dated May 1,
1947, signed by Roy E. James, RG 48, File 9-0-7.
7, Harry S. Truman Library, James F. Byrnes to President,
January 5, 1946, Official file, 85-L.
8, Admiral Nimitz felt so strongly that the islands should
be administered by only one agency that he .recommended Interior
for the job if the Army continued to stand firm on its demands
for Saipan, Tinian, Midway, Wake and Kwajalein. U. S. Naval
Archives Office, Note by Admiral Edwards on memorandum from
M. B. Gardner to Admiral King, November 15, 1945, declassified




that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would have the strategic
responsibility for such decisions as the number, types, and
locations of bases. The Joint Chiefs of Staff still maintained
their view that the " is lands should be under permanent and ex-
9
elusive United States control." Another reason for the block-
age was given by the new Secretary of the Interior, J. A. "Cap"
Krug, after he arranged for the President to send a letter to
the other Secretaries ordering the Four Secretary Committee to
meet. This was in Hay 1947, after the decision had been made
to submit the islands to the United Nations as a strategic
trusteeship. Secretary Krug gave this report of his first
conference on the issue with Secretary of State Marshall,
Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, and Secretary of War Patterson:
he [Patterson]] said when President named
this four-man committee, Byrnes decided it
was useless to sit down with Iekes. He
said something to the effect that he
wouldn't sit down with him and that was
the end of it. Then directed Fred Searles
to get hold of Abe Fortas and work thing
out and Patterson says that was done, but
so far as I know, nothing was done. Diffi-
culty arose over feeling of all three
[Marshall, Forrestal, and Patterson]] of
them. One thing we have to keep in mind
in our dealings on these matters is that
military people are just full of instances
where civilian government has worked bad
in time of emergency. 10
The President's Navy Day speech on October 27th repeated
the pledge that the United States did not seek "one inch of
territory in any place in the world. Outside of the right to
9, Richard, Naval Adm inistration of the Trust Territory .
Vol. 3, p. 5.
10, Library of Congress, Transcript of telephone call




establish necessary bases for our own protection, we look for
11
nothing which belongs to any other power." Yet, this state-
ment could also be read different ways.
Meanwhile, the question remained alive in the public
domain. The Commission To Study The Organization Of Peace
urged the placement of the islands under the trusteeship system.
It's phamplet stated in respect to President Truman's August 9
statement that, "consistency with the United Nations Charter
can only mean in the case of strategic areas acquired from
Japan trusteeship under the supervision of the Security
12
Council." The American Association for the United Nations
criticized the government on December 23, 1945, for being
"strangely silent" on any official statement of policy toward
13
the mandated islands.
The Soviet Union was also curious to know the American
policy. At the first meeting of the three Foreign Ministers
in Moscow on December 16, 1945, Molotov asked Byrnes what the
United States intended to do with the islands. Byrnes told
him that the government's views had not yet been formulated
and that the only agreements concerning Japanese islands in
the Pacific were the Cairo Declaration and the Yalta agree-
14
ment regarding Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands.
11. R ichard , Naval Administration of the Trust Territory
,
Vol. 3, p. 8.
12. "The United States and the International Trusteeship
System," Commission To Study The Organization Of Peace , New
York, September, 1941), p. 6.
13. Vernon McKay, "International Trusteeship - Role of
United Nations in the Colonial World," Foreign Policy Report ,
Vol. 22, No. 5 (May 15, 1946).
14. James F. Byrnes, Snoak
i
x\r Frank 1y , p. 218,
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Thus, Byrnes kept his options open while gently reminding the
Russians that jlf the United States kept the mandates, the
Soviet Union had nothing to complain about as they had South-
ern Sakhalin and the Kuriles.
Just before the First Session of the United Nations General
Assembly opened in London on January 10, 1946, General George
C. Kenney, USA, Air Representative on the United Nations Mili-
tary Staff Committee, told newsmen at a press conference that
the United States should annex all the Japanese islands that
15
it needed, Forrestal recites that Byrnes, at a cabinet meet-
ing on January 29, told of his "difficulties with Senator
Vandenberg and John Foster Dulles, who, spurred on by General
Kenney during conversations on the way over on the boat, let
the word leak out that there was dissatisfaction with the Ameri-
can policy and position on trusteeship.,.. Byrnes said that
the fact had to be faced that Vandenberg' s - and for that
matter Dulles* s - activities from now on could be viewed as
16
being conducted on a political and partisan basis,"
Perhaps because of the leaks, press speculations, political
overtones, and foreign inquiries at London, Byrnes suddenly
cabled home on January 15th asking the President for permis-
sion to state that the United States would be prepared to
trustee the islands "either under ordinary trusteeship arrange-
17
ments or as strategic areas,"
15, Richard, Naval Administration of the Trust Territory,
Vol, 3, p, 10, See alsoi Hans W, Weigert, "U, S. Strategic" Bases
and Collective Security," Foreign Affairs. Vol. 25 (1947), pp.
250-262.
16, Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries , p. 132.
17, Richard, Naval Administration of the Trust Territory ,
Vol. 3, p. 11.

119
The President held a news conference on the same day,
it is not known if he had already received the cable, and
»
stated in ambiguous language his policy on the islands. The
Department of State Radio Bulletin of January 15, 1946, reported:
The President declared that those
(islands) we do not need will be placed
under UNO trusteeship, and those we need
we will keep. Asked how long we intended
to keep these islands, Mr. Truman said,
as long as we needed them, , . . Asked if
they would be under individual trusteeship
of this country, President replied in the
affirmative in regard to those islands we
need.... Asked if we would have to ask
UNO's authority for our individual trustee-
ships, President replied affirmatively. .. **
The President also said that some islands would be under
individual trusteeship as well as collective trusteeship, "but
that policy would have to be worked out by the United Nations
as it went along. He said that we had not demanded any of the
19
islands we need,"
Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson, meanwhile, obtained
the President's consent for Byrnes to make a statement that the
United States would be prepared to trustee the islands "either
under ordinary trusteeship arrangements or as strategic areas,"
and so cabled Byrnes on the 17th without ever having consulted
the Army or the Navy, It is as yet unknown who within the
State Department took the initiative in proposing this action
to Dean Acheson, Forrestal heard of it on the 20th and the
next day took the Under Secretary of War, Kenneth Royall, with
18, U, S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol, 14, No. 343




him to see the President. Forrestal wrote in his diary»
Royall and I said that we thought it
was a most unwise and precipitate decision
and requested the President to tell Byrnes
not to make any such statement. He said
that the message had gone today requesting
Byrnes not to commit this country to any
definitive position; it was not clear to
me, however, whether he meant that Byrnes
was not to make any statement.
I told the President that I think
Acheson's method of securing his approval
to Mr. Byrnes' request was not consistent
with our general ideas of cooperation be-
tween War, State, and Navy, and rather in
my opinion was a desertion of the general
idea of cooperation by getting hasty deci-
sions out of him on behalf of a particular
point of view, and I told him I propose to
make such a representation to Acheson in
very strong terms. He said he hoped I
would ....
This incident is a reflection of the
rapidly vanishing determination in America
to see to it that we do not repeat the mis-
takes of 1918-19 when the formerly German-
owned islands of the Pacific were turned
over to Japan and Australia , . • under a
secret agreement between England and Japan
without American knowledge until after it
was a fait accompli . It is a case for the
greatest concern to see this tendency develop-
ing so soon in the attitude of the State.
Department. 20
There is no account of this incident in Truman's, Byrnes',
or Acheson's memoirs.
Forrestal had found out about the cables from his repre-
sentative attending the SWNCC meeting on the afternoon of
January 20th. His representative, probably Under Secretary
John L. Sullivan although no record exists of his name, and
War's representative, Mr, Howard C. Peterson, had learned of
20, Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries , pp. 130-131.
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the situation from Mr. H. Freeman Mathews, the State Depart-
ment representative. The War and Navy men were astonished
»
and felt that the President should not commit the government
without consulting War and Navy. The Navy representative
reported that he understood that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
were taking an unsolicited position on this, and that Admiral
Leahy was transmitting that position to the President, Peterson
confirmed that fact, and the two of them convinced Mathews that
the Joint Chiefs of Staff's views should be brought to Acheson's
attention at oncej and that Acheson should be urged to cable
Byrnes "requesting him to make no statement until advised
further after consultation with the President. The cables
sent to Byrnes last night, with the President's approval, were
the result. It was at this point that I [Patterson"! called
21
you at the White House to advise you of the facts."
Therefore, Forrestal knew of the cables that were sent
to Byrnes on the night of the 20th. Ke perhaps did not know
their exact content but did know that action had been taken
to prevent the government from being committed. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff had fired off a quick letter notifying the
Secretary of State, and indirectly the President, that they
still considered it essential to national defense for the
United States to gain strategic control of the mandated islands
22
by assuming full sovereignty. The Chiefs had evidently kept
close watch on the whole situation.
21. U. S. Naval Classified .A.rchives Office, Memorandum to
Forrestal, unsigned, on SWNCC meeting January 21, 1946, SWNCC
249 files.
22. Richard , Naval Administration of the Trust Territo ry
,






On January 22, Acheson held a news conference and stated
that in respect to strategic trusteeship agreements, a refusal
of* any of the five permanent members of the Security Council
would mean there would be no agreement j and the result would
be to maintain the status qjjo. These words implied that the
United States had nothing to fear from a failure to reach an
agreement protecting American strategic interests. If the
United States did not like the final draft trusteeship agree-
ment, there would be no obligation to accept itj and the status
.
quo would be maintained. Furthermore, he pointed out that
once such an agreement had been signed, it could not be changed
without the consent of the United States, thanks to the veto
power. In other words, the only way the United Nations would
get the mandated islands under a trusteeship agreement would
be by accepting terms agreeable to the United States. When a
-reporter a.sked him if the United States did not have to wait
until a peace conference awarded the area to the United States
before we could make decisions on trusteeship, Dean Acheson
replied he did not think it was necessary and that one could
23
proceed in any order "that the nations think best."
The press reports and public reaction increased in atten-
tion rather than decreased after the President's statement of
the 15th, James Reston in The New York Times reported that the
Army and Navy, with the support of many Senators and Represen-
tatives, were still not reconciled to the trusteeship formula,
23. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 14, No. 344,




even under the strategic formula. An informal poll conducted
by The New York Times among a limited number of Senators and
Representatives indicated more sentiment for annexation than
25
for "individual trusteeship under the U.N.O."
In February, the news of the Yalta decision concerning
the granting of Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands to
the Soviet Union was publically revealed, and this informa-
tion only increased the cry for annexation. Senator Byrd of
Virginia stated that it would be "absurd" to consider placing
Pacific bases under trusteeship when the Soviet Union was gain-
26
ing sovereignty over the Kuriles. Former President Hoover
spoke out in favor of annexation at the graduation ceremonies
of the School of Naval Administration at Stanford. Hoover
believed that "the holding of these islands is not an exten-
sion of imperialism because we have no designs of economic
exploitation.
. . • What we are doing is looking after not only
our own defense but we are looking after the defense of the
27
world as a whole,"
In March, 1946, a survey of American public opinion by
the National Opinion Research Center of the University of
Denver showed 40% of the American people were for outright
ownership of the islands, 28% were for American Operation
24. The New York Times . January 17, 1946.
25. Ibid
.
, January 31, 1946.
26. Richard, Naval Administrat ion of the Trust Territory.
Vol. 3, p. 16.
27. Ibid. , pp. 16-17,
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without ownership, and 25% were for the United States shar-
28
ing its control with other members of the United Nations.
Prbfessor W. H. Hobbs was interested enough to write a book
that examined each island for its strategic value, its suita-
bility for naval bases, gun positions, air-strips, and sea-
29
plane bases in relation to its location, form, and weather.
Opposition to the annexationists was minor but vocal.
Secretary Ickes and Forrestal had bitter words whenever the
subject of naval administration was raised. Secretary Ickes
took his views to the public as soon as he left office. On
May 29, 1946, he (out of office) delivered a speech entitled,
"Meet the Navy" before a joint meeting of the Institute of
Ethnic Affairs and the Institute of Pacific Relations. Ke
severely criticized the government for not having prepared a
trusteeship agreement for the islands. Blasting the Navy for
desiring a strategic trusteeship (which actually it did not
want) in order that it could keep its administration of depen-
dent peoples "top secret," he continued by saying:
It i'-It is time that the State Department
ceased to be beguiled by the pleasant
tinkle of brass and the luster of gold
braid, for it is the Navy which has largely
been responsible for our moral failure to
date as to our dependencies.... Naval
absolutism sneers at every Constitutional
guarantee
. .
. The Navy is arbitrary, dic-
tatorial and utterly disregardful of
civilian rights ...
28. Jane Bedell, "In Trust We Annex," New Republic
.
Vol. 116, No, 11 (March 17, 1947), p. 31.
29, W. H. Hobbs, Fortress Islands of the Pacific (Ann
Arbor, Michigan* J. W. Edwards, 1945,
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The Navy is bent upon ruling these
island peoples and it is determined that
they shall not have those rights which
the Charter of the United Nations guar-
,
anteesj that they shall not have self-




The ultra-liberal Institute of Ethnic Affairs, under
John Collier (Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1933-1945,
Editor of the Guam Echo , published in Washington) contended
that military security and trusteeship under the General
Assembly were compatable and that the United States should
place the islands under a General Assembly trusteeship just
because they M lie in a strategic zone where defensive and
offensive interests of three powers overlap - China, the
31
Soviet Union and the United States. The Institute also
declared that*
When the military makes foreign policy,
foreign policy makes toward war.
All Americans know that the Army and
Navy exercise a pressure power very strong
and also dangerous to lasting peace.
But apparently, few Americans - few
editors, for example - are aware that the
military control over our nation's foreign
policy goes entirely beyond mere influence,
mere pressure.
The Army and Navy control over foreign
policy exists as a formalized, technically
and procedurally implemented arrangement....
[which] is known in Washington as SWNCC -
the State, War and Navy Co-ordinating Com-
mittee through which foreign policies of
even the remotest military interest must be
cleared. That committee operates under an
unanimity role, so that not merely Army and
Navy acting together, but Army and Navy
30, Richard, Naval Administration of the Trust Territory ,
Vol. 3, p. 19.
3 1 • News. Letter of the Institute of Ethnic Affairs, Inc.
,
Vol. 1, No". 5 (November, T9SFJT p. 3.
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acting separately, are empowered to veto
any proposal made by State.,.. The State
Department technicians, adequate in numbers
and often in technical knowledge, and inter-
» nationally experienced, confront the mili-
tary snap- judgment and prejudice; and again
and again, to procure action at all, they
find themselves accepting compromises or
worse, to the grave and cumulative injury 32
of the United States and of the peace hopes.
Collier, Ickes, and former Vice-President Wallace main-
tained a running public attack throughout 1946 on the military,
naval administration of the islands, and on the need for over-
33
seas bases. Forrestal took no public notice of these attacks
except when The New York Times printed an editorial filled with
inaccurate facts on September 2, 1946, Captain R. L. Dennison
drafted a reasoned defense of naval administration but inten-
tionally avoided raising the question of "sovereignty" versus
34
"trusteeship." Forrestal *s reply was printed in The New York
Times on September 24, 1946, To further offset the bad pub-
licity, the Navy arranged for ten newspapermen to tour the
islands. Their reports were consistently favorable to the
35
Navy's position and record in administering the islands,
32, Ibid. . pp. 6-7,
33, These took the form of letters to editors of papers
and public speeches. It is interesting to note that in 1945
and 1946, Ickes had "strongly opposed" the early granting of
independence to the Philippines by taking a "vigorous stand"
and showing "violent opposition" to the idea. See» Harry S.
Truman, Memoirs . Vol. 1, p. 275,
34, U. S. Naval Classified Archives Office, Memorandum
from Dennison to Forrestal, September 7, 1946, OP-35 files.
35, The Baltimore Sun , January 11, 1947; The Christian
Science Monitor. December 2 and 4, 1946; The Washington Post .
December 1, 1946, The New York Times Magazine, May l§, 1946.
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The Issue of what to do with the mandated islands con-
tinued to be discussed throughout the summer and fall of 1946
within the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretarial meetings,
and SWNCC. A special ad hoc subcommittee of SWNCC was estab-
lished to work on the problem. It was within this subcommittee
that substantive work was done, in close liaison with the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Navy's OP-35 Division, on the develop-
ment of a draft strategic trusteeship agreement that might be
acceptable to all parties. The Army took little part in the
work since it felt that the Navy sufficiently upheld the Army's
36
interests. The development of this draft was to be without
prejudice to the Joint Chiefs' stated position that only tra-
ditional sovereignty could safeguard for all time the rights of
the United States in the islands. It was also to be without
prejudice to the ultimate decision on what to do with the
islands. On those conditions, the Joint Chiefs stated that
a strategic trusteeship agreement would be the next best thing
to annexation and would probably prevent any future compromise
of American security jif it contained the following points
»
(1) the entire trusteeship to be designated a strategic area;
(2) the United States to be sole administering authority; (3)
no limitation to be placed upon the utilization of all or any
part of the area for United States security purposes; (4) the
right of the United States to exclude any areas utilized for
military purposes from inspection or report to the United
37
Nations or any of its agencies.
36. Admiral Robert L. Dennison, USN (Ret.), Interview,
September 4, 1969.
37. Richard, Naval Administration of the Trust Territory ,
Vol. 3, p. 18.
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A strategic trusteeship would come under the Security
Council where the veto power would ensure that any agreement
fo'l lowed the proposed draft and, once made, could not be
changed without United States consent.
With the above points in mind, the SWNCC ad hoc sub-
committee set to work. On June 28, 1946, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff evidently felt that their position might indeed become
prejudiced by the SWNCC work on a feasible draft trusteeship
agreement. They reviewed the situation and "reached a con-
clusion that United States sovereignty over the Japanese Man-
dated Islands is, from the military point of view, necessary
to the national defense, and decided to report that conclusion
38
to the Secretary of State and the President. H By October, a
draft trusteeship agreement had been developed containing the
above four points, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were asked to
study and comment on it. They repeated their position, but did
mention that if other considerations than military had priority,
then the proposed agreement was considered adequate to safe-
39
guard American security.
The second part of the United Nations General Assembly 1 s
First Session was scheduled to convene in New York in November
1946, and President Truman called a conference of the State, War
and Navy Secretaries on October 22 at the request of the Secre-
tary of State to discuss this subject. Admiral Nimitz was also
present, as was Admiral Leahy, the Chief of Staff to the Commander-
38. Library of Congress, Leahy papers, Vol. 12, June 28,
1946, p. 66.
The






in-Chief and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral
Nimitz, now Chief of Naval Operation, still argued that
"sovereignty of the ex-Japanese mandates should be taken by
the U. S. t that the ultimate security of the U. S. depends
in major part on our ability to control the Pacific Ocean,
that these islands are part of the complex essential to that
control, and that the concept of trusteeship is inapplicable
here because these islands do not represent any colonial
problem nor is there economic advantage accruing to the U. S.
40
through their ownership." Secretary Byrnes records that»
The State and War departments felt
that, since Japan had received these
islands under a mandate from the League
of Nations, our rights were not superior
to those delegated by the League and that
therefore, if possible, the United Nations
should declare them a strategic area to be
administered by us under a United Nations
trusteeship agreement. We pointed out
that at San Francisco the United States
delegation, by direction of President
Roosevelt, had been a strong advocate of
the trusteeship system. We argued that
we could not properly adopt a policy that
would show a lack of confidence in the
system we had urged upon the United
Nations. Japan had violated her mandate
and therefore we could seek a decision
from the United Nations on these mandated
islands, while those islands that belonged
to the Japanese, such as the Ryukyus, would
have to await disposition by the peace
conference. 41
It is surprising that the Secretary of War, Robert P.
Patterson, would have supported this view. The War Department
40. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries
, p. 214.
41, Byrnes, Speaking Frankly , p. 219.
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had consistently backed the Navy in the long struggle for
American absolute control over the Islands. Unfortunately,
there has not yet been located any account by Mr. Patterson
or the War Department of this conference or any other evi-
dence to support or refute Byrnes* statement.
President Truman's memoirs are slightly confusing on this,
perhaps because he does not directly mention this particular
conference. He states
t
In earlier meetings with Cabinet members on
the question of trusteeships, I found that
the State Department held views that differed
from those of the War and Navy Departments.
I listened carefully to both points of view.
In the end I sustained the Army and Navy
chiefs on the major issue of the security of
the bases. But I also saw the validity of
the ideal for which the State Department was
contending - that the United Nations should
not be barred from the local territories
beyond the bases, if at any time the United
Nations should want to look into social and
economic conditions on these islands. The
United States would never emulate the policy
of Japan in the areas that were given her
under mandate by the League of Nations. We
thus assured full protection to our nation
against a future Pacific aggressor and, at
the same time, laid the foundation for future
self-government of the island people.... I
had always been opposed to colonialism. What-
ever justification may be cited at any stage,
colonialism in any form is hateful to Ameri-
cans. America fought her own war of libera-
tion against colonialism, and we shall always
regard with sympathy and understanding the
desire of people everywhere to be free of
colonial bondage,,,, I still believed in
Woodrow Wilson's philosophy of ' self-deter-
mination. '42
42. Truman, Memoirs , Vol. 1, pp. 274-275.
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None of the other recorders of the discussion mention
Truman's talking about not barring the United Nations from
local territories beyond the bases. The trusteeship agree-
ment, as finally concluded, gave the United States the right
to close any area for security reasons. Perhaps Truman was
talking of another conference or of Okinawa or was giving
oral instructions to the military not to close off any area
more than necessary while still obtaining the right to do so
in the agreement with the United Nations. The last two
sentences of President Truman's statement has the ring of
State Department drafting. Mr. Truman wrote his memoirs
after leaving office. During the first years of his Presi-
dency, he stressed the United Nations and the high principles
of de-colonialism and self-determination. He was also inclined
to follow the policies and commitments made by President Roose-
velt because of his lack of experience and the overwhelming,
often hectic, events requiring decisions and action during
his initial years in office.
This October 1946 conference occurred just prior to the
1946 elections, at the same time as the controversy over the
meat-ration controls, and under the pressure of preparing for
the United Nations General Assembly meeting. Additionally,
President Truman was deeply involved in the military unifi-
cation struggle with Forrestal and the Navy bucking him and
the other services over the details of the plan. Also, American
relations with the Soviet Union were rapidly deteriorating. To
his credit, President Truman made a firm decision on this issue
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in contrast to President Roosevelt's lack of any clear-cut,
command decision. It took only one Presidential conference,
where all sides were heard, for a binding decision to be made.
Secretary Forrestal, by this time, had accepted the idea
of the islands becoming a strategic trusteeship. At the con-
ference, his main concern was that the State Department negoti-
ators might compromise and accept an arrangement that would
jeopardize the security of the United States. Secretary Byrnes
assured him that no changes in the draft agreement would be
accepted without the approval of the President or the Secretary
43
of State. Forrestal then stated that he was satisfied.
Forrestal was also reassured by Byrnes on his fear that a sub-
ordinate of Byrnes or a delegate to the United Nations might
leak an opinion to the press to the effect that "the intransi-
gence of the military was blocking the good intentions of the
44
State Department," Forrestal was very sensitive to the public
opinion trend toward disarmament, the belief of the thesis that
the military was running American foreign policy, and against
45
Byrnes' policy in general.
Truman's firm decision was to submit the islands to the
United Nations as a strategic trusteeship with the United States
as sole administrator under the terms of the agreement drafted
by the SWNCC subcommittee. Perhaps the account that comes
closest to reflecting the underlying reason for the decision'
43, Byrnes, Speaking; Frankly
, pp. 219-220 and Millis, ed.,
The Forrestal Diaries , pp. 213, 215, and 216,




is found in Admiral Leahy's unpublished diaries, on restricted
access at the Library of Congress. He recorded t
decision was made to accept a United States
trusteeship over these islands on terms ac-
ceptable to the United States. In view of
public announcements previously made by Presi-
dents Roosevelt and Truman, it did not appear
possible to take any other action . I cannot
escape a fear that sometime in the distant
future this decision will permit possible
enemies to obtain positions in the Pacific
that will require great expenditures of life
and treasure to retake. 46 [Emphasis added]
It would appear that the previous, wide sweeping statements
of national policy (Atlantic Charter, United Nations Declara-
tion, and Cairo Declaration, among others, which were enun-
ciated primarily for war-time propaganda purposes) had backed
the American government into a corner at the time of a crucial
decision.
Unfortunately, Admiral Niraitz* papers are not yet open;
but the general feeling of Admiral Leahy and Admiral Nimitz
was described by Benjamin Gerig when he talked with John D.
Hickerson about M a meeting with the Admirals [not named]....
The Admirals were over-ruled. They left with their tails
47
between their legs."
The President made the unequivocal public announcement on
November 6, 1946, that the United States was prepared to place
48
under trusteeship the former Japanese mandated islands.
46, Library of Congress, Leahy papers, Vol. 12, October 22,
1946, p. 86.
47, Ambassador John D. Hickerson, Interview, June 19, 1969.
48, U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 15, (Novem-
ber 17, 1946), p. 889.
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Concurrently, the United States made public the draft trustee-
49
ship agreement. It also circulated it to certain foreign
governments with the United Nations Charter phrase "states
directly concerned" in mind.
Press reaction was, on the whole, favorable; with the usual
50
small, vocal dissenters.
On February 26, 1947, the United States submitted the
draft agreement designating the islands as a Strategic Trustee-
ship with the United States as the administrator. The Security
Council accepted the draft on April 2, 1947, after minor changes
were negotiated. Article 6 was amended to refer to the terri-
tory's development "towards self-government or independence,
as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of the
Trust Territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes
of the peoples concerned," rather than merely reading develop-
ment "towards self-government." Additionally, the words, "as
an integral part of the United States," were deleted from
51
Article 3. The Agreement gave the United States wide powers
including full powers of administration, legislation, and juris-
diction, the right of fortification, and the right to close
52
areas for security reasons.
49. Ibid.
50. For an example, sees Jane Bedell, "In Trust We
Annex," New Republic . Vol. 116, No. 11 (March 17, 1947).
51. Robert R. Robbins, "United States Trusteeship for the
Territory of the Pacific Islands," U. S. Department of State
Bulletin . Vol. 16 (May 4, 1947), pp7~783^792.
52. United States Treaties and Other International Acts
Series, 1665, and United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 8, No. 123,
"Trusteeship Agreement For The Former Japanese Mandated Islands,"
See also: Harold Karen Jacobson, "Our 'Colonial* Problem in the
Pacific," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 1 (October, 1960), pp.
56-66. See: Appendix E for a copy of the trusteeship agreement.
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The American military via S T»7NCC and its liaison with
the JSSC of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization had kept
a 'close watch on the negotiations over changes in the agree-
ment. They were consulted on each proposal? and the final
agreement, as amended, received their approval.
Secretary Forrestal and Admiral Nimitz recommended the
approval of the agreement in appearances before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on July 7, 1947. Congress approved
the agreement by Joint Resolution on July 18, 1947; and the
President ratified it the same day.

CHAPTER SIX
THE ISLANDS UNDER TRUSTEESHIP
>
On July 18, 1947, the same day as the ratification of
the trusteeship agreement, military government of the islands
was ended by Executive Order No. 9875, which also appointed
the Navy Department as administrator pending Congressional
legislation. The Four Secretaries (State, War, Navy, Interior)
Committee was revitalized after May 1947, on the urging of
Interior, to consider which agency should administer the islands.
The President decided in 1949 that the Interior Department
should administer all of the United States island possessions
in the Pacific, i.e., Guam, American Samoa, and the Trust Terri-
tory. Various consultations took place, mainly within the
framework of an ad hoc SWNCC committee enlarged to include
Interior representatives, to coordinate the turn-over and to
draft organic bills for submittal to Congress. When Congress
did not act on the bill for the Trust Territory, the adminis-
tration was transferred on July 1, 1951, by Executive Order
No. 10265 of June 29, 1951. [This consultation will be ex-
plored in more detail in the doctoral dissertation].
Congress did pass an act in 1954 [68 Statute 330] pro-
viding for Presidential control of the Trust Territory's govern-
ment, something which he had exercised de facto since they had
been captured. In 1953, the Saipan District, except for the
island of Rota, was returned to naval control for a special




to Interior Department administration in 1962 after criticism
by the United Nations Visiting Mission that separate adminis-
1
tration was encouraging separatist tendencies.
Separatist tendencies have been one of the main issues
over the past twenty years in regard to the Micronesians*
national aspirations. "Political development has been retarded
by the persistence of the traditional culture and the absence
2
of a feeling of identification with the territory as a whole."
The vastness of the area, the diversity of the population, and
the scarcity of natural resources are significant obstacles to
forming a sense of unity.
The Marianas, led by the Saipan Legislature, has consis-
tently voiced their desire to separate from the Trust Territory
for union with Guam, There is close social, economic, cultural,
biological and geographic ties between Guam and the rest of the
Marianas.
On June 12, 1950, the people of the Northern Marianas
petitioned the United Nations for their incorporation with the
United States as a possession or as a territory, preferably as
a territory. They declared that they wanted to someday be con-
sidered a part of the United States and get American citizenship,
In 1959, the Saipan Legislature petitioned that the Mariana
Islands be incorporated into the framework of the Territory of
1. Whitney T. Perkins, Denial of Empire: The United States
and Its Dependencies (Leyden, The Netherlands: A. W. Sythoff,
1962), p. 324 and David W. Wainhouse, Remnant s of Empire: The
United Nations and the End of Colonialism CNew York: Harper and
Row, Inc., 1964), pp. 123-124.
2. Perkins, Denial of Empire , p. 326.




Guam, including American citizenship. They called for a United
Nations plebiscite to demonstrate the validity of their aspir-
4
ation. An unofficial plebiscite was held on Saipan and Tinian
in 1961 to determine whether the people would prefer union with
Guam, annexation by the United States, or the status quo. Over
eighty percent of the registered voters responded with 1,642
5
for union, 875 for annexation, and 27 for the status quo.
In July 1963, the Saipan Legislature again unanimously
6
reaffirmed its desire for union with Guam. The Legislature
conducted another unofficial plebiscite with 1,286 voting out
of 3,015 registered. Of those voting, 1,231 voted M to become
a United States citizen within the political framework of the
7
Territory of Guam, H
During the Visiting Mission's trip in 1964, the Saipan
and Mariana legislatures presented many petitions which "declared
that the people of the Marianas were ready for self-government
and wished to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement," and expressed
their desire for "integration with Guam on the grounds of his-
torical and cultural affinity, the desire of the people of
Saipan to advance at a faster pace than the rest of the Trust
4. United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Document
T/PET. 10/31 . November 5, 1959.
5. Morgiewicz, "Micronesia, Especial Trust," U. S. Naval
Institute , p. 77.
6. United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Document
T/PET. 10/2.4. July 31, 1963.
7. United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Report of the
United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands, 1964, Document T/1620 . May 18, 1964, p. 155.
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Territory, and the freely-expressed wishes of the Saipanese
8
people as made known in the unofficial plebiscites." The
majority political party, the Popular Party, supported these
desires. The minority Democratic Party opposed the petitions
claiming that any move to join Guam was premature. They, how-
ever, also favored integration with the United States, but
only after the Territory as a whole achieved self-government.
The American administration has opposed any separatist
movement, and the Visiting Mission strongly pointed out that
the future of the Trust Territory must be as an integral unit.
The Visiting Mission discounted the historical and cultural
links as the reason for the movement, and stated it believed
it had originated from Guam and the motivations were for gain-
ing the economic and political benefits of American citizenship.
With the development of a "vigorous and unified" Micronesia, it
9
felt that the issue "may simply wither away."
In 1964, the Saipan Legislature submitted a blistering
petition claiming that they believed the United Nations and
the United States "want to inspire and create a nation out of
six different districts, different cultures, customs, and tra-
ditions.... The people of Mariana Islands District do not
10
desire or aspire to that." Six months later, they declared
that the proposed Territorial-wide legislative body "is a




10. United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Document T/PET.
10/2.6 . March 19, 1964,
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preponderent mass of our people are not prepared to observe
11
and refuse to abide by it." The desire has not appeared
to^ have significantly withered. In 1965 and 1966, the Mariana
District Legislature passed resolutions petitioning for closer
12
ties with the United States and maintaining their own identity.
During a Congressional House Subcommittee visit in 1965,
the Mariana District Legislature requested American citizen-
13
ship for all of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory. In
1966, the Saipanese Legislature voted again for merger with
14
Guam. The Saipanese Chief Sablan stated in 1966, "If a pleb-
iscite were taken, ninety-nine percent of the people would
15
vote to become a territory of the United States."
The 1964 United Nations Visiting Mission reported, "The
territory is still in the process of being knitted together.
Its unity is still fragile; most people still look at the world
and the future from their own districts, not as a part of a
16
unified Micronesia." In 1953, the Marshallese petitioned
the United Nations Visiting Mission stating that they didn't
11. United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Document T/PET.
10/L.9
. September 29, 1964.
12. United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Documents T/PET.
10/L.10. October 25, 1965, and T/PET. 10/L. 11 . January 20, 1966.
13. United States Congress, House of Representatives, Com-
mittee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Reports on Pacific Affairs,
1965 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1965;
, p. 99.
14. The New York Times. March 20, 1966.
15. Willard Price, America's Paradise Lost (New York: The
* m— » n - i i i n ii » mm — mm ii i i— — i
John Day Company, 1966), p. 229.
16. Visiting Mission Report, 1964, p. 159.
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want to be "classed with or merged with the Ponapeans! We
are proud of our race and our heritage and fear any attempt
to* merge us culturally or otherwise with other peoples with
17
the resultant loss of our own culture and individuality."
This lack of unity applys within certain island groups
and even, as in the case of Ponape, on a single island. Such
a situation hinders the "building an administration staffed
by Micronesians and greatly limits the rate of progress toward
18
self-government beyond a local level."
Steps have been made, however, starting with the local
level and building to the territorial-wide level. In 1957, a
systematic program of chartering municipal governments was
19
begun. District Legislatures were also developed. Reso-
lutions of these legislatures, when approved by the High Com-
missioner, became law for the particular district. They are
now all composed of elected members and have been granted
20
certain taxing powers.
The Congress of Micronesia was created in September 1964.
The first territorial-wide elections were held on January 19,
1965, and the first meeting was held in July 1965, It is
17. Robert Trumbull, Paradise In Trust t A Report On
Americans In Micronesia, 1946-1958 "(New Yorkt William Sloane
Associates, 1959), p. 109."
18, Ibid. , p. 108.
19, Wainhouse, Remnants Of Empire , p. 125.




bicameral with a House of Representatives of twenty-one
members elected for two-year terms j and a Senate of twelve
members , two from each district, serving for four-year terms.
The House is apportioned by population with three seats from
the Marianas, four from the Marshalls, four from Ponape, five
from Truk, three from Palau, and two from Yap. All citizens
21
over eighteen years of age may vote.
This Congress has helped to create some sense of unity
within the Territory, if from nothing else than the mere fact
of initiating the first real communications between the peoples
of the three groups. The process of evolution of the Congress
provided experiences of working together for common purposes.
The Congress evolved from a Council of Micronesia whose members
were elected by the District Legislatures which, in turn, had
evolved from an advisory body whose members were appointed by
the District Administrators. The growth and transformation of
these bodies was due, in large measure, to the wishes, desires




Election also brought political awareness to the people.
The first election had vigorous campaigning with twenty-three
21. U. S. Congress, Reports On Pacific Affairs. 1965 ,
pp. 4-9.
22. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 53 (August 16,
1965), Statement of Mr. Barley Olter, Representative, Congress
of Micronesia, before the United Nations Trusteeship Council,
May 28, 1965, p. 296. See: Norman Meller, The Congress of Micro-
nesia: Development of the Leg;islative Process in the Trust Terri-






candidates in Ponape running for the six seats and two parties
in Palau campaigning with one party capturing five of the six
seats.
The intensity of the people in the
creation of this Congress is evidenced by
the percentage of voting [seventy percent]].
It is also evidenced by their celebrations
and staying up late beside their radios to
hear election results. The people's attach-
ment to this Congress is shown by their en-
thusiasm in the meetings after the voting
and the high courtesy and honor they have
extended to the elected Congressmen. 23
Mr Francis Nunan f Treasurer of the Yap Islands Congress
and a representative from the Yap Islands District to the House
of Representatives, told the Trusteeship Council in 1966, "The
Congress of Micronesia, once only a dream, now stands as an
embodiment of the wishes of the people. The formation of the
Congress also pointed out very vividly the fact that the Micro-
nesia people can work together for a common goal, one that is
24
beneficial to the welfare of the entire area."
Before the Trusteeship Council in 1968, the High Commis-
sioner, William R. Norwood, stated, "since then [creation of
the Congress! political development has moved forward at an
accelerating pace and the deliberation and legislative actions
of the Congress of Micronesia have had the effect of strengthen-
25
ing bonds of mutual interest and a sense of common destiny."
23. Ibid., pp. 296-297.
24. U, S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 55 (Septem-
ber 12, 1966), Statement of Mr. Francis Nunan, Representative,
Congress of Micronesia, before the United Nations Trusteeship
Council, June 27, 1966, p. 400.
25. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 59 (August
26, 1968), Statement of High Commissioner, Mr. William R.




The aspirations of the Micronesians in regard to their
future political status have not yet developed to any firm
consensus of opinion.
In 1964, the United Nations Visiting Mission reported
that no properly matured opinions on the future had yet
emerged. It felt that most Micronesians had assumed that
the choices were either full independence or some form of
integration with the United States and, knowing that Micro-
nesia was not self-sufficient, felt that the only practical
choice was some form of integration with the United States,
26
either as part of Hawaii or part of the Territory of Guam.
Caution has been the policy of the Micronesians. They
have had the wisdom to understand that every alternative must
be studied and understood before any choice is made. Mr. Tomas
Remengesau in 1964 stated that a consensus of opinion for a
particular status "is like the papaya fruit- -when it is ripe,
27
it will show on the surface." Mr. Barley Olter, the next
year, described the situation in a suscinct statement:
Given several alternatives, the people
invariably insisted that they wished to
remain under the present system until they
are ready in terms of education standard,
economic stability, political sophistication,
and social maturity and responsibility. The
Micronesians are cautious and are reluctant
to gamble for the price of uncertainty. When
we are ready to accept the responsibility and
are aware of the implications and conse-
quences of committing ourselves to whatever
26. Visiting Mission Report, 1964, pp. 158-159.
27. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 50, (June 29,
1964) , Statement of Mr, Tomas Remengesau to the United Nations
Trusteeship Council, May 28, 1964, p. 1019.
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political status we prefer, we will ask
for it. 28
President Johnson asked Congress in August 1967 to estab-
lish a study commission to assess all the factors bearing on
the political future of Micronesia in response to a request
for such a commission by the Congress of Micronesia. In his
request, he stated that Congress should provide for the Micro-
nesians to express their wishes "as soon as possible, and not
later than June 30, 1972, on the future status of the Trust
29
Territory." The Senate struck out the reference to the date
and passed the resolution; but it never passed the House and
no status commission has yet been established nor has any com-
30
mitment been made to a date for an act of self-determination.
After an extensive sounding of political opinion in Micro-
nesia in 1967, Mr. Robert Trumbull reported that while most of
the leaders would prefer a union with the United States rather
than independence, there was a "general reluctance to 'rush' a
31
decision on the future political status." Mr. Trumbull
28. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 53 (August 16,
1965), Statement of Mr. Barley Olter, May 28, 1965, p. 296.
29. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 57 (September 18,
1967), Presidential letter to Congress with Text of Proposed
Joint Resolution Concerning Future of Pacific Islands Trust
Territory, August 21, 1967, pp. 363-364.
30. Interview with Mr. Robert R. Blackburn, Jr.,
March 21, 1969.
31. The New York Times , news article by Robert Trumbull,
"Tie to U. S. Favored in Pacific Islands," November 5, 1967.
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reported that all of the leaders considered President Johnson's
date of 1972 as "too early." The political leader of Yap,
»
High Chief Roboman, said "We are Yapese, not Micronesians,
and we want to remain that way," and favored retaining Micro-
32
nesia under American trusteeship for "at least ten more years."
Petrium Mailo, the hereditary chief, political leader and largest
businessman of Moen Island, Truk, stated, "we need unity within
Micronesia before we try to decide a common political destiny
33
for all the islands." Many of the older generation remember
the more busy, exciting and prosperous times under the Japanese
and perhaps might favor ties with Japan? whereas, many of the
young students expressed desires to "study all alternatives
34
before making a decision." Most leaders realize that inde-
pendence "is impracticable for islands so widely scattered and
35
so diverse in language and custom." The two political parties
of Palau are divided in that one, the Liberal Party, espouses
the status quo; whereas, the Progressive Party advocates closer









, and The New York Times , news article by Robert
Trumbull, "Micronesia: 2,141 Islands Forgotten by U.S.,"
October 30, 1967.
35. Price, America's Paradise Lost, p. 229. Statement
attributed to Amata Kabua, a frequent critic of the United
States* record in Micronesia.
36. Ibid. , p. 230.
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on August 8, 1967, to study "the range of possibilities and
alternatives as may be open to Micronesians with respect to
37
their choice of political status." The Commission realized
that the question of the political status of Micronesia was
tied to economic and social conditions and that the political
choice should be one that would give the Micronesians the
"advantages and benefits of Western culture and civilization,
without losing their identity as a people and without sacrific-
38
ing their more cherished heritage and cultural values." The
Commission met with United States Congressional subcommittees
touring the islands, has retained an Australian political science
professor as an advisor, and has studied the political develop-
ment of Guam, Fiji, Cook Islands, Puerto Rico, Philippines, and
Western Samoa.
The Status Commission filed its report in July 1969. Its
recommendation is»
that the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands be constituted as a self-governing
state and that this Micronesian state --
internally self-governing and with Micro-
nesian control of all its branches, includ-
ing the executive — negotiate entry into
free association with the United States. 39
Ten Micronesian political leaders came to Washington for three
weeks in October 1969 to consult with the government on this
vital issue.
, .
37. Congress of Micronesia, Interim Report of the Future
Political Status Commission of the Congress of Micronesia, p. 4.
38. Ibid.,, p. 10.
39. Congress of Micronesia, Report of the Future Political
Status Commission of the Congress of Micronesia, July, 1969.
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Over the past two years, and especially over the past
year, there has been a rapidly mounting interest among the
Mi'cronesians in their political future. High Commissioner
William R, Norwood referred to this increasing discussion
and debate within the territory in his speech to the Trustee-
40
ship Council on May 27, 1963. During the 1967 Trusteeship
Council debate, Representative Salii had stated that Micro-
nesians did not want to exercise their right of self-determin-
ation until the people had "acquired a first-hand knowledge of
both the benefits and the responsibilities under each of the
41
possible alternatives available." However, Representative
Sawaichi, in 1968, reflected the increased tempo of interest
when he reported!
Since then [June 1967], events within
and without the Trust Territory have seemed
to dictate a reevaluation of our position
in this regard and an exploration of ways
and means to accelerate the time when the
political status of Micronesia can be deter-
mined..,. We are anxious to get on with the
job of nationbuilding. I have all the mis-
givings, however, that unless we renew our
efforts and unless we take positive steps
to remove the obstacles which lie in the
way of self-determination for the people of
the Trust Territory, Micronesia may be over-
taken by events; then it would be useless,
and indeed moot, to talk about a plebiscite
or self-determination.
Many of my fellow Micronesians within
and without the Congress of Micronesia enter-
tain doubts when one discusses the prospects
40. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 59 (August 26,
1968), Statement of High Commissioner William R. Norwood to the
United Nations Trusteeship Council, May 27, 1968, p. 227.
41, U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 57 (Septem-
ber 18, 1967), Statement of Mr. Lazarus Salii, Representative,
Congress of Micronesia, to the United Nations Trusteeship
Council, June 8, 1967, p. 378.
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of a plebiscite on status alternatives
which seem to be open to Micronesia. The
argument they advance most frequently in
support of their positions is that of in-
adequate development of education and of
the economy. There seems to be a general
consensus that social and economic develop-
ment must necessarily precede political
self-determination.
There are other Micronesians who take
the position that political self-determina-
tion must be exercised as soon as it is
possible to do so in order to assure some
measure of political stability and that,
having resolved the political question,
the problems of economic, social, and edu-
cational development can then be easily
identified and resolved.... The determina-
tion of the future political status of Micro-
nesia presumes a certain degree of economic
and social self-sufficiency. The rate in
which [presently] planned programs are put
into effect will determine when it will be
appropriate for Micronesians to decide on
their political status. I am hopeful that
the end results of our present efforts in
the Trust Territory will be such that Micro-
nesians may soon decide on their future
political status. 42
Some observers feel that this increased interest in rapid
political development is due to a desire to pressure the United
States to increase and accelerate its economic and social
development programs. Such "scare tactics" as the separatist
Saipan Legislature's recent notes to the Soviet Union, Nation-
alist China, Communist China, France, United Kingdom, and
Australia requesting statements outlining the advantages of an
alliance with them perhaps are a way of "pecking" at the United
42. U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 59
(August 26, 1968), Statement of Mr. Jacob Sawaichi, Repre-
sentative, Congress of Micronesia, to the United Nations




States in order to get a reaction.
Perhaps some Micronesians feel that independence might
actually be possible with financial and technical assistance
obtained by "renting" areas to the United States for bases
j
areas that are now used freely and that they know the United
States will need.
Since 1967, there has been a shift toward more voca-
tional training and an emphasis placed on English language
training to provide the Micronesians with a common language.
Over seven-hundred Peace Corps Volunteers, more per-capita
than in any other country, have been throughout the area since
1967 carrying out these and other programs. These Peace Corps
members have had a definite influence on the Micronesians.
They have helped by creating a spirit of self-help, self-
assurance and political awareness within the communities. They
have hurt by' urging the inhabitants to demand equal pay as the
Americans, spreading wild rumors of impending military base
acquisitions, and by submitting petitions to the United Nations
concerning the desire of the inhabitants of Bikini and Enewetak
44
to return to their islands.
A questionnaire concerning the future political status
of the Territory was submitted to juniors and seniors of the
high schools in late 1967. Returns were received from all
43, Interview with Mr. Robert R. Blackburn, Jr.,
March 21, 1969.
44. United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Document T/PET.
10/42 . April 30, 1968.
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high schools throughout the Trust Territory, except from
three parochial schools. Of those responding, 85.9 percent
favored closer association with the United States? although
there was no clear consensus whether it should become an
integral part of the sovereign territory of the United States
or should adopt some kind of an autonomous relationship. Addi-
tionally, there was no consensus as to the inclusion or non-
45
inclusion of Guam in the ultimate status of Micronesia.
What of the possibility of a development of a sense of
regionalism in Pacific Oceania? Regional cooperation has
developed rapidly since the Second World War. Educational
facilities such as the University of the South Pacific in
Suva, the College of Guam, the University of Papua-New Guinea,
the East-West Center in Honolulu, and the colleges of Australia
and New Zealand have been opened to many islanders on scholar-
ships and grants. Inter-island transportation and communications
facilities have been improved. Of major importance has been
the South Pacific Commission with its two auxiliary bodies,
the Research Council and the South Pacific Conference. The
Commission members are presently the Western powers that have
dependencies in Pacific Oceania plus independent Western Samoa.
The scope of the Commission covers almost the entire area of
46
Pacific Oceania. The Commission's projects are non-political
45, Harvey David Melniker, Questionnaire Concerning; The
Future Political Status of The Trust Territory of The Pacific
Islands (Medford, Massachusetts: Department of Political Science,
Tufts University, 1968), pp. 16-19.
46. See map in Appendix. The Kingdom of Tonga cooperates
with the Commission's projects and has participated in South
Pacific conferences and the South Pacific Games.
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and concentrate on social, educational, medical, and agri-
cultural projects that lend themselves to regional solutions.
The South Pacific Games, started in 1963, are sponsored by
the Commission,
Delegates from all of the participating islands meet
as the South Pacific Conference, originally every three years
and since 1967, every year, to review and recommend regional
projects. Politics is not on the agenda but is a topic for
conversation. Led by Ratu (Chief) K, T, Mara of Fiji and
Mr, Carlos Taitano of Guam, the delegates to the 1965 Confer-
ence asked for a stronger voice in deciding and executing the
47
programs of the Commission, At the 1967 Conference held at
Noumea, there were again desires expressed for fuller parti-
cipation. By agreement of the Commission members, the rules
were modified to give the Conference a more important role in
the planning and executing of the work program and to provide
for annual meetings of the Conference,
As for the future of regionalism in Pacific Oceania, "if
the Western powers do the necessary, both in their own terri-
torial programs and internationally, the island territories
will grow slowly closer together until they comprise a regional
grouping of peoples with a common ecological pattern* but inte-
grated politically with their separate metropolitan countries.
No basis exists for a separate nation of Pacifica or for a
Pacific Island Federation, There is every sign that the people
47, The New York Times , news article by Tillman Durdin,
Pacific Islanders Chafe At Control," July 13, 1965.
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are proud to be Americans, Britishers, Frenchmen, Australians,
48
and New Zealanders .
"
The many obstacles of vast distances, different cultures,
different languages, separatist tendencies, a lack of a sense
of "One Micronesia," a lack of social and economic development,
and a desire to retain their own special economic safeguards
(especially land titles) and their own cultural heritage, while
at the same time desiring mass economic development, appear too
by the Micronesians
great to be overcome/ in the relatively near future. The poli-
tical development of the people has far outstripped their social
and economic development. This can only lead to frustration.
New problems such as urban blight and the coral reef-destroying
"crown of thorns" starfish only add to their dependence on out-
side assistance.
One observer reported his fears that "there is a real
danger that the United States, so sensitive to world opinion
and unhappy to be thought a colonialist power, may step out of
49
the islands before the people are prepared to take over."
48. Carlton Skinner, "Self -Government in the South Pacific"
Foreign Affairs
.
Vol. 42 (October, 1963).





In the preface, the assumption was made that military
considerations should and must be considered in the formula-
tion of foreign policy. This premise appears to have been
successfully demonstrated in this particular case.
If the recommendations of the military had not been heard,
the original trusteeship concepts and intentions held by the
State Department in 1942 and 1943 would probably be seen in
the United Nations Charter. They would have been desirable
for non-strategic areas; however, these intentions included
that of direct administration of the Micronesian islands by
an international organization. The present world might have
been treated to the spectacle of the United Nations owning
and administrating not only the former mandated islands but
probably other strategic areas as well. The consequences for
world peace would have been disasterous in light of the actual
development of the United Nations and the Cold War.
The Soviet Union would have been able to block any un-
desired Security Council action in respect to the trusteeships.
The growth of the number of non-aligned nations and mini- states
in the General Assembly, the rise to power of the anti-west
Committee of 24 in respect to dependent areas, the decrease in
power of the balanced (between administering and non-administer-




the United Nations on rapid de-colonialization [GA Res, 1514
(XV) 1 would have led, in all likelihood, to chaos in respect
tc> any internationally administered trust territory. Condo-
minium governments are difficult enough as seen in the New
Hebrides where Great Britain and France govern in remarkable
inefficiency. Imagine the efficiency of a government con-^J
trolled by more than one-hundred states. Not only world
security, but also the inhabitants* welfare would have been
adversely affected.
The welfare of the Micronesians would have suffered under
international administration, especially by an organ of the
United Nations as that institution has evolved. On the other
hand, Micronesian welfare has suffered under United States
trusteeship administration. This author believes their welfare
could have been advanced far more if the islands had been
annexed by the United States. As a trust territory, the
islands are neither fish nor foul. They are neither "foreign"
territory nor "American" territory in respect to American laws
as v/ell as American interest. For example, import-export
duties are exacted for all materials going between the islands
and the United States, thus, hindering the islands' development.
Psychologically, there has been a lack of attention placed on
the islands' economic development since their future political
status is unknown. Only with the advent of the Nixon adminis-
tration have the Micronesians been implicitly told that the
United States desires closer association with them in the future.
The lack of attention paid to the islands during the 1950 's
earned for them the nickname, "Rust Territory." The "zoo" theory

156
accepted then was that the "paradise" should be held in "trust"
just as it was received until the natives' educational and
pdlitical development had advanced to the degree that they
could make the decision whether or not they desired economic
and social development. Only since the beginning of the Kennedy
Administration-- led by the demands of the politically educated
Micronesians--has the "zoo" theory been discarded. Annexation
would have solved the question of the future political status,
permitted American investment, eliminated trade barriers, and
eliminated the "zoo" theory from the very beginning of American
administration.
Flowing from the premise that military considerations must
be taken into account in formulating foreign policy is the
further premise that the military establishment must, therefore,
be represented at the working- level by means of formal liaison
committees as well as by informal consultations. Such arrange-
ments were lacking at the commencement of this issue in 1942.
This issue helped create an awareness of the need for such co-
ordination which, in turn, led to the establishment of the first
permanent liaison committee (SWNCC)
•
The "civilian mind" and the "military mind" both have
attributes that are of value. These attributes and points of
view have something to contribute to the formulation of any
foreign policy decision bearing on national security. Hope-
fully, they can be complimentary. In this case study, it
appears they were not; but in the crucible of their conflict,
a solution was obtained that was marginally acceptable to both.
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As with many other conflict resolutions, the debate did
not stop with the "final" Presidential decision. The issue
»
was still alive as recently as 1962 when the Saipan District
was turned back to the Interior Department. Indeed, as late
as 1966, the Assistant Secretary of State for International
Organization Affairs circulated a paper "for clearance" to
the Pentagon and the Peace Corps for six months before con-
fronting the Interior Department. This paper recommended that
the State Department assume responsibility for administering
1
the Trust Territory. Since Congress has yet to pass any
organic act for the Territory and has given the President
authority over the "civil government" of the islands, the
President has the power to transfer Administration agencies
by Executive Order.
Mr. Philip W. Quigg suggested that the White House
directly administer the Trust Territory in an April 1969
2
article. The navy moved back into the islands in June 1969
with two Seabee teams (thirteen men each) assigned to Truk
and Ponape. In early 1969, the Interior Department had asked
the Department of Defense "to assign [Seabee] teams to the
Trust Territories (sic) in an effort to develop a trained core
1. Robert R. Robbins, "United States Territories In Mid-
Century," paper presented at the Conference on the History of
the Territories, National Archives and Research Service, Wash«
ington, D. C. , November 3-4, 1969, unpublished, pp. 59-60,
2. Philip W. Quig<>, "Coming of Age In Micronesia,"
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 3 (.April, 1969), pp. 504-505.
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of permanent residents capable of carrying on self- improvement
3
programs." The Array controls the island of Kwajalein as a
closely-guarded missile base. The Assistant Commandant of the
Marine Corps toured the islands during 1969 with a view toward
selecting possible future training sites. The issue of the proper
administrative agency for the islands has, therefore, not died
completely.
The "civilian" side of the decision-making process appears
to have been sincerely motivated. The "one worlders" did, in
fact, believe that the only possibility for world peace after
World War II would be by great -power collaboration. They also
believed in self-determination for all peoples. However, self-
determination was not at issue in regard to the mandated Pacific
islands. All participants in the controversy agreed that the
Micronesians would not be ready for any form of political self-
determination for the foreseeable future. Most estimates, if
given at all, were in terms of one-hundred years. In fact,
there is a disturbing lack of consideration by any of the parti-
cipants for the interests of the Micronesians. There is no
mention in any of the documents of a desire to consult with
any Micronesians, consider Micronesian interests, or to guaran-
tee eventual self-government to them. The "military" concen-
4
trated on the security aspects. The "civilians" had two objec-
tives in mind: (1) to develop a trusteeship system guaranteeing
3. Navy Times . March 11, 1970.
4. In this sense, "military" includes the Service Secre-
taries, Stimson and Forrestal.
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eventual self-government to all dependent peoples and to
encourage the colonial powers to place their colonies within
ttiat system; and (2) to set an example for hopeful emulation
by the other powers of: (a) no territorial aggrandizement as
a result of the war (with the Soviet Union particularly in mind)
,
(b) faith in and support for the new international organization,
and (c) placing of dependent territories within the trusteeship
system.
To achieve these political objectives, the "civilians"
strongly believed that the former Japanese mandated islands
should be included within the proposed trusteeship system. The
welfare of the Micronesians had nothing to do with that belief.
In this respect, the islands were a "tool" to be utilized in
obtaining essentially non-related political objectives. Only
as a by-product, in an off-hand manner, was the Micronesian's
welfare enhanced.
The premise that post-war, great-power collaboration was
essential for world peace underlay all of the State Department
post-war planning. Alternative contingency plans were never
considered by the State Department. The military were more
pragmatic in following the balance-of-power premise. They
believed that post-war, great- power collaboration was neither
probable nor essential to world peace (as it has been shown)
and that security measures should, therefore, be taken to place
the United States in a favorable balance-of-power position.
Additionally, with the recent experience of Germany in mind,
protective steps had to be taken to prevent any post-war

160
resurgence of Japanese power in the Pacific. The islands were
strategically important in a negative sense--that of denial
to any potential enemy. Sea lanes to Guam, China, the Philip-
pines, and to Australia had to be secure. The Pacific war
being fought concurrently with the inter-departmental debate
had a great impact on the military's position. Admiral King
expressed his feelings as "how long can the United States afford
to continue a cycle of fighting and building and winning and
giving away, only to fight and build and win and give away
5
again?" It appeared senseless, to the military, to make
arrangements to give away strategic islands to an unproven
international organization when American men were, at that
very moment, dying to capture them. The military felt that
the Soviet Union would annex territory based on her own national
interest and not be dissuaded by any American example.
In fact, the President had even made an agreement at Yalta
to support the Soviet Union in the Soviet annexation of Southern
Sakhalin and the Kuriles. This action by President Roosevelt
contravened all of his grand announcements of "no territorial
aggrandizement." Certainly no example was set for the Russians
when they saw that the United States, while publically pro-
fessing non- aggrandizement, condoned aggrandizement by the
Russians.
By October 1946, the cold war had started and the Soviet
5. Army and Navy Journal. Vol. 82 (April 7, 1945), p. 937.
Also: The New York Times . April 5, 1945, and U. S. Congre ss iona l
Record Appendix
.
79th Cong., 1st -sess., pp. A1660 and A1706,
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Union had already annexed Bessarabia, eastern Poland, and part
of Czechoslovakia. What could Secretary Byrnes have meant at
» -
the October 22, 1946, conference when he said he did not want
to set any precedent for other great powers to annex what they
felt was important to their security? The Soviet Union had
already done so. The cold war was already well underway.
Britain had no designs of acquiring territory. France was
trying to re-establish herself in Indochina but had neither
the power nor the intentions of annexing any new territory.
Throughout all of this issue is the lack of reality by
many policy makers, an idealism of one peaceful world after the
war, and a "blind" faith in the ability of the proposed interna-
tional organization to handle everything. As Ambassador Hickerson
said in an interview on June 19, 1969, the atmosphere in the
State Department in 1945 and 1946 was one of "bring the boys
home" and "let the U.N. do it."
Another conclusion is the inadvisability of making grand,
eloquent, all-inclusive statements for propaganda purposes. The
"non-aggrandizement" statements removed all options and hindered
President Roosevelt in his negotiations with the Allies, He had
given away a convenient cjuid pro quo for any diplomatic deals.
President Truman started being deliberately ambiguous in his
public statements on this issue. The reasons for this are un-
known. Perhaps Secretary Forrestal urged him to do so; although,
President Truman "was not easily urged," Perhaps President Truman
felt he did not have a clear grasp on the issue and declined to
paint himself into a corner. He had many issues of greater
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immediate importance on the "front burners" during 1945 and
1946 to have the time to consider effectively this issue.
Once the approaching United Nations General Assembly meeting
in New York moved the problem to a "front burner? a Presidential
decision was clearly and unequivocally made.
The propaganda value of President Roosevelt's "non-
aggrandizement" statements cannot be accurately measured, but
they probably had little, or no, real effect. In any case, any
such value did not outweigh the disadvantages of foreclosing
options.
The administrative style of President Roosevelt, as demon-
strated in this issue, left something to be desired. The Presi-
dent probably benefited from his style prior to the war; but
once war came, a one-man show with encouraged inter-departmental
feuding could no longer be afforded. Indeed, the burdens placed
upon the President by his own style of leadership, more than likely,
were the cause of his death.
Secretary Stimson's conclusions about the President's style
and a. possible improvement on the war-time administration are
worthy of quoting extensively*
After the war. • . . Stimson was reinforced
in his wartime belief that Mr. Roosevelt's
personal virtuosity in high politics carried
with it certain disadvantages which might have
been limited if the President had been willing
to provide himself with a War Cabinet for the
co-ordinated execution of his policies -- a
body which might have done in war diplomacy
what the Joint Chiefs of Staff did in military
strategy.
Problems like those of China and France
[could add the disposition of the former Japan-
ese mandated islands] were not merely diplo-
matic -- the State Department could not and
would not assume the whole labor of determin-
ing policy in areas where the military interest
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was so significant. Yet the military interest
could not of itself be wholly determinant; it
was not proper that such questions should be
decided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as the
members of that body well understood.
Mr. Roosevelt therefore could not rely on
his regularly constituted advisers -- military
or diplomatic -- for final recommendation and
co-ordinated execution in problems of war diplo-
macy. Nor were his regular Cabinet meetings a
suitable place for such discussion and decision;
there were nearly twenty men in Cabinet meet-
ings, and during the war they became a for-
mality. , .
.
The proper solution, Stimson believed,
would have been for Mr. Roosevelt to provide
himself with a War Cabinet like that upon which
Winston Churchill relied in Great Britain. Cabi-
net responsibility of course is not the same in
the United States as in Great Britain, but
Stimson felt that Mr. Roosevelt would have found
it helpful to have some such body.,,. Such a
body would have included his most trusted per-
sonal adviser, Harry Hopkins, and perhaps the
Secretaries of State, Treasury, War, and Navy,
organized like the Join*- Chiefs of Staff, with
a secretariat of top quality and a continuing
record of policy decisions made or approved by
the President.,.. Stimson would never have
desired that the President's personal initiative
and extraordinary talent should be limited by
red tape, but he felt sure that such a body
would have been a reinforcement to Mr. Roose-
velt's less evident abilities as a co-ordinator
and executive. Unfortunately the whole idea
was foreign to the President's nature; only
reluctantly had he accepted the notion of such
an organization even in the purely military
field, and he never showed the least disposi-
tion to alter his methods in diplomacy,,,,
Mr. Roosevelt's policy was so often either
unknown or not clear to those who had to execute
it, and worse yet, in some cases it seemed self-
contradictory. . .
•
In summary, then» Stimson' s experience of
the diplomacy of coalition warfare in World War
II left him with this conclusion: Franklin Roose-
velt as a wartime international leader proved
himself as good as one man could be -- but one
man was not enough to keep track of so vast an
undertaking.
°
6. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service
in Peace and War, pp. 561-564.

164
Much needless time and effort was spent on the problem
of the disposition of the islands. It should have been decided
quickly and decisively. Instead, thanks to the President's
style of leadership and, perhaps, also to his health, the
issue dragged on for five- years; bitterness developed between
State, Interior, and Navy personnel; and the trusteeship pro-
visions of the United Nations Charter were weakened to a point
of virtual uselessness. As described in the preface, the United
Nations trusteeship system has failed to be universally accepted
by both administering powers and the Third World because, in
large part, of watering down the provisions, first regular and
then strategic, in order to include the Micronesian islands.
The Admirals • decisions to take the issue to the public
and to their sympathizers in Congress in April 1945 may be con-
sidered by some to have been beyond the limits of responsible
military professionalism. This issue is often debated in the
theoretics of military professionalism, politico-military rela-
tions in a democracy, and the proper role of the military in
the formulation of foreign policy. However, under the American
constitutional system, the legislative branch must have access
to information and testimony from the military leaders. This
right has been insisted upon by Congress and it has been success-
fully protected.
Furthermore, the Admirals spoke out in the absence of any
policy decision. This is an entirely different matter than
speaking out after a policy decision has been made by the res-
ponsible civilian officials. Another distinction is that the
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issue being discussed was not a partisan political issue.
The public certainly has a right to know the facts, unless
the interests of national security dictate otherwise. In this
case, all of the interested foreign governments (especially
the United Kingdom and Soviet Russia) were officially notified
by the State Department that this policy debate was occurring,
and for that reason, no American trusteeship paper would be
ready for discussion. This occurred at the Dumbarton Oaks
Conversations and, prior, to the San Francisco Conference.
National security interests certainly did not dictate with-
holding this issue from public debate. In fact, public specu-
lation and debate over the disposition of the islands did occur
prior to the Admirals* actions in the Spring of 1945. A more
reasoned Congressional and public debate could have been
developed as an aid in formulating the policy as well as pre-
paring the public for the probable outcome. Instead, the
debates were often based on speculation and steeped in polemics.
Another conclusion from this case study is that the Service
Secretaries during this period were effectively out of touch
with what was happening on this issue. Not until the Spring
of 1945, when SWNCC and the Three Secretaries Meetings were
effectively in operation, did Forrestal see a trusteeship
plan; and, then, he could not believe that it was serious
document. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were thrust into the
decision-making arena by President Roosevelt and not by any
particular desire of their own. Civilian control and influ-
ence by the Service Secretaries on this issue, as well as on
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most matters of strategy, was virtually non-existent until
after the death of President Roosevelt.
The question of national policies, military policies,
foreign policies, and priorities must be evaluated. Admiral
King, in a speech on December 6, 1946, clearly stated the
national policies of that time which, in fact, are still valid
i
It is to be remembered that the Navy
does not formulate national policies; the
business of the Navy is to support national
policies. Under our democratic form of
government, national policies are, in fact,
the expression of the will of the people, as
formulated in the Congress and effectuated
by the President. The basic purpose for
maintaining United States armed forces is
to provide for our security and to uphold
and advance our national foreign policies.
The major national foreign policies,
from which our military policies derive,
appear to be, as nearly as we can now deter-
mine: (a) Maintenance of the territorial in-
tegrity and security of the United States,
its territories, possessions, leased areas,
and trustee territories, (b) Maintenance of
the territorial integrity and the sovereignty
or political independence of other American
states, and regional collaboration with them
in the maintenance of international peace
and security in the Western Hemisphere. (c)
Maintenance of the territorial integrity,
security and the political independence of
the Philippine Islands, (d) Participation
in, and full support of, the United Nations,
(e) Enforcement, in collaboration with our
Allies, of terms imposed upon the defeated
enemy states, (f) Maintenance of the United
States in the best possible relative position
with respect to potential enemy pothers, ready
when necessary to take military action abroad
to maintain the security and integrity of the
United States at home.
These policies in the aggregate are
directed toward the maintenance of world peace,
under conditions which insure the security,
well-being and advancement of our country -




The tasks of the Navy, both in war and
peace, stem from the national policies. My
overriding concern is that the United States
will have, and henceforth, a Navy competent
» to carry out these tasks.
/
The above statement compares well with Forrestal's quo-
tation on the front-piece. If the United States is to have
international responsibilities and such national foreign policies,
then she must also have the power with which to carry them out.
With these national policies set, it is then the responsibility
of the military to make recommendations as to how best to
achieve them. Foreign policy and military policy must fall
within the framework of the national policies.
This is where the coordination between the military and
foreign policies comes into the picture. This is where the
military must participate in the formulation of foreign policies
that have military implications.
Point four of Admiral King's speech: (d) Participation in,
and full support of, the United Nations was and is a national
policy. But here the matter of priorities is involved. If the
islands were given to the United Nations to administer directly,
the national policies of points (a), (c), (e) and (f) above,
would have been adversely affected. Furthermore, the cause of
the United Nations would probably have been also hurt because
of the instability of the area and the mismanagement of the
islands that would most likely have followed. Maintaining
world peace and security is a large part of the United Nations'
7. U. S. Naval Classified Archives Office, King Papers,
Speech to Aircraft Club, Detroit, Michigan, December 6, 1946.
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goals, perhaps even larger than the principle of trusteeship
and the goal of self-determination for all peoples.
The question of priorities had to be considered by the
American decision-makers. Was Byrnes right when he felt that
setting an example and supporting the United Nations' trustee-
ship provisions was of higher priority than the other national
goals listed in Admiral King's speech? Perhaps he sincerely
believed that the proposed strategic trusteeship agreement
would provide for the other national policies, and that the
United States could advance all of them by offering the islands
under those terms. Truman's memoirs seem to indicate that he
felt that way.
Since that decision, the United States has maintained its
military rights and position in the islands; but the future
status of the islands is uncertain. The Committee of 24 in
the United Nations continues to urge the inhabitants to state
a desire for independence. Most of the inhabitants wish to
maintain their ties with the United States, yet, are becoming
disturbed over the lack of development and attention.
Strategically, the islands are still of vast importance
even in this nuclear age of inter-continental ballistic missiles.
As in 1945, the main strategic value of them to the United States
is in their denial to any potential enemy. Over ninety-eight
percent of all material sent to South Viet-Nam goes by ship.
If the United States is to remain a Pacific power, the sea
lanes must be controlled. Also of strategic importance is
their value in the positive sense- -that of providing training
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bases and staging areas for American armed forces. After the
reversion of Okinawa to Japan, many, if not most, of the mili-
tary establishments on that island (as well as those to be
closed in Japan proper) will have to find new locations in the
Western Pacific. Guam is already saturated with military instal-
lations. American commitments to South Korea, Japan, Formosa,
and the Philippines will continue under the Nixon Doctrine;
and American military installations in the Western Pacific will,
therefore, still be required.
The emergence of nationalism among many Asian and African
peoples has been coupled with national aspirations for political
independence and neutrality vis-a-vis the big-power blocs. It
is, therefore, advisable to consider Micronesia's emerging,
incipient sense of nationalism and national aspirations in
order to arrive at practical policies whereby the United States
can help, guide and influence these aspirations in order to
achieve an eventual political outcome truly in the best interests
of both the Micronesians and the United States,
Nationalism has various definitions, with Hans Kohn's defi-
nition being the classic example:
Nationalism is a state of mind, permeat-
ing the large majority of a people and claim-
ing to permeate all its members,* it recognizes
the nation-state as the ideal of political
organization and the nationality as the source
of all creative cultural energy and of economic
well-being. The supreme loyalty of man is
therefore due to his nationality, as his own
life is supposedly rooted in and made possible
by its welfare.
8
8. Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nat ionalism (New York* Collier
Books, 1944), p. 16.
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Does an emergence of nationalism necessarily result in
a demand for a politically independent nation-state, or can
»
a sense of nationality be satisfied and compatable with only
local autonomy and local self-government? What if a nation-
ality evolves having a sense of nationalism! yet, realizing
that political independence is impossible or impracticable due
to a lack of natural resources, population, education or a
modern economy? What political aspirations develop when the
political development of a people outreaches their economic,
social and educational development? All these questions pertain
particularly to Micronesia.
The politically-aware people in Micronesia are looking at
Asia and Africa and asking themselves the following questions.
Is the preferred government really independence no matter how
bad it might be? Which is better: economic growth, personal
liberties, governmental stability but without political inde-
pendence; or a stagnant economy, restricted personal liberties,
governmental instability but with political independence?
Should the old culture and social system be preserved at the
expense of rapid economic development?
The Micronesian answers to these questions are vitally
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Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. - Secretary of State
Henry L. Stimson - Secretary of War
James Forrestal - Secretary of the Navy
Joseph C. Grew - Under Secretary of Stato
Janes C. Dunn - Assistant Secretary of State
Harvey H. Bundy - Special Assistant to Secretary of War.
j
Dr. Leo Pasvolsky - Special Assistant to Secretary of Stf'tq '
.,,
G. Hayden Raynor - Special Assistant to Secretary of State'_'""'''
Mathias F. Correa, Major, USf'CR - Special Assistant to tl'^e
Secretary of Navy.
At the outset of the meeting it was agreed that there would be no
postponement of the discussion of international trusteeships scheduled
to take place at the San Francisco Conference.
Next discussed was the question of whether or not the declaration of
policy, which is annexed to draft letter of Secretary of State end
Secretary of War to the President dated 13 April 1945, should be







ftfl] Stettinius ur^ed that'i'_t ought not be at this time because of the
effect it would have on the other nations participating in the confer-
\ ence. Mr. Stirnson indicated that he was inclined to agree with this.
i It was finally agreed that the declaration of policy would not be
put forth at this time but at some future date such a declaration
would be promulgated.
A discussion was then had concerning the State Departments proposed
alternate statement. It was agreed that such a statement should te
promulgated after it had been approved by the President. Considerable
discussion was had of the specific language which would be included
in such a statement and e draft was finally agreed upon. Mr. Eundy
and Mr. IMnn were delegated to set this drtift up in proper form for
presentation to the President as the recommendation of the State, War
and the Navy for his approval. It was not agreed as to how the state-
ment should be promulgated. A suggestion was made that it should be
put out in answer to a "planted" question at the press conference of
the Secretary of State.





The Secretary of the Navy asked the Secretary of State ?/hether or not
in the view of the Secretary of State it would embarrass him if the
Secretaries of War and Navy were to send to the President the expression
of their views contained in the draft joint letter of 13 April 1945.
The Secretory of State replied that it would at this time and asked
that ^ the sending of such a statement be deferred "for a few days." The
implication of his statement, although it was not entirely clear, was
that he did not wish such a statement to go forward to the President
until the San Francisco Conference was finished or at least until it
was well under way. The Secretaries of War and Navy indicated that
they acquiesced in his request.
The question was raised as to whether or not the draft on the chapter
of trusteeships be proposed by the United States at the San Francisco
Conference would include language which would make it clear that the
United States by agreeing to the draft or by proposing it did not
commit itself to place under trusteeship arrangements any particular
territories and that this would be a matter of subsequent agreement.
It was agreed by all present that there would be included in Title I,
Section B 1. cf the State Department draft, the following language:
"It shall be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which specific
territories within the foregoing categories should be brought under
the trusteeship system and upon what terms."
The Secretary of the Navy raised the question as to whether or not
the United States draft of the chapter on trusteeships should include
provisions similar to those contained in the Secretary of War and
the Secretary of the Navy revision of the State Department draft which
would place the initial negotiation of trusteeship arrangements with
respect to strategic areas in the Security Counsel rather than the
General Assembly. The Secretary of War indicated that he concurred
in the Secretary of the Navy's view that initial negotiations for
trusteeship arrangements be made with the Security Counsel. Dr. I
Pasvolsky indicated dissent - stated that in his view all negotiations
should be had with tho General Assembly, but finally it was agreed
that the negotiations of the original trusteeship arrangements
with respect to strategic areas sho\ild be made with the Security
Counsel rather than the General Assembly, that any alterations of
such trusteeship arrangements should not be made without the concur-
rence of the Security Counsel but that other arrangements concerning
strategic areas which had t© do solely with welfare could be negotiated
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DECLASSIFIED
[Draft for statement of United States policy prepared by Mr,
Henry H. Bundy]
HHB #2 - 4/16/45.
DECLARATION OF UNITED STATES POLICY.
The Conference of the United Nations will soon commence at
San Francisco. During this conference a possible system of inter-
national trusteeships will be discussed and it is of great impor-
tance that this country clearly understand the nature of these
discussions. It is not proposed at San Francisco to determine
the placing of any particular territory under a trusteeship
system. All that will be discussed there will be the possible
machinery of such a system.
In entering upon these discussions, the United States Govern-
ment desires to make clear its attitude with respect to certain
areas and to recall certain facts of history. The United States
has always been the champion of peace and freedom in the Pacific
Ocean area. This war has been fought and is being fought in
that cause against the aggressions of Japan who sought to en-
slave in their empire the Western and Southwestern Pacific,
Our country is now liberating that Ocean from this attack, not
only for ourselves but for the interests of all peaceful nations
who are situated or have interests in the Pacific, In this cause,
with great loss of American lives and expenditure of American





certain islands and atolls and still more will shortly be in
our hands.
The United States does not seek annexation of territory
or economic wealth but strategic rights in a certain number of
these islands and atolls are vital to any effective military
guaranty of peace in the Pacific. Harbors and airfields are
as much an integral part of necessary military power as war
ships or planes. In order to discharge its responsibility as
a champion of peace and freedom in the Pacific, it will be
necessary for the United States to have these strategic rights
and such rights will involve complete control in the case of
certain atolls in the Pacific. The United States policy will
be to hold any such reserved strategic rights in the interests
of the same cause for which we are now fighting — the cause of
international peace and freedom in the Pacific, a cause in which
all law-abiding nations in that area have a vital interest.
It will not be the policy of the United States to hold
any strategic rights for selfish advantage and the United States
will cooperate with the United Nations through such arrangements
as may be appropriate to assure the economic and social advance-
ment of the inhabitants of these territories, many of which are
very sparsely populated and contain little or nothing of economic
value.
The United States Government considers that it would be
entirely practicable under a trusteeship system to provide, by
agreements, for the maintenance of such United States military
and strategic rights and control as will be necessary to assure
peace and security in the Pacific Ocean or elsewhere in the world.

APPENDIX E
TRUSTEESHIP AGREEMENT FOR THE FOfttiER JAPANESE 'IANDATED ISLANDS
Draft proposed by the United States on 17 February 1047, with changes made by the
Security Council, when it approved the agreement on 2 April 1947. Words added
by the Council are in italics; omitted words are in brackets. Adapted fror.
SCOR, II, Supp. S; 3 [)>l Treaty Series, p. 190.
Whereas Article 75 of the Charter of the United Nations Provides for the
establishment of an international trusteeship system for the administration and
supervision of such territories as nay be Placed thereunder by subsequent agree-
ments; and
Whereas under Article 77 of the said Charter the trusteeship system may be
applied to territories now held under mandate; and
Whereas on 17 December 1020 the Council of the League of Nations confirmed a
mandate for the former German islands north of the equator to Japan, to be adminis-
tered in accordance with Article 22 of the Covenant: of the League of Nations; and
Whereas Japan, as a result of the Second World War, has ceased to exercise any
authority in these islands;
Now therefore, the Security Council of the United Nations, having satisfied
itself that the relevant Articles of the Charter have been complied with, hereby
resolves to approve the following ternis of trusteeship for the Pacific islands
formerly under mandate to Japan.
ARTICLE 1. The territory of the Pacific islands, consisting of the islands
formerly held by Japan under mandate in accordance with Article 22 of the Covenant
of the League of Nations, is hereby designated as a strategic area and placed under
the trusteeship system established in the Charter of the United Nations. The
territory of the Pacific islands is hereinafter referred to as the Trust Territory.
ARTICLE 2. The United States of America is designated as the Administering
Authority of the Trust Territory.
ARTICLE 3. The Administering Authority shall have full powers of administra-
tion, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory subject to the provisions
of this Agreement [as an integral part of the United States], and may anniy to the
Trust Territory, subject to any modifications which the Administering Authority
may consider desirable, such of the laws of the United States as it may deem appro-
priate to local conditions and requirements.
ARTICLE 4. The Administering Authority, in discharging the obligations of
trusteeship in the Trust Territory, shall act in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations and the provisions of this Agreement, and shall, as specified
in Article U3, paragraph 2, of the Charter, aorly the objectives of the interna-
tional trusteeship system, as set forth in Article 76 of the Charter, to the
people of the Trust Territory.
ARTICLE 5. In discharging its obligations unJ-.^r Article 76a and Article 84 o r
the Charter, the Administering Authority shall ens :re that the Trust Territory
shall olav its part, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in the
maintenance of international peace and security. To this end the Administering





1. To establish naval, military and air bases and to erect fortifications
in the Trust Territory;
2. To station and employ armed forces in the Territory; and
3. To make use of volunteer forces, facilities and assistance from the Trust
Territory in carrying out the obligations towards the Security Council undertaken
in this regard by the Administering Authority, as well as for the local defence
and the maintenance of law and order within the Trust Territory.
ARTICLE 6. In discharging its obligations under Article 76b of the Charter,
the Administering Authority shall:
1. Foster the development of such political institutions as are suited to the
Trust Territory, and shall promote the development of the inhabitants of the Trust
Territory towards self-government or independence
, as may be appropriate to the
particular circumstances of the Trust Territory and its peoples and the freely ex -
pressed wishes of the peonies concerned; and to this end shall give to the inhab?.-
tsnts of the Trust Territory a progressively increasing share in the administrative
services in the Territory; shall develon their participation in [local] government;
shall give due recognition to the customs of the inhabitants in providing a system
of law for the Territory; and shall take other appropriate measures towards these
ends;
2. Promote the economic advancement and self-sufficiency of the inhabitants,
and to this end shall regulate the use of natural resources; encourage the develop-
ment, of fisheries, agriculture, and industries; protect the inhabitants against the
loss of their lands and resources; and improve the means of transportation and
communication;
3. Promote the social advancement of the inhabitants, and to this end shall
protect the rights and fundamental freedoms of all elements of the population with-
out discrimination; r>rotect the health of the inhabitants; control the traffic in
'arm:; and ammunition, onium and other dangerous drugs, and alcohol and other spiri-
tuous beverages; and institute such other regulations as may be necessary to pro-
tect the inhabitants against social abuses; and
4. Promote the educational advancement of the inhabitants, and to this end
sha?.] take steps toward the establishment of a general system of elementary educa-
tion; facilitate the vocational and cultural advancement of the population; and
shall encourage oualified students to pursue higher education, including training
on the -professional level.
A3TICLE-7. [In discharging its obligations under Article 76c of the Charter v
the Administering Authority, subject only to the requirements of public order and
security, shall guarantee to the inhabitants of the Trust Territory freedom of
speech, of the press, and of assembly; freedom of conscience, of worship, and of
religious teaching; and freedom of migration and movement.]
In dis charging its obligations under Articl e 76c f the Charter, the Adminis -
tering authority shall guarantee t" the inhabitants p- the Trust Territ ory freedom
c i~^r<:nscl cnee, and, iub ject only t< > the require) ien t j__. f public order an d_ security
.
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ARTICLE 3.-1. In discharging its obligations under Article 76d of tlie Charter,
as defined by Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Charter, the Administering Authority,
subject to the requirements of security and the obligation to promote the advance-
ment of the inhabitants, shall accord to nationals of each .fember of the United
Nations and to companies and associations organized in conformity with the laws
of such iembers, treatment in the Trust Territory no less favourable than that
accorded therein to nationals, conpanies and associations of any other United
Nation except the Administering Authority.
2. The Administering Authority shall ensure equal treatment to the Members
of the United Nations and their nationals in the administration of justice.
3. Nothing in this article shall be so construed as to accord traffic rights
to aircraft flying into and out of the Trust Territory. Such rights shall be
subject to agreement between the Administering Authority and the State whose
nationality such aircraft possesses.
4. The Administering Authority may negotiate and conclude commercial and
other treaties and agreements with 'Iembers of the United Nations and other States,
designed to attain for the inhabitants of the Trust Territory treatment by the
tlembers of the United Nations and other States no less favourable than that granted
by them to the nationals of other States. The Security Council may recommend, or
invite other organs of the United Nations to consider and recommend, what rights
the inhabitants of the Trust Territory should acciuire in consideration of the
rights obtained by Members of the United Nations in the Trust Territory.
ARTICLE 9. The Administering Authority shall be entitled to constitute the
Trust Territory into a customs, fiscal, or administrative union or federation with
other territories under United States jurisdiction and to establish common services
between such territories and the Trust Territory where such measures are not in-
consistent with the basic objective^ of the international trusteeship system and
with the terms of this agreement.
ARTICLE 10. The Administering Authority, acting under the provisions of Arti-
cle 3 of this Agreement, may accent membership in any regional advisory commission,
regional authority, or technical organization, or other voluntary association of
States, may co-onerate with specialized international bodies, public or private,
and may engage in other forms of international co-operation.
ARTICLE 11. -1. The Administering Authority shall take the necessary steps to
provide the status of citizenship of the Trust Territory for the inhabitants of
the Trust Territory.
2. The Administering Authority shall afford diplomatic and consular protec-
tion to inhabitants of the Trust Territory when outside the territorial limits
of the Trust Territory or of the Territory of the Administering Authority.
ARTICLE 12. The Administering Authority shall enact such legislation as may be






ARTICLE 13. The provisions of Articles 07 and 33 of the Charter shall be
applicable to the Trust Territory, provided that the Administering Authority nay
determine the extent of their applicability to any areas which may from time to
time be specified by it as closed for security reasons.
ARTICLE 14. The Administering Authority undertakes to apply in the Trust
Territory the provisions of any international conventions and recommendations
which may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of the Trust Territory
and which would be conducive to the achievement of the basic objectives of article
6 of this agreement.
ARTICLE 15 r The terms of the nresent Agreement shall not be altered, amended
or terminated without the consent of the Administering Authority.
ARTICLE 16. The nresent Agreement shall come into force when approved by the
Security Council of the United Nations and by the Government of the United States





Adam, Thomas R., Western Interests in the Pacific Realm (New
York* Random House, Inc., 1967).
Albion, Robert Greenhalgh and Robert Howe Connery, Forrestal
and the Navy (New York* Columbia University Press, 1962).
Ambler, John Steward, Soldiers Against the State : The French
Army in Politics (.Garden City, New York: Doubleday and
Company, Inc., 1968).




, The Record of American Diplomacy:
Documents and Readings in the H istory of American Foreign
Relations (4th ed., New Yorkt Alfred A. Knopf, 1964 J7~
Bentwich, Norman and Andrew Martin, A Commentary on the Charter
of the United Nations (London* Routledge and Kegan Paul,
Ltd., 1950).
Braisted, William Reynolds, The United States Navy in the
Pacific. 1897-1909 (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1958).
Brookes, Jean Ingram, International Rivalry in the Pacific
Islands. 1800-1875 (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1941).
Brown, J. Macmillan, Peoples and Problems of the Pacific
(2 vols., London: T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd., 1927).
Burns, James MacGregor, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1956).
Byrnes, James F., All In One Lifetime (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1958).
Byrnes, James F. , Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1947).
Campbell, John C, and others, The United States in World
Affairs 1945-1947 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947).
Caraley, Demetrios, The Politics of Military Unification:
A Study of Conflict and the Policy Process (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1966).
Cheever, Daniel S. and H. Field Haviland, Jr., Organizing
For Peace: International Organization In World Affairs




Churchill, Winston S., The Second World War (6 vols., Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948-1953)
.
Claude, Inis L., Swords Into Plowshares : The Problems and
Progress of International Organization (3rd. ed. t Rev .
,
* New York* Random House, 1964).
Cline, Ray S, t Washington Command Postt The Operations Division
(Washington! Office of the Chief of Military History,
Department of the Army, 1951).
Clyde, Paul H., Japan's Pacific Mandate (New York: The Mac-
millan Company, 1935).
Coles, Harry L. and Albert K. Weinberg, Civil Affairs:
Soldiers Become Governors (Washington: Office of the Chief
of Military History, Department of the Army, 1964),
Coles, Harry L., ed., Total War and Cold War: Problems in
Civilian Control of the Military (Columbus, Ohio: State
University Press, 1962).
Daniel, Hawthorne, Islands of the Pacific (New York: G. P.
Putnam f s Sons, 1943).
Davis, Vincent, Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy.
1943-1946 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1966).
Dulles, Foster Rhea, America in the Pacific: A Century of
Expansion (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Com-
pany, 1932),
Eccles, Marriner S., Beckoning Frontiers (New York: Knopf,
1951),
Eden, Anthony, The Reckoning, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1965),
Ekirch, Arthur E., The Civilian and the Military (New York:
Oxford, 1956).
Emerson, Rupert, From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-
Assertion of Asian and African Peoples (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1960).
Freidel, Frank Burt, Franklin D. Roosevelt (3 vols,, Boston:
Little, Brown, 1952-1956"J7~
Furer, Julius Augustus, RADM, U.S.N. (Ret.), Administration
of the Navy Department in World War I I (Washington: United
States Government Printing Office, 1959),
Galbraith, John Kenneth, How to Control the Military (Garden





Goldman, Eric, The Crucial Decade (New Yorki Knopf, 1956).
Gratten, C. Hartley, The Southwest Pacific S ince 1900: A
Modern History (Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University
Press, 1963).
»
Gratten, C. Hartley, The United States and The Southwest
Pacific (Cambridge, Massachusetts* Harvard University
Press, 1961).
Gray, Capt. J. A. C, MC, U.S.N. , Amerika Samoa: A History
of American Samoa and Its United States Naval Administra-
tion (Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute,
1960).
Grew, Joseph C. , Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty
Years. 1904-1945 (2 vols., Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1952).
Hammond, Paul Y., Organizing For Defense: The American Military
Establishment in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961).
Hammond , Paul Y
.
, The Secretaryships of War and the Navy: A
Study of Civilian Control of the Military (Ph.D. thesis
i
Harvard University, 1953).
Harley, J. Eugene, Documentary Textbook on the United Nations
(Los Angeles: Center for International Understanding, 1947).
Herring, Pendleton, The Impact of War (New York: Rinehart and
Company, Inc., 1941)
.
Hobbs, W. H. , Fortres s Islands of the Pacific (Ann Arbor,
Michigan: J. W. Edwards, 1945J7"
Holborn, Hajo, American Military Government:, Its Organization
and Policies (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947)
.
Holcombe, Arthur N., Dependent Areas in the Post -War World
(Boston* World Peace Foundation, 1941).
Howard, Michael, ed., Soldiers and Governments: Nine Studies
in Civil-Military Relations (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode,
195?)
.
Hull, Cordell, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (2 vols., New York:
Macraillian Co., 1948).
Huntington, Samuel P., ed., Changing Patterns of Military
Politics (New York* Free Press of Glencoe, 1962).
Huntington, Samuel P., The Soldier and The State: The Theory
and Politics of Civll-Militafy Relations (Cambridge, Massa-




Janowitz, Morris, The Professional Soldier* A Social and
Political Portrait (Glencoe, Illinois! Free Press of
Glencoe, I960;.
Kqrwin, Jerome Gregory, Civil-Military Re lationships in
American Life (Chicago! University of Chicago Press, 1948).
King, Ernest J. and Walter M. Whitehall, Fleet Admiral King.
A Naval Record (New York* Norton, 1952).
Kohn, Hans, The Idea of Nationalism (New York* Collier Books,
1944)
.
Lansing, Robert, The Peace Negotiations (Boston* Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1921).
Leahy, William, I Was There* The Personal Story of the Chief
of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His
Notes and Diarie s Made at the Time " (New York* McGraw-Hi1 1
,
1950)
Leeson, Ida, ed., A Bibliography o f Bibliographies of the
South Pacific (London and New York* Oxford University
Press, 1954),
Leff, David N. f Uncle Sam 's Pacific Islets (Stanford, California*
Stanford University Press, 1940)
,
Leonard, L. Larry, International Organization (New York*
McQraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1951).
Lippmann, Walter, U. S. War Arms (Boston* Little, Brown and
Company, 1944).
MacMahon, Arthur W. , Administration in Foreign Affairs (Univer-
sity, Alabama* University of Alabama Press, 1953).
Macmillan, Harold, The Blast of War . 1939-1945 (London*
Macmillan, 1967).
Matloff , Maurice and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for
Coalition Warfare (Washington: Office of the Chief of
Military History, Department of the Army, 1953).
McCamy, James L. , The Administration of Foreign Affairs (New
York* Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., l"950)
.
Mclntire, VAdm. Ross T., White House Physician (New York*
G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1946).
Miller, David Hunter, The Drafting of the Covenant (2 vols.,
New York* G. P. Putnam's Sons, 192*8).

190
Millis, Walter, American Military Thought ( Indianapolis
t
Bobbs-Merrill, 1966).
Millis, Walter, Arms and Mem A Study In American Military
History (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956).
Millis, Walter, Harvey C. Mansfield, and Harold Stein, Arms
and the State : Civil-Military Elements in National
Policy (New Yorki Twentieth Century Fund, 1958).
Millis, Walter, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The
Viking Press, 1951).
Morris, Max K«, Political-Military Coordination in the United
States Armed Forces (Ph.D. thesis, Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy, Medford, Massachusetts, 1967).
Neustadt, Richard E., Presidential Power : The Politics of
Leadership (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960).
Notter, Harley, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation. 1939-
1945 (Washington* United States Government Printing
Office, 1949).
Peltason, Jack W. and James M. Burns, ed., Functions and
Policies of American Government i Big Democracy in Action
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1958)
.
Perkins, Dexter, The New Age of Franklin Roosevelt. 1932-
1945 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957).
Perkins, Whitney T., Denial of Empire: The United States
and Its Dependencies (Leyden, The Netherlands: A. W.
Sythoff, 1962).
Pogue, Forrest C., George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope.
1939-1942 (New York: The Viking Press, 1966).
Pomeroy, Earl S. , Pacific Outpost: American Strategy in Guam
and Micronesia (Stanford, California: Stanford University
Press, 1951).
Pratt, Julius William, America's Colonial Experiment (New
York: Prentice Hall, 1950).
Price, Willard, America's Paradise Lost (New York: The John
Day Company, 1966).
Range, Willard, Franklin D. Roosevelt's World Order (Athens,
Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1959)
.
Richard, Cdr. Dorothy E., USNR, United States Naval Admin-
istration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands




Roberts, Stephen H. t Population Problems of the Pacific
(London: George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1927).
Roosevelt, Elliott, As He Saw It (New York: Duell, Sloan
and Pearce, 1946)
.
Roosevelt, Elliott, ed., F.D.R. His Personal Letters 1928-
1945 (2 vols., New York* Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950).
Root, Elihu, The Military and Colonial Policy of the United
States (2 vols., Cambridge, Harvard, 1916).
Rosenman, Samuel I., The Public Papers and Addresses of
Franklin D. Roosevelt (9 vols., New Yorkt Random House,
1938).
Rosenman, Samuel I., Working; With Roosevelt (New York:
Harper, 1952).
^
Russell, Ruth and Jeanette Muther, A History of the United
Nations Charter: The Role of the United States 1940-
1945 (Washington: The Brookings Institution, October,
1958)
.
Sapin, Burton M., The Making of United States Foreign Policy
(Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1966)
•
Sapin, Burton M. and Richard C. Snyder, The Role of the
Military in American Foreign Policy ^Garden City, New
York: Doubleday, 1954).
Schlesinger, Arthur Meier, The Age of Roosevelt (3 vols.,
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957).
Scott, Andrew M. and Raymond H. Dawson, Readings in the
Making of American Foreign Policy (New York: The Mac-
millan Company, 1965).
Sherwood, Robert E,, Roosevelt and Hopkins? An Intimate
History (New York: Harper, 1948).
Smith, Gaddis, American Diplomacy During the Second World
"ar, 1941-1945 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.,
196777
Smith, Louis, American Democracy and Military Power: A
Study of Civil Control of the Military Power in the
United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1951). ~
Snell, John L., Illusion and Necessity: The Diplomacy of
Global War. 1939-1945 " (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963).

192
Snyder, Richard C, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, Foreign
Policy Decision-Makingi An Approach to the Study of
international Politics (New York: The Free Press of
,
Glencoe, 1962).
Social Science Research Council, Committee on Civil-Military
Relations Research, Civil-Military Relations; An Annotated




Stein, Harold, ed., American Civil-Military
Book of Case Studies (University. Alabama:
of Alabama Press, 1963).
Stettinius, Edward R., FDR and the Russians! The Yalta
Conference (Garden City, New Yorki Doubleday, 1949).
Stewart, William James, The Era of Franklin D. Roosevelt.
A Selected Bibliography of Periodical and Dissertation
Literature. 194~*5-1966 (Hyde Park. New York! Genera 1
Services Administration, National Archives and Records
Service, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, 1967).
Stimson, Henry L. and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in
Peace and War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948).
Stouffer, Samuel A., The American Soldier (2 vols., Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1949).
Tansill, William R., The Concept of Civil Supremacy Over the
Military in the United States; Its History and Practice
{Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service,
Public Affairs Bulletin No. 94, Washington, 1951).
The Brookings Institution, The Administration of Foreign
Affairs and Overseas Operations (Washington! June, 1951),
Thullen, George, Problems of the Trusteeship System; A Study
of Political Behavior in the United Nations (Geneva:
Droz, 1964).
Tocqueville, Alexis de., Democracy in America (New York;
The New American Library, Inc. , 195"6~)
.
Toussaint, Chairman Edwards, The Trusteeship System of The
.United Nations (New York; Frederick A. Praeger, 1956).
Truman, Harry S. t Memoirs (2 vols., Garden City, New York;
Doubleday, 1955).
Trumbull, Robert, Paradis e In Trust i A Report on Americans





Tucker, Gordon B,, ed. t A History of Military Affairs in
Western Society Since the Eighteenth Century (Lithoprint,
Ann Arbor t Edwards Bros,, Inc., 1952).
Tudor, Judy, ed. , Pacific Islands Yearbook and Who's Who
(10th ed., Sydney, Australiai Pacific Publications, Ltd.,
1963).
Tuleja, Thaddeus V., Statesmen and Admirals: Quest For a Far
Eastern Naval Policy (New Yorkt W. W. Norton and Company,
Inc., 1963).
Vagts, Alfred, A History of Militarism . Rev. ed. (New York*
Meridan, 1959^
Vandenberg, Arthur H., Jr., ed,, The Private Papers of Senator
Vandenberg (Bostoni Houghton Mifflin, 1952).
Wainhouse, David W., Remnants of Empire: The United Nations
and the End of Colonialism (New Yorki Harper and Row,
Inc., 1964).
Wann, A. J., The President as Chief Administrator: A Study
of Franklin D. Roosevelt (Washington: Public Affairs
Press, 1968).
Welles, Sumner, Seven Decisions that Shaped History (New
York: Harper and Brothers, 1950).
Welles, Sumner, The Time for Decision (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1944).
Westerfield, H. Bradford, The Instruments of America's
Foreign Policy (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1963).
Wiens, Herold J., Pacific Island Bastions of the United States
(Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1962).
Williams, T. Harry, Americans at War: The Development of the
American Military System (New York: Collier Books, 1962).
Wilmot, Chester, The Struggle for Europe (New York: Harper,
1952).
Wittmer, Felix, The Yalta Betrayal; Data on the Decline and
Fall of _Franklin Delano Roosevelt (Caldwell, Idaho:
Caxton Printers, 1953).
Wood, Gordon L. and Patricia McBride, The Pacific Basin
(Melbourne, Australia: Oxford University Press, 1955).
Woodward, Sir Llewellyn, British Foreign Policy in the Second




Wright, Quincy, Mandates Under the League of Nations (Chicago
i
University of Chicago Press, 1930)
.
Yanaihara, Tadao, Pacific Island s Under Japanese Mandate
(London and New York* Oxford University Press, 1940).

JOURNALISTIC ARTICLES
Army and Navy Journal . Vol. 82 (April 7, 1945).
Arnold, E. G., "Self-Government in U. S. Territories,
"
Foreign Affairs . Vol. 125, No. 4 (July, 1947;,
Baldwin, Hanson W., MThe Military Move In," Harper's
Magazine . CXCV (December, 1947), pp. 481-489.
Bedell, Jane, "In Trust We Annex,** New Republic . Vol. 116,
No. 11 (March 17, 1947).
Blakeslee, George H. t "Japan's Mandated Islands," U. S.
Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 11, No. 286 S
(December 17, 1944).
Buffum, Richard A., "Japanese Mandated Islands," The New
York Times (letter to the Editor), November 18, 1946.
Clarkson, R. and S. Kling, "Should We Retain Our Pacific
Bases," Forum . (January, 1947).
Collier, John, "The Trusteeship Council," The New York Times
(letter to the Editor), November 13, 1946.
Collier, John, "Trusteeship," The New York Times (letter to
the Editor), November 7, 1946.
Corbett, Percy E., "The Dumbarton Oaks Plan," Yale Institute
of International Studies . Memorandum No. 13 (November 25,
1944)
.
Douglas, William 0., "Should We Fear the Military?" Look .
XVI, No. 6 (March 11, 1952), p. 34.
Embree, John F., "Micronesia; the Navy and Democracy," Far
Eastern Survey . Vol. 15, No. 11 (June 5, 1946).
Field, Harry H. , "American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,"
Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations
.
American Council Paper No. 8, January, 1945,
Fifield, R. H,, "Disposal of the Carolines, Marshalls and
Marianas at the Paris Peace Conference," American
Historical Review, April, 1946, Vol, 51, No. 3.
Fox, Annette Baker, "The Disposition of Enemy Dependent Areas,"





Fox, William T. R. f "Civil-Military Relations Research!
The SSRC Committee and Its Research Survey , " World
Politics
. VI (January, 1954), pp. 278-288.
Gilchrist, Huntington, "Japanese Islands* Annexation or
Trusteeship," Foreign Affai rs. Vol. 22, No. 4 (July, 1944).
Gross, Leo, "United Nations Trusteeship and League of Nations
Mandate Systems," India Quarterly. Vol. IV, No. 3 (July-
September, 1948), pp. 224-240.
Hitch, T. K. , "Administration of America's Pacific Islands,"
Political Science Quarterly . September, 1946.
Hoopes, Townsend, "Civilian-Military Balance," Yale Review
.
XLII (Winter, 1954).
Ickes, Harold L., "The Navy at Its Worst," Collier's .
Vol. 118, (August 31, 1946).
Jacobson, Harold Karen, "Out •Colonial 1 Problem in the
Pacific," Foreign Affairs . Vol. 39, No. 1 (October,
1960)
.
Katzenbach, E. L., Jr., "Should Our Military Leaders Speak
Up?" New York Times Magazine . April 15, 1956, pp. 17 ff.
Lippraann, Walter, column, Washington Post . December 2, 1952.
Marquand, John P., "Inquiry Into the Military Mind," The New
York Times Magazine . March 30, 1952, p. 53.
Marquand, John P., "The U. S. Military Mind," Fortune . XLV
(February, 1952), pp. 91 ff.
Masland, John W., "Group Interests in Post-War American
Pacific Policy," Ninth Conference of the Institute of
Pacific Relations . American Council Paper No. 6,
January, 1945,
May, E. R. , "The Development of Political-Military Consul-
tation in the United States," Political Science Quarterly
LXX (June, 1955), pp. 161-180.
McCloy, John J., "In Defense of the Army Mind," Harper's
Magazine . CXCIV (April, 1947), pp. 341-344.
McKay, Vernon, "International Trusteeship - Role of United
Nations in the Colonial World," Foreign Policy Report .
Vol. 22, No. 5 (May 15, 1946).
Middleton, Drew, "The Enigma Called 'The Military Mind,'"
The New York Times Magazine . April 18, 1948, pp. 13 ff.

197
News Letter of the Institute of Ethnic Affairs. Inc. .
Vol. 1, No. 5 (November, 1946).
Okumiya, Lt. Gen. Masatake, JASDF (Ret.), "For Sugar Boats
or Submarines , " U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
.
Vol. 94, No. 8 (August 9, 1968).
Olch, Cdr. Isaiah, "National and Naval Policy," U. S. Naval
Institute Proceed inp-.s . LXIX (July, 1943), pp. 925-932.
"Pacific Isles Under U. S. --They* re In Bad Shape," U. S. News
and World Report . November 21, 1966.
Perkins, James A., "Administration of the National Security
Program," Public Administration Review . XII (Spring,
1953), pp. 80-86.
Potter, Pitman, "Origin of the System of Mandates Under the
League of Nations," American Political Science Review ,
Vol. XVI (1922), pp."363^8T;
Price, Don K., "Notes from the War Memoirs," Public Adminis-
tration Review . X (1950), pp. 197-207,
Quigg, Philip W., "Coming of Age In Micronesia," Foreign
Affairs . Vol. 47, No. 3 (April, 1969).
Robbins, Robert R., "United States Trusteeship for the
Territory of the Pacific Islands," U. S. Department of
State Bulletin . Vol. 16 (May 4, 1947).
Rogers, Lindsay, "Civilian Control of Military Policy,"
Foreign Affairs . XVIII (January, 1940), pp. 280-291.
Rogers, Lindsay, "Our Brass-Bound Foreign Policy,"
The Reporter . VII (October 28, 1952), pp. 14-16.
Roosevelt, Franklin D,, "Out Foreign Policy: A Democratic
View," Foreign Affairs . VI, No. 4 (July, 1928), pp. 573-
586.
Schlesinger, Arthur M. , Jr., "Generals in Politics,"
The Reporter . VI, No, 7 (April 1, 1952), pp. 33-36.
Schlesinger, Arthur M. , Jr., "Military Force: How Much and
Where?," The Reporter. IX (August 4, 1953), p. 13.
Skinner, Carlton, "Self-Government in the South Pacific,"
Foreign Affairs , Vol. 42 (October, 1963).
Smith-Hutton, Cdr. H. H., "Post-War Problems and the Navy,"




Sprout, Harold, "Trends in the Traditional Relation between
Military and Civilian," Proceedings of the American
Philosophical Society
.
XCII, No. 4 (October, 1948J7
pp. 264-270.
Sulzberger, C. L., " •Military Mind 1 Weighed as Political
Question," The New York Times News of the Week in
Review . June 1, 1952.
Sunderland, 1st Lt. R. t "The Soldier's Relation to Foreign
Policy , " United States Naval Institute Proceedings
,
LXIX (September, 1943), pp. 1170-1175.
The Baltimore Sun , editorial, November 5, 1946.
The Baltimore Sun , nei^s article by Gerald Griffin, "Civil
Regime Favored for Former Jap Isles," January 11, 1947.
The Christian Science Monitor , news article by Roland
Sawyer, "U. S. Takes Over in Pacific," December 2, 1946.
The Christian Science Monitor , news article by Roland
Sawyer, "Pacific Military Government Challenges Navy,"
December 4, 1946.
The New York Herald Tribune , editorial, November 15, 1946.
The New York Herald Tribune . January 18, 1946.
The New York Times . October 27, 1942; November 7, 1942
i
June 28, 1944; April 3, 1945; April 5, 1945; April 20,
1945; April 24, 1945; May 4, 1945; May 8, 1945;
January 17, 1946; January 31, 1946; September 24,
1946; March 20, 1966.
The New York Times , news article by Tillman Durdin, "Pacific
Islanders Chafe at Control," July 13, 1965.
The New York Times , news article by A. M. Rosenthal, "U. S.
Gives Hope to Pacific Isles," February 12, 1962.
The New York Times , news article by Robert Trumbull, "Micro
-
nesiai 2,141 Islands Forgotten by U. S.," October 30,
1967.
The New York Times , news article by Robert Trumbull, "Tie
To U. S. Favored In Pacific Islands," November 5, 1967.
The New York Times Magazine , article by Robert Trumbull,
"Swing Around Our Pacific Empire," May 19, 1946.
The Statesman . Boise, Idaho, editorial, November 8, 1946.

199
"The United States and the International Trusteeship System,"
Commission To Study the Organization of Peace , September,
1945.
The United States News . Vol. 18 (May 11, 1945).
The Washington Star . April 24, 1945.
Weigert, Hans W, , M U. S. Strategic Bases and Collective
Security,- Foreign Affairs . Vol. 25 (1947).
Weil, C. A., "An American Way of Peace or War," U. S. Naval
Institute Proceedings . LXIX (May, 1943), pp. 674-694.
Wolfers, Arnold, "Conflict and Compromise at San Francisco,"
Yale Institute of International Studies . Memorandum
No. 16 (April 24, 194b).

DOCUMENTS
Chapman, Oscar L., Personal Papers . U. S. National Archives,
RG48.
>
Comraager, Henry Steele, ed., Documents of American History
(New York i Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1948).
Congress of Micronesia, Congress of Micronesia Manual (Capital
Hill, Saipan, Mariana Islands, 1965)
.
Congress of Micronesia, Interim Report From The Future Poli-
tical Status Commission . July 8, 1968)
.
Eberstadt, Ferdinand, Unification of the War and Navy Depart-
ments and Postwar Organization for National Security .
Report to the Honorable James Forrestal, Secretary of
the Navy, October 22, 1945, 79th Cong., 1st sess.,
Committee print, Senate Committee on Naval Affairs
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office,
1945).
Elliot, Johnathan, ed., The Debates [of 1787-88] in the
Several State Conventions, on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution (Washington: Printed by and for the editor,
1836).
Fitzpatrick, John C, ed., The Writings of George Washington
from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799 (10 vols.
,
Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1931-1944).
King, Fleet Admiral Ernest J., Personal Papers. U. S. Naval
Classified Archives Office, Naval History Division, Navy
Department, Washington, D. C, Speech to Aircraft Club,
Detroit, Michigan, December 6, 1946.
Knox, Frank, Personal Papers . Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
Krug, Julius A., Personal Papers. Library of Congress, Washington,
D. C, Transcript of telephone call from Krug to Girard
Davidson, May 16, 1947.
Leahy, Fleet Admiral William, Unpublished Diary . Library of
Congress, D. C, Vol. 12, June 28, 1946 and October 22,
1946.
Leahy, Fleet Admiral William, Personal Papers . U. S. Naval
Classified Archives Office, Naval History Division, Naval
Department, Washington, D. C.





Melniker, Harvey David, .Questionnaire Concerning The Future
Political Status of The Trust Territory of The Pacific
Islands (Medford, Massachusetts! Department of Political
Science, Tufts University, 1968).
»
Nathan, Robert R., and others, Economic Development Plan
For Micronesia: A Proposed Long-Range Plan for Develop-
ing the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (4 parts
,
Washington: Robert R. - Nathan Associates , Inc., 1966).
National Security Act of 1947 ( Public Law 253 , 80th Cong.,
1st sess., July 26, 1947).
National Security Act Amendments of 1949 ( Public Law 216 ,
8lst Cong., 1st sess., August 10, 1949).
National Security Organization . Report of the Task Force,
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government (Hoover Commission), January, 1949.
Piatt, William J., Philip H. Sorensen, and others, Planning;
For Education and Manpower In Micronesia (Menlo Park,
California: Stanford Research Institute, 1957).
Security in the Pacific: A Preliminary Report of the Ninth
Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations (New
York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1945),
Truman Library, Abe Fortas to President, September 28, 1945,
Official File, 85-L.
Truman Library, Ickes to President, October 18, 1945,
Official File, 85-L.
Truman Library, James F. Byrnes to President, January 5,
1946, Official File, 85-L.
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Annual Report, July 1,
1965-June 30, 1966, to the United Nations Trusteeship
Council, United States Department of State Publication
.8205 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1966).
United Nations Conference On International Organization,
Documents (21 vols., New York: United Nations Informa-
tion Organizations, 1945).
United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 8, No. 123, Trusteeship
Agreement for The Former Japanese Mandated Island s
,
Approved by the Security Council on April 2, 1947.
United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Documents T/PET.
1
0/5,
June 12, 1950; T/PET. 10/31 . November 5. 1959; T"7Pv.1204 .
May 29, 1963; T/PV.1205 . May 31, 1963; T/PET. 10/L.,4,
July 31, 1963; T/PET .10/L..6, March 19, 1964; T/PET. 10/L.9 .
September 29, 1964; T/PElTTO/L. 10, October 25, 1965;




United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Report of The United
Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands, 1964, Document T/1620 . May 18, 1964.
United Nations, Trusteeship Council, Report of Visiting
» Mission to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,
1967, Document T/1658 and Add. 1.
U. S., Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs , Reports On Pacific Affairs .
1965 (Washington! U. S. Government Printing Office, 1965).
U. S., Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee of
the Committee on Appropriations, Hearings. Military
establishment appropriation bill for 1948 . 80th Cong.,
1st sess., 1947.
U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Hearings. The Charter of the United Nations . 79th Cong.,
1st sess., 1945.
U. S., Congress, Senate, Committees on Foreign Relations and
Armed Services, Hearings on Military Situation in the Far
East . 82nd Cong., 1st sess., May 3-August 17, 1951,
5 parts.
U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Hearings on Japanese Peace Treaty and Other Treaties
Relating to Security in the Pacific . 82nd Cong., 2nd
sess. 1952.
U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Staff Study No. 9, The United Nations And Dependent
Territories . Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter,
84th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1955).
U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Naval Affairs, Hearings
on S.2044 [National Security bill], April, May, July,
1946, 79th Cong., 2nd sess., 1946,
U. S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriations, Hearings . Military establishment appro-
priation bill for 1947 . 79th Cong., 2nd sess,, 1946.
U. S., Congressional Record . 78th Cong., 2nd sess,, August 15,
1944.
U. S., Congressional Record . 78th Cong,, 2nd sess., August 18,
1944,
U, S,, Congressional Record . 79th Cong., 1st sess., April 9,
1945.
U. S., Congressional Record . 80th Cong., 1st sess., June 19,
1947; July 9, 1947.

203
U. S., Congressional Record
. 8lst Cong., 2nd sess., Septem-
ber 15, 1950.
U. S., Congressional Record Appendix . 79th Cong., 1st sess,,
pp. A1660 and A1706.
U. S., Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 232 (Decem-
ber 4, 1943), Cairo Declaration.
U. S., Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 13, No. 310 (June 3,
1945) Secretary of State speech of May 29, 1945.
U. S., Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 13, No. 318 (July 29,
1945), Potsdam Declaration.
U. S., Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 13, No. 320 (August 12,
1945), President's broadcast August 9, 1945.
U. S., Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 13 (November 11, 1945).
U. S., Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 14, No. 343,
(January 27, 1946).
U. S., Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 14, No. 344,
(February 3, 1946).
U. S., Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 15, (November 17,
1946).
U. S., Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 50, (June 29, 1964),
Statement by Mr. Tomas Remengesau to the United Nations
Trusteeship Council, May 28, 1964.
U. S., Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 53, (August 16,
1965), Statement by Mr. Barley Olter, Representative,
Congress of Micronesia, before the United Nations Trustee-
ship Council, May 28, 1965.
U. S., Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 55, (September 12,
1966), Statement by Mr, Francis Nuuan, Representative,
Congress of Micronesia, before the United Nations
Trusteeship Council, June 27, 1966.
U. S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 57, (September 18,
1967), Statement by Mr. Lazarus Salii, Representative,
Congress of Micronesia, to the United Nations Trusteeship
Council, June 8, 1967.
U. S,, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 57, (September 18,
1967), Presidential Letter to Congress with Text of Pro-
posed Joint Resolution Concerning Future of Pacific
Islands Trust Territory, August 21, 1967.

204
U. S., Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 59, (August 26,
1968), Statement of High Commissioner William R. Norwood
to the United Nations Trusteeship Council, May 27, 1968.
U. S., Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 59, (August 26,
1968), Statement of Mr. Jacob Sawaichi, Representative,
Congress of Micronesia, to the United Nations Trustee-
ship Council, May 27, 1968.
U. S., Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 59, (August 26,
1968), Statement of High Commissioner, Mr. William R.
Norwood, before the United Nations Trusteeship Council,
June 5, 1968.
•
U. S., Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 61 (September 8,
1969), Statements by Ambassador Christopher H. Phillips,
June 6 and 13, 1969.
U. S., Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 61 (September 8,
1969), Statements by Mr. Edward E. Johnston, High
Commissioner, June 6 and 13, 1969.
U. S., Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 61 (September 8,
1969), Statements by Senator Olympio Borja, Congress of
Micronesia, June 6 and 13, 1969.
U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United
States? Diplomatic Papers? The Conferences at Malta and
Yalta . Department of State Publication 6199 (Washington*
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955).
U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United
States. Diplomatic Papers 1942 (6 vols.. Washington?
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1960-1963).
U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United
States. Diplomatic Papers 1943 (6 vols., Washington?
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1963-1965).
U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United
States. Diplomatic Papers 1944 (7 vols., Washington?
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1966-1967).
U. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United
States. Diplomatic Papers 1945 (8 vols., Washington?
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967-1969).
U. S., Department of State, Historical Office, Bureau of
Public Affairs, Record of Uni ted States Pol icy Toward
Annexation of Pacific Islands. 1789-1930. Research
Project No. 456 . January, 1961.
U. S., Department of State, Peace and War? United States






Department of State, Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands t July 1. 1967 to June 30. 1968. 21st Annual
Report to the United Nations (Washington t U. S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1968).
U.'S., Department of the Interior, Trust Territory of the
Pacific I slands; 1968 Annual Report to the Secretary of
.the Interior For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30 (Washing-
ton* U. S. Government Printing Office, 1968).
U» S., National Archives, U. S. Department of the Interior,
Office of Territories, RG 48 and 126.
U. S., National Archives, U. S. Department of State, RG 500,
800, 890, 894 (1940-1945) (Far Eastern Affairs, Post-
war planning, International Organization).
U. S., Naval Classified Archives Office, Secretary of the Navy
(SO A14-7/EF, General Board, CNO (SC) A14-7/EF, 0P-35,
OP- SOD, SWNCC 249 files.
U% S,, Naval Classified Archives Office, United States Depart-
ment of State, Background Information On The Japanese
Mandated Islands . No. DA- 107, November 18, 1946.
U. S«t Navy Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of
_the Navv for the fiscal year 1920
.
U» S. , Navy Department, Annual Reports of the Secretary of
me Navy. 1941-1947 .
U% 3,, Navy Department, U. S. Navy at War. 1941-194 5 t Off icial
Reports to the Secretary of the Navy by Fleet Admiral
Ernest J . King (Washington: U. S. Government Printing
Office, 1946).
U » S » * War Department , Annual Reports of the Secretary o f
War. 1941-1947 .
.United State s Foreign Policy for the 1970'st A New Strategy
jfor Peace . Presidential foreign-affairs message to
Congress, February 19, 1970 (Washington* United States
Government Printing Office, 1970).
United States Treaties and Other International Acts Series,
No. 664, Japanese-American Convention , ratified
February 11, 1922.
United States Treaties and Other International Acts Series,
ftfo. 1665. Trusteeship Agreement for The Former Japanese
Mandated Islands , signed April 2, 1947, U. S. Ratifi-
cation July 18, 1947.
War Reports of George C. Marshall. H. H. Arnold. Ernest J .




Blackburn, Robert R. , Jr., Desk Officer, Pacific Islands,
» United States State Department, Interview, March 21,
1969.
Dennison, Adm. Robert L. , U.S.N. (Ret.), Vice President,
Copley Newspapers, Interview, September 4, 1969.
Hickerson, Ambassador John D. , Interview, June 19, 1969.
Milner, George R., Acting Director, Office of Territories,







Abend, Hallett, Ramparts of the Pacific (Garden City, New Yorki
,
Doubleday, Doran, 1942J".
Bryant, Arthur, The Turn of the Tide, 1939- 1943 » A Study Based
on the Diaries and Autobiographical Notes of Field Marshall
The Viscount Alanbrooke ( London : Collins, T957)
.
Heinl, Robert Debs, Jr., Dictionary of Military and Naval Quo -
tations (Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute,
1966.
Huzar, Elias, The Purse and the Sword: Control of the Army by
Congress Through Military Appropriations, 1933-1950 (Ithaca
,
New York: Cornell University Press, 1950)
.
Jeffries, William W. , ed., Geography And National Power (4th ed.,
Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute, 1967).
MeHer, Norman, The Congress of Micronesia: Development of the
Legislative Process in the Trus t Territory of the Pacific
I slands (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1969).
JOURNALISTIC ARTICLES
Bergbauer, Cdr. Harry W. , Jr., USN, "A Review of the Political
Status of the Trust Territory of the Pacific," Naval War
College Review, Vol. 22, No. 7 (March, 1970).
Morgiewicz, Cdr. Daniel J., USN, "Micronesia Especial Trust,"
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings , Vol. 94, No. 10 (October,
1968).
Navy Times . March 11, 1970.
Robbins, Robert R., "United States Territories In Mid-Century,"
paper presented at the Conference on the History of the
Territories, National Archives and Research Service, Wash-
ington, D, C, November 3-4, 1969, unpublished.
The New York Times. April 13, 1945.
The New York Times , news article by Robert Trumbull, "Micronesians
Ask Loose Ties," May 7, 1969.
The New York Times, news article by Robert Trumbull, "Micronesians

























a case in American
pol i tico-iihi 1 i tary re-
lations.
thesW99
Micronesia and strategic trusteeship
3 2768 001 90682 9
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
